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3Abstract
The first chapter examines how an increase in statutory retirement ages affects in
the short-run firms’ labour demand for older workers on the cusp of retirement, their
co-workers and outsiders. By leveraging administrative data and a pension reform
that in 2011 suddenly and heterogeneously raised statutory retirement ages in Italy,
the paper finds effects on firing and hiring that are consistent with substitutability
among different types of workers. It also documents changes in the take-up of other
social insurance programs. This caused leakages on the revenues raised on a firm’s
employees by the reform.
The second chapter studies whether pension reforms affect labour supply before in-
dividuals come close to the retirement and benefit claiming decisions. By relying on
administrative data, the paper examines the labour supply dynamics of a sample of
Italian private-sector workers who were aged 35-45 in 1995, when a pension reform
changed the way of calculating their social security benefits. Workers are observed
until they reach ages between 46 and 56: during this period, at most small adjust-
ments to labour supply are documented. Heterogeneity analyses explore whether
the extent of the adjustments differs across socio-demographic groups.
The third chapter assesses the effects of a reform that substantially lengthened the
school day in Chilean publicly subsidized primary schools. By leveraging adminis-
trative data, the paper documents a positive effect on reading scores in fourth grade.
Achievement improves more for schoolchildren who enrolled in no-fee charter schools
than in public schools and there is a difference in how these schools adjusted the
teaching input; the former, which enjoy more autonomy, relied more than the latter
on hiring new classroom teachers and less on increasing working hours per teacher.
Albeit less robust, there is also suggestive evidence that positive effects are larger
for less advantaged pupils.
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Chapter 1
Labour substitutability and the impact of raising
the retirement age
1.1 Introduction
Substitutability among workers within the firm is crucial for the study of public
policies. When a fraction of workers are targeted by a policy that alters incentives
to work, spillovers on their co-workers may arise depending on whether the em-
ployer finds close substitutes or complements among incumbent employees. Labour
demand for outsiders can also be affected. These “hidden” micro-level effects have
welfare implications that are hard to detect when looking at targeted individuals.
Labour substitutability may exist along several worker’s characteristics: an example
is substitutability between age cohorts that can affect the incidence of Social Secu-
rity policies targeting older employees. In this paper, we propose a novel approach
that regards firms as active agents in the analysis of delayed retirement policies and
extends to other policies that lower the turnover of older workers.
Raising the retirement age provides older employees with incentives to postpone
retirement.1 A rich literature documents the positive effects of these reforms on old-
age labour supply (e.g., Mastrobuoni, 2009; Staubli and Zweimu¨ller, 2013).2 There
is, on the other hand, limited evidence on how firms adjust labour demand when
older employees work for longer than expected. Do firms change their hiring and
firing policies? Do labour demand adjustments affect earnings of incumbent employ-
ees? Do these changes uniformly affect all cohorts of workers or disproportionately
affect some of them? Answering these questions sheds light on the degree of sub-
stitutability among workers of different ages within the firm. The extent to which
1Many governments have passed reforms that increase the retirement age to cope with popu-
lation aging and its threat to the sustainability of Social Security systems. The US is following
such trends by committing to gradually adjust the full retirement age from 66 to 67 by 2022. The
Congressional Budget Office has suggested further raising the statutory age to 70 to help reduce
the budget deficit between 2017 and 2026 (Congressional Budget Office, 2016). Most European
countries have implemented similar measures since 2000 (Carone et al., 2016).
2Other papers on how public pension systems affect retirement behaviour are Behaghel and
Blau (2012), Cribb et al. (2016), Lalive et al. (2017), Manoli and Weber (2018), Fetter and Lock-
wood (2018) and Seibold (2019). This literature documents bunching in retirement at statutory
retirement ages and large responses of retirement choices to statutory retirement ages.
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older employees close to retirement, their co-workers, and outsiders are substitutes
has important implications for the effects of delayed retirement policies as well as
of other policies that similarly reduce the turnover of older workers. Therefore, it
is primarily important to assess firm responses to changes in the design of Social
Security. In addition, since revenues raised on a firm’s employees by an increase in
the statutory retirement age are a key component of welfare, it is crucial to examine
whether and how they are affected by labour substitutability within the firm.
To address these questions we exploit the quasi-experimental variation of a unique
pension reform implemented in Italy in 2011 - the Fornero reform - that caused sud-
den, substantial and heterogeneous changes in the full retirement age, i.e. the age at
which workers can claim full pension benefits.3 We link matched employer-employee
records for small and medium firms to novel records that track all contributions to
Social Security accumulated by their workers (more than 6 million individuals, over
one third of private employees in 2009). Leveraging this novel match of different
data sources, we can build firm-level measures of the reform-induced shock to the
retirement date of older employees and we can study whether it affects firms’ firing
and hiring decisions. Furthermore, we can observe the entire career of all workers
and their take-up of various social insurance programs.
We start by investigating whether and how employers change their demand for
labour in response to the reform. The results are informative about the degree of
substitutability between workers within and across age cohorts. We then document
how a higher full retirement age affects labour earnings and the take-up of social in-
surance programs of older employees and - due to labour substitutability within the
firm - of their co-workers. We conclude by discussing the implications of micro-level
substitutability for the revenues collected by the reform from a firm’s employees in
the short-run. To this end, we incorporate the demand-driven behavioural responses
into the estimation of the fiscal externality of the policy, i.e. the leakages on the
revenues that the government hopes to raise on a firm’s employees. We thus im-
prove upon the existing literature that focuses on the behavioural responses of older
workers. This exercise represents a first step to evaluating the importance of labour
substitutability and firms’ decisions for the analysis of Social Security policies.
Estimating labour demand responses to reforms that increase the full retirement
age poses two main identification challenges. First, most pension reforms are an-
ticipated. Confounding anticipation effects make it hard to isolate firms responses.
Second, the share of employees whose retirement date is delayed in the short-run,
which is an intuitive metric of the reform shock, depends on the workforce age dis-
tribution. Workers’ demographics vary across firms possibly due to differences in
3The full retirement age is intended throughout the paper as the age at which workers can
claim full pension benefits, as opposed to the early retirement age when a different - typically less
generous - rule for computing retirement benefits applies.
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labour demand trends and other unobservable, time-varying characteristics. Hence,
firms with a high concentration of younger workers, which are not affected much by
the reform, may not serve as credible controls.
The features of the 2011 Italian pension reform allow us to address both identifica-
tion issues. The reform was enacted by a newly appointed technocratic government
in December 2011 and entered into effect in January 2012, leaving limited room for
anticipatory effects. The new law raised the age and contribution requirements for
old-age and seniority pensions. The design of the policy generated heterogeneous
changes in the years until retirement eligibility across otherwise similar older work-
ers. Specifically, these changes depend on gender and on small differences in the
other two ingredients that determine eligibility, i.e. age and years of retirement
contributions. As a result, firms with a similar workforce composition experienced
differential shifts in the retirement date of employees who were expected to retire
soon.
We leverage this feature of the reform to address the endogeneity problem. We
restrict our attention to the subset of full-time workers on the cusp of retirement at
the time of the reform. We then construct a treatment that measures the average
firm-level shift in the full retirement date of these employees. The treatment is only
weakly related to the demographics of the firm’s workforce in the data; this is be-
cause it leverages small idiosyncratic differences across firms in the distribution of
age, years of contributions and gender within the narrow subset of employees on the
cusp of retirement. Neither does the treatment predict differences in labour demand
trends in the pre-reform period. Furthermore, it has a direct economic interpreta-
tion as a firm-level shift in the policy parameter, i.e. the retirement date of older
workers. For this reason, in the second part of the paper we use it to study the
short-run effect of raising the full retirement age on the revenues collected from a
firm’s employees. In the first part of the paper, to document substitutability be-
tween workers, we also use the treatment as an instrument to estimate how many
individuals are fired or hired when an additional senior employee delays retirement.
To conduct our analysis, we include the treatment into a difference-in-differences
model estimated over the period 2009-2015. In the first part of the paper, we com-
pare the labour demand of differentially treated firms before and after the reform.
We look at two main margins: layoffs of incumbent workers and external hiring. Our
results document that older employees on the cusp of retirement, their co-workers
and outsiders are substitutes. Indeed, a larger shift in the full retirement date of
older employees leads to more layoffs in the post-reform period. We show that de-
laying the retirement date of one additional senior worker causes 0.17 more layoffs,
44 per cent of the average number of layoffs in the pre-reform period. Layoffs do
not only involve older employees who were expected to retire soon. Young (aged 35
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or below), middle-aged (aged 36-55) and other older (aged above 55) co-workers are
also fired, causing spillovers within the firm. In particular, the percentage increase
in firing is higher for older co-workers than for younger ones, indicating a closer
substitutability with older workers expected to retire soon. Delaying the retirement
date of an additional older worker also reduces hirings by 0.35 units (7 per cent
of the pre-reform average). The decline is largely explained by fewer young and
middle-aged new hires under temporary contracts. The effect on dismissals and
hiring is concentrated within incumbent workers or outsiders who share the same
qualifications (blue-collar, white-collar or manager) as older employees on the cusp
of retirement.
In the second part of the paper, we study how the reform affected workers on the
cusp of retirement and - due to labour substitutability within the firm - their co-
workers. We look at labour earnings and the take-up of social insurance programs.
We associate each employee to the firm where he/she worked at the reform date.
Then, we aggregate the outcomes of interest across workers of the same type (on the
cusp of retirement or co-workers) who were incumbent at the same employer. We
find that the pension reform has a positive effect on the earnings of employees close
to retirement as they work for longer, but a negative effect on co-workers’ earnings.
A 1-year shift in the full retirement date of workers close to retirement leads to a
11,356 euros drop in total labour earnings of co-workers in 2015, equivalent to 1.8
per cent of their average value in the pre-reform period. The decline in earnings
becomes smaller when we take non-work subsidies into account. Hence, part of
the observed dynamics reflects an increased layoff risk. We perform a calibration
to infer what share of the drop can be attributed to layoffs. We find that firing
explains around one-fifth of the earnings drop. The remaining part of the loss is
likely attributable to within-firm earnings dynamics. The latter are more relevant
for older and middle-aged employees, consistent with a model where the firm job
ladder is based on seniority and the closer substitutes for senior employees on the
cusp of retirement are older and middle-aged co-workers.
Stricter criteria for pension eligibility reduce the amount of pension benefits received
by employees on the cusp of retirement, but increase - to a lower extent - their take-
up of non-work subsidies and disability benefits. The receipt of non-work subsidies
also increases among co-workers. Hence, a comprehensive evaluation of the short-run
revenues raised by the reform needs to take into account the consequences on work-
ers who are not directly affected by the policy and that arise due to the behaviour
of firms. The previous literature has focused on the behavioural responses of older
workers (e.g. Staubli and Zweimu¨ller 2013; Vestad 2013). We show that spillovers
on their co-workers - caused by labour substitutability - are also very important.
To evaluate the implications of labour substitutability for the revenues collected
CHAPTER 1. 15
from a firm’s employees in the short-run, we develop an accounting model. Our
framework allows for spillovers on co-workers and takes into account the effects of
the reform on labour tax revenues and other social insurance programs. Using the
model, we estimate the fiscal externality of the policy, i.e. the share of mechanical
savings on the pension payments to a firm’s employees that the government loses be-
cause of the behavioural responses of these employees and of the firm. According to
our estimates, about two-thirds of the savings are lost in the short-run. The cost is
entirely explained by spillovers on co-workers. By ignoring these spillovers, we would
estimate a positive fiscal externality: higher labour tax revenues on older workers
would more than offset costs stemming from their increased take-up of other social
insurance programs. We therefore conclude that labour substitutability is pivotal to
assessing the consequences of this reform and potentially similar policies that lower
the turnover of older workers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the related
literature; Section 1.3 illustrates the institutional setting; Section 1.4 describes the
data; Section 1.5 outlines the identification strategy; Section 1.6 shows that older
workers delay retirement in response to the policy; Section 1.7 presents the main
findings on firms’ labour demand adjustments; Section 1.8 discusses the main re-
sults in relation to the literature; Section 1.9 documents the effect of the reform on
co-workers’ earnings; Section 1.10 builds a model to estimate the revenues effects of
the reform; Section 1.11 concludes.
1.2 Related literature
Our paper relates to the literature that explores the substitutability between
workers within the firm using a firm’s responses to unforeseen shocks to its work-
force. Ja¨ger and Heining (2019) exploit sudden workers’ deaths.4 While they lever-
age a negative shock to the retention rate, we study a positive one. Unlike a single
worker’s death, a higher full retirement age may affect the retirement choice of more
than one incumbent worker, providing a larger shock to a firm’s workforce. More-
over, since our shock affects older employees, it allows us to study substitutabilities
between workers within and across age cohorts. We relate our findings to labour de-
mand theory and contribute to the understanding of labour substitutability within
firms as studied in models with heterogeneous labour and imperfect labour markets
(Cahuc et al., 2008 and Pissarides, 2000). We also add evidence on changes in in-
ternal labour market dynamics (Baker et al., 1994).
Our study of the implications of labour substitutability for the revenues raised by
4Other recent papers that exploit sudden deaths or hospitalization events to study the impor-
tance of directors, CEOs and inventors include Nguyen and Nielsen (2010), Quigley et al. (2017),
and Jaravel et al. (2018).
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increasing the full retirement age relates to the literature that examines how the gen-
erosity of a given social insurance program affects the take-up of other programs.5
Closely related to our work is Staubli and Zweimu¨ller (2013) who examine a reform
increasing the early retirement age.6 Like them, we show that changes to Social Se-
curity rules can generate spillovers on other government programs. We bring a new
perspective by treating the firm as an active agent for the transmission of the effects
of a pension reform. To do so, we include in our accounting model the demand-
driven spillovers on incumbent workers who are not directly affected by the policy
in the short-term.
We provide firm-level evidence of substitutability within and across age cohorts.
Several papers have studied the relationship between young and older employment
within countries or sub-national macro-areas.7 Gruber and Wise (2010) conclude
that the correlation is positive looking at country case studies. More recent work
by Bertoni and Brunello (2017) exploits variation in the age structure of Italian
provinces and regions. They find that pension reforms causing fewer older workers
to retire have negative effects on youth employment, especially during recessionary
periods. Exploiting variation in the age structure of the older population across
US commuting zones, Mohnen (2019) finds that the retirement slowdown is asso-
ciated with increased unemployment and occupational downgrading among young
individuals. As we discuss later, our results can be regarded as an evidence of the
micro-level mechanisms that could deliver substitutability at a macro-level.
Recent and limited literature uses micro-data to investigate how pension reforms
that affect elderly labour force participation change labour demand at the firm level.
Vigtel (2018) shows that a decrease of the legal retirement age in Norway increases
the hiring of senior workers, especially of “risky types” (blue-collar and with previ-
ous records of sickness). Martins et al. (2009) study a Portuguese pension reform
that increased the legal retirement age for women, finding negative effects on hiring,
especially of younger female workers. Boeri et al. (2017) and Carta et al. (2019)
evaluate the effects of the Fornero pension reform on employment. The former doc-
ument a reduction of youth employment, whereas the latter find positive effects on
young and middle-aged employment in a sample of large firms. Our new contribu-
tion is threefold. First, we propose a novel identification strategy that exploits firm
idiosyncratic variation in treatment intensity unrelated to broad firm demograph-
5Some examples are works on the spillovers of changes in the disability insurance (Karlstro¨m
et al., 2008; Borghans et al., 2014; Staubli, 2011) or unemployment insurance (Lammers et al.,
2013; Inderbitzin et al., 2016). Program substitution effects are also studied by Kline and Walters
(2016).
6Vestad (2013) also studies how changes to early retirement provisions affect other social insur-
ance programs; Duggan et al. (2007) examine the spillovers on disability insurance of a change in
the full retirement age in the US; Atalay and Barrett (2015) explore how increasing the minimum
age for women to claim the age pension in Australia affects the take-up of disability benefits.
7In a recent strand of literature, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) study the interaction of de-
mography and automation showing that robots substitute for middle-aged workers.
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ics. Second, we study separately layoffs of incumbent permanent workers and new
hires of outsiders; this allows us to explore the susbstitutability among incumbent
workers of different ages and the substitutability between incumbent workers close
to retirement and individuals outside the firm. Third, we study the relevance of
spillovers within the firm to provide novel evidence on the importance of firms for
the incidence of these types of policies.
1.3 Institutional Setting
This section describes the main features of the Italian pension system. We
provide statistics and institutional details on the Italian labour market in Appendix
Section 1.A.
1.3.1 The Italian pension system
As for many OECD countries, including the US, the main pillar of the Ital-
ian public pension system is a compulsory pay-as-you-go scheme.8 A combination
of earnings-related and contributions-related methods determines pension benefits.
The Social Security tax rate on private payroll employment is 33 per cent. Statutory
incidence falls on the employee for one-third and for the remaining two-thirds on
the employer.
There are two options for claiming full retirement benefits: old-age pensions and
seniority pensions. The eligibility criteria for both options have been substantially
redesigned by the 2011 Fornero pension reform. The main early retirement op-
tion, called opzione donna, is available for women only; it allows women to claim
benefits before satisfying the old-age or seniority pension requirements. Similarly
to early retirement in the US, until 2011 opzione donna allowed the claiming of
benefits about 3 years before the statutory age.9 Exercising the early retirement
option comes at the cost of receiving lower pension benefits.10 The average cut is
estimated to be roughly 35 per cent of the full benefits that an individual would be
entitled to if choosing the seniority retirement option (INPS, 2016). Working past
eligibility to retirement is allowed, although protection against dismissals is reduced
8In 2015 only 7.3 million people (less than one-third of people employed) had supplementary
private pension plans (COVIP, 2015). Although the number has been growing in recent years, the
limited diffusion of these financial instruments is partly due to the fact that the public pension
system is relatively generous.
9Early retirement using opzione donna was possible in 2011 upon turning 57 years old (with 35
years of contributions). In the same year, private sector female employees could claim an old-age
pension upon turning 60 years old (with 20 years of contributions).
10This is in part due to the fact that pension benefits are calculated using a fully contributions-
based method, rather than a combination of the contributions-based and the, typically more gen-
erous, earnings-based method.
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when employees reach a certain combination of age and years of contributions.11
1.3.2 Statutory and observed retirement date
How retirement choices change in response to pension reforms that extend the full
retirement date determines the extent to which firms experience an increase in the
retention rate of older employees when these policies are implemented. We define an
individual as retired when he/she starts collecting retirement benefits. Retirement
spikes around the earliest among statutory full retirement dates in our data; more
than 70 percent of individuals retired within a 1-year window around such a date in
2012 (Appendix Figure 1.H.1). This trend is common to other countries. In the US
the share of workers retiring at the full retirement age has been increasing in the
last decade; the share of individuals exercising the early retirement option has also
starkly dropped (Munnell and Chen, 2015). Estimates in Mastrobuoni (2009) for
the US document a strong response of retirement choices to the full retirement date:
an increase in the full retirement age by 2 months increases the age at retirement by
around half as much. A similar response emerges from our data where a one year
shift in the full retirement date translates into a 7-month delay in retirement (see
Section 1.6).
1.3.3 The Fornero reform
The Fornero pension reform was passed in December 2011 (Decree Law 201/11,
article 24). It was part of the “Save Italy” decree, an emergency package of measures
in response to the mounting pressure of financial markets on the Italian sovereign
debt. Designed by a new technocratic government and approved one month after its
appointment, it entered into force in January 2012. Although the need for a deficit
reduction package was anticipated, its exact content was not known in advance.
Moreover, the decision and implementation lags were both very short. As a result,
anticipatory effects were likely negligible. The reform raised the requirements for
claiming old-age and seniority pensions, reducing the number of new retirees and
increasing the average age at retirement.12 The new dispositions applied to all
workers who did not accrue the right to claim retirement benefits under pre-reform
rules by the end of 2011. A few other categories of workers - listed in Appendix
Section 1.B - were grandfathered. For all other private sector employees, Table 1.1
compares the main features of pre- and post-reform retirement rules over the period
11In particular, the age and years of contributions are those needed by men for claiming an
old-age pension.
12Appendix Figures 1.H.2 plots the evolution of age at retirement and of the number of new
retirees over the period 2005-2015, distinct by gender and type of pension (old-age and seniority).
It focuses on retirees who were private sector workers. The participation rate in the 55-64 age
group increased from 39.3 per cent in 2011 to 57.0 per cent in 2018, halving the gap with respect
to the average in euro-area countries.
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2012-2015, for old-age (Panel a) and seniority (Panel b) pensions. Appendix Table
1.H.1 and Appendix Section 1.B provide further details.
Old-age pensions: The reform raised the age requirement for old-age pensions,
whilst leaving the contribution requirement (20 years) unchanged. In 2011 the
statutory retirement age was 60 for women and 65 for men. Absent the reform,
it would have risen gradually to reach 61 years and 10 months for women and 65
years and 7 months for men in 2018. Per effect of the reform, the age requirement
has further increased, to reach 66 years and 7 months for both genders in 2018.
Hence, the change in the age requirement was considerably larger for women than
for men.
Seniority pensions: The reform re-designed the rules for claiming seniority pen-
sions. Until 2011 a “quota” system was in place; workers could retire as soon as
their age and years of contributions summed up to a “quota”, conditional on both
surpassing a certain threshold. In 2011 the quota was set to 96, conditional on
being at least 60 years old and having at least 35 years of contributions. Had the
rules not changed, the “quota” would have gradually risen from 96 to 97.6 over the
2012-2108 period.13 Alternatively, workers could retire upon totalling 40 years of
contributions, regardless of their age. The Fornero reform abolished the “quota”
system. It legislated that in 2012 a seniority pension could be claimed upon totalling
at least 41 years and 1 month of contributions for women and 42 years and 1 month
of contributions for men; the requirement gradually increased to reach 41 years and
10 months and 42 years and 10 months in 2018, respectively.14
The reform did not abolish the early retirement option. The take-up of such op-
tion was very low until 2011, because of the cut in benefits. After the reform,
which substantially tightened eligibility criteria for claiming full benefits, the take-
up of opzione donna increased. Yet, even in the year when it peaked within our
sample period (2015), less than 20 per cent of eligible women claimed early retire-
ment. Moreover, only 80 per cent of them made job-to-retirement transitions (INPS,
2016).15 As a result, the take-up of opzione donna remains limited in our sample.
The reform caused heterogeneous changes in years until retirement eligibility among
otherwise similar older workers. As a result, firms with a similar senior workforce
were affected by the reform to a different extent. Appendix Figure 1.H.3 shows the
relationship between age and years of contributions in 2011 and the shift in the
13The age requirement for the “quota” 97.6 would have been 61 years and 7 months.
14If individuals start collecting retirement benefits before age 62, there is a 1 per cent penalty
for every year between the ages of 60 and 62, which raises to 2 per cent for every year before the
age of 60.
15The remaining 20 per cent were unemployed or out of the labour force when they retired.
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retirement date.16 It focuses on workers who could have started collecting pension
benefits by 2014 under pre-reform rules. The heatmap highlights the substantial
variation in the extent of the shift. Among female workers, the most affected are
those between 58 and 59 years old with less than 35 years of contributions in 2011.
Their retirement age shifts by 4 years or more.17 Women with more than 36 years of
contributions or who are closer to 60 years old experience smaller changes. Among
male workers, those close to eligibility under “quota 96” are the most affected.
Milder changes apply to male employees who would have retired under the old-age
option or who were close to reaching 40 years of contributions.
1.4 Data
We leverage high-quality and confidential administrative data available at the
Italian Social Security Institute (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale, INPS).
We describe below the three main sources that we combine to build the dataset used
for the analysis.
Workers’ contribution histories: we have access to previously unexploited con-
tribution histories for all employees (more than 6 million) who worked in small-
medium sized firms between 2009 and 2015.18 For every contribution spell in any
given year we observe the following information: (i) the number of weeks covered
by contributions to Social Security; (ii) the event triggering the payment of contri-
butions (e.g. paid work, maternity leave, unemployment benefits) and the amount
of contributions paid. We use the information on the length of contribution spells
to compute the number of accrued years of contributions by the end of 2011, which
is needed to predict the change in the full retirement date. The information on the
type and amount of contributions allows us to derive measures of the take-up of
non-work subsidies as well as comprehensive measures of earnings, which include
labour income from quasi-salaried employment, self-employment and public sector
jobs.
Matched employer-employee records: we also exploit linked employer-employee
records available over the period 1983-2015 for the universe of non-agricultural firms
with at least one employee. Firms report detailed information about employees cov-
16In Subsection 1.5.1.1 we describe how we compute the expected retirement dates under pre-
and post-reform rules.
17Before the reform, they were close to retiring under the “quota 96” option. After the re-
form, their earliest available retirement option became either the new seniority pension, which
requires more years of contributions, or the old-age pension, the age requirement of which had
been substantially raised by the reform.
18We focus on firms with 3 to 200 employees in the first quarter of 2009. The restriction stems
from limitations to the maximum number of workers’ contribution histories that could be made
available by the INPS for the sake of the project.
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ered by Social Security filling the so-called Uniemens modules. The data covers 74
per cent of private employment and 93 per cent of private sector employees.19 We
use monthly data for the period 2009-2015.20 Firms are identified by a unique Tax
Identification Number (TIN). In case of a multi-establishment firm, all establish-
ments feature the same TIN. For a subset of firms the TIN is associated to multiple
Contribution Identification Numbers, which however do not necessarily identify the
different establishments. In our analysis we will focus on firms with a single Contri-
bution Identification Number.
For each worker-firm record, the following information is available: (i) beginning and
end date of the contract, alongside the underlying motivation (e.g. layoff, quit); (ii)
type of contract (permanent vs fixed-term, full-time vs part-time); (iii) broad occu-
pation group (blue-collar, white-collar or manager); (iv) wage; (v) number of days
worked.21 We link these records to workers’ and firms’ registers containing baseline
information, such as gender and age of employees as well as opening date, sector
and location of businesses. Drawing on these sources, we build yearly firm-level
measures of adjustments in labour demand by counting total new hires and layoffs
of permanent workers. We also construct these measures for different categories of
workers, as identified by their contract, occupation or demographic group.
Register of retirees: the register of retirees provides information about the type
of pension paid to each retiree, including disability benefits, as well as the date
when the first pension payment was collected and the amount received. We use this
information to study how the reform affected the receipt of old-age and seniority
pensions, as well as of disability benefits.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
The purpose of our empirical analysis is twofold. First, we aim to study the firm-
level substitutability between workers on the cusp of retirement, their co-workers and
outsiders, by exploiting a reform that delayed the retirement of older employees.
Second, we want to evaluate the implications of substitutability for the short-run
revenues that the government raises on a firm’s employees through this policy. Ad-
dressing these questions is challenging because the share of workers retained in a firm
due to the reform is strongly related to the firm’s demographics. Variation along
19Self-employment accounts for most of the share of total private employment that the data
does not cover. The agricultural sector accounts for most of the missing share of private sector
employees.
20The INPS has been collecting matched employer-employee records with an annual frequency
since 1983 and with a monthly frequency since 2005. Since our analysis spans the period 2009-
2015, we mostly use the latter dataset, relying on the former to compute worker-level measures of
experience and tenure.
21We deal with multiple records for worker-firm-month combinations using the procedure ex-
plained in Appendix Section 1.C.
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this dimension could reflect differences in unobservable labour demand dynamics.
Hence, it cannot be directly exploited for identification. We instead leverage the
fact that the reform changed the full retirement date of similar older workers to a
different extent. Specifically, our treatment exploits variation in the firm-level av-
erage shift in the full retirement date of employees on the cusp of retirement. This
variable changes across firms due to idiosyncratic differences in the distribution of
gender, age and years of contributions among the narrow set of these individuals,
but does not reflect substantial variation in the broad demographics of the firm. It
also captures shifts in the policy parameter (the full retirement age), the revenues
effect of which we examine in the second part of the paper. In the first part of the
analysis, we provide a more intuitive measure of substitutability that shows how an
increase in the number of older employees who delay retirement affects the number
of workers hired or fired. To do so, we use our treatment in an instrumental variable
setting.
1.5.1 Treatment construction
To construct the treatment, we follow a two-step procedure. First, we compute
the change in the full retirement date for employees close to retirement before the
reform, who we define potential retirees (Subsection 1.5.1.1). Second, we construct
the average variation in the full retirement date of potential retirees employed at a
given firm when the reform is passed (Subsection 1.5.1.2). We exploit such an iden-
tifying variation within a difference-in-differences regression framework (Subsection
1.5.2).
1.5.1.1 Individual shift in the full retirement date
For the purpose of computing the retirement date, an older worker can be sum-
marized by his/her type θ(g, a, c), where g is gender, while a and c are age and
years of contributions as of December 2011, respectively. We draw on workers’ de-
mographics to build the first two variables and on contribution histories to compute
total years of contributions, following the rules detailed in Appendix Section 1.D. For
every type θ we compute the reform-induced change in years until full retirement,
thus excluding early retirement options. To this end, we construct the predicted
retirement dates according to pre- and post-reform rules and denote the difference
CHAPTER 1. 23
with δθ:
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δθ = Years until full retirement date
post-reform
θ −Years until full retirement datepre-reformθ
(1.1)
If early retirement choices are influenced by the reform, δθ is an individual assign-
ment to treatment as opposed to the actual change in the retirement date. To
construct δθ, we take as given the contribution history observed in the data up to
2011 and we make the following assumptions on the post-2011 contribution history:
(i) workers accrue full contributions on their accounts (52 weeks per year) until
retirement;
(ii) the predicted retirement date is the earliest date at which the worker can start
collecting benefits under either the old-age or the seniority pension scheme.
Assumption (i) requires that individuals work year-round and full-time in the post-
reform period.23 Data shows that the median annual contribution is 52 weeks for
workers aged 60 or above in 2012, suggesting that assumption (i) has solid ground.
Assumption (ii) provides a criterion to select among the different options for claiming
full benefits: after predicting the retirement date associated with every available op-
tion, we select the earliest one.24 As discussed earlier, the literature has documented
that retirement behaviour displays bunching at the acquisition of full pension rights
and Appendix Figure 1.H.1 shows consistent evidence for Italy.
For all workers expected to retire by 2014 under pre-reform rules and who actually
retired by 2017, we compare actual and predicted retirement dates. We define the
actual retirement date as the date when an individual starts collecting Social Secu-
rity benefits. Appendix Figure 1.H.4 shows a “forecast quality” assessment. The
majority of the differences between the two dates (69 percent) lies within a 1-year
window, indicating that our measure is quite accurate in predicting the actual re-
tirement date (panel a). This also provides supportive evidence to assumption (ii),
because a thin right tail of the distribution implies that workers do not often retire
later than we predict. The left-skewness arises because of two main reasons. First,
women can use the early retirement option (opzione donna), which causes a larger
difference between actual and predicted retirement dates for female workers (panel
22Before the Fornero reform abolished them, the so-called “waiting windows” (finestre mobili)
were in place: workers could start collecting pension benefits only 12 months (or more, see Appendix
Table 1.H.1) after becoming eligible. Most workers postponed retirement until that moment. We
incorporate this feature of pre-reform rules by assuming that, had the reform not passed, employees
would have retired when they could start collecting benefits.
23Alternatively, we require that non-work periods are covered by figurative contributions (see
Appendix Section 1.D).
24Under this assumption, the option to claim full benefits may change because of the reform:
some types θ could first reach eligibility to an old-age pension under pre-reform rules, while the
seniority pension may become the earliest option available under post-reform rules, and viceversa.
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b). Second, some workers maintain the right to retire under pre-reform rules (see
Appendix Section 1.B).
1.5.1.2 Firm-level shift in the full retirement date
We focus on the change in the full retirement date of older workers on the cusp of
retirement before the reform. We define potential retirees as the full-time employees
who could have retired within 3 years under pre-reform rules (i.e. by 2014) and who
are directly affected by the reform in the short-run. The 3-year threshold also allows
us to focus on a subset of workers with similar age and contribution histories, who at
the same time face a diverse enough variation in their full retirement date because
of the reform. We will also show how results change when considering shifts in the
full retirement date of workers further away from retirement in 2011. Panel (a) of
Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of the change in years until the full retirement date
for potential retirees employed in the sample of firms that we describe in Subsection
1.5.2. As already emerged from the heat-maps in Appendix Figure 1.H.3, δθ displays
a substantial variability, with the mean equal to 1.36 and the standard deviation
equal to 1.4.
Every potential retiree of type θ experiences the same shift δθ in the expected full
retirement date. To construct the firm-level change in the full retirement date, we
build a shift-share shock. We weight the δθs by the share of every θ in the subset of
potential retirees employed in the firm. The firm-level treatment Ti therefore is:
Ti =
∑
θ∈Potential retirees
piθ,i δθ (1.2)
piθ,i is the share of type-θ workers among potential retirees employed at firm i in
the last quarter of 2011. The piθ,is depend neither on firm size nor on the share of
potential retirees out of the firm’s total workforce. As a consequence, we show that
they do not reflect meaningful differences in the broad demographics of the firm.
Ti therefore captures the idiosyncratic firm-level shift in the full retirement date of
potential retirees. It also has a straightforward interpretation as the change in the
policy parameter that was shifted by the reform. Because of these properties, we
use Ti as the treatment variable. In the first part of the paper, where we aim to
study the extent of substitutability among workers, we also use Ti as an instrument
for the number of older workers who delay retirement.
The distribution of Ti for firms that employ at least one potential retiree displays
significant variability. The mean is 1.37 and the standard deviation is 1.33 (Figure
1.1, panel b). The variability of Ti decreases with firm size.
25 This is one of the
25This is because larger firms employ more potential retirees, so that the distribution of age,
gender and contributions among them is more likely to mirror the one prevailing in the universe of
employees on the cusp of retirement. For the same reason, Ti does not exhibit substantial variation
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reasons why we focus on small and medium firms, where the variability of Ti is
greater.
1.5.2 Empirical Specification and identifying assumptions
1.5.2.1 Empirical specification
To study the effect of the reform we restrict our attention to the sample of firms
with a single Contribution Identification Number and with 3-200 employees in the
first quarter of 2009 that are active in every year between 2009 and 2015.26 We then
focus on firms that employ at least one potential retiree in the quarter when the
reform is passed (last quarter of 2011). Firms with no potential retirees may not be
an appropriate control group, because they have a different demographic composi-
tion and are likely to differ along other unobserved time-varying characteristics. We
nonetheless show that results are qualitatively similar in the universe of firms in the
3-200 size class. These restrictions leave us with a balanced panel of 61,434 firms.
In this sample, we estimate a difference-in-differences model with a continuous treat-
ment and multiple pre- and post-reform periods:
Yit = λi + γt +
2015∑
k=2009
βTk 1(k = t) · Ti + εit (1.3)
i indexes the firm and t indexes the year. Yit is the outcome of interest. λi is a
firm fixed effect that captures time-invariant heterogeneity across firms, including
differences in average outcomes across treatment levels; γt are year fixed effects that
control for year-specific shocks common to all firms. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level to address the potential concern of serial correlation across periods
(Bertrand et al., 2004). The coefficients of interest are {βTk }k=2015k=2009 and show how the
treatment Ti affects the outcome of interest in year k relative to the reform year.
27
To summarize the results, we also estimate a more compact difference-in-differences
regression comparing pre-reform years (2009-2011) to post reform years (2012-2015):
Yit = λi + γt + β
TPostt · Ti + εit (1.4)
We interact the treatment with the dummy Postt that takes value 1 in years 2012-
2015. βT captures the average effect of a 1-year increase of Ti in the post-reform
years.
To provide a measure of the extent of labour substitutability, in the first part of
across local labour markets.
26The majority of firms in our size range have a single Contribution Identification Number; some
firms have multiple Contribution Identification Numbers, which however do not necessarily map
into different establishments.
27We set βT2011 equal to 0.
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the analysis we also re-scale the coefficients so that they capture the effect of an
additional potential retiree delaying retirement. Specifically, we estimate a version
of specification (1.4) where we use Ti as an instrument for the number Ri of potential
retirees who delay retirement by at least one year relative to the predicted full
retirement date under pre-reform rules.28 Ri therefore is:
Ri =
∑
j:j∈Potential Retireesi
1(δ˜j ≥ 1) (1.5)
where δ˜j is the observed change in the full retirement date of individual j, i.e. the
difference in years between the observed retirement date and the predicted pre-
reform full retirement date.
1.5.2.2 Identification assumptions
We leverage variation in the characteristics of potential retirees for identification.
The extent to which firms are affected by the reform depends on the distribution
of the shares of types θ among their potential retirees (equation 1.2). Identification
requires that piθ,is do not correlate with firms’ unobservable time-varying character-
istics (Borusyak et al., 2018 and Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2019). In other words,
the characteristics of potential retirees employed at a given firm should not corre-
late with a firm’s time-varying unobservables. The shares piθ,is depend neither on
firm size nor on the share of potential retirees. Thus, we leverage a source of vari-
ation that does not depend explicitly on the firm’s broad demographics; we only
exploit the variability that stems from idiosyncratic differences across firms in the
distribution of gender, age and years of contributions (i.e. in the distribution of
types θ) among the narrow set of potential retirees. Evidence that the composition
of potential retirees in a firm relates to trends in labour demand would provide a
sign of potential threats to identification. Pre-trends as captured by the coefficients
{βTk }k=2011k=2009 provide suggestive evidence of the conditional exogeneity of Ti. If trends
are parallel among differentially treated firms, these coefficients should not be dif-
ferent from zero. We also perform placebo and balancing tests to assess the validity
of the identifying assumptions.
1.5.2.3 Placebo tests
We assess whether Ti predicts labour demand trends in the pre-reform period
by running a series of placebo tests. To this end, we artificially assign the date in
which the reform becomes effective to 2010 or 2011, rather than to 2012. We then
estimate a version of specification (1.4) on the pre-reform period (2009-2011). We
28We exploit the fact that, everything else being equal, larger shifts in the full retirement date
result in more potential retirees substantially delaying retirement. The exclusion restriction requires
that the change in the full retirement date affects firms only through a delay in the retirement of
potential retirees.
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test the effect of Ti on layoffs and new hires, which are the main firm-level outcomes
we study in Section 1.7. Appendix Table 1.H.2 shows that a one standard deviation
(hereafter 1σ) increase of Ti has virtually zero effects. It is only marginally significant
in predicting layoffs when the placebo reform is assigned to 2009. This indicates that
firms facing heterogeneous shifts in the full retirement date of potential retirees in
2011 did not exhibit substantially different demand trends in the pre-reform period.
Appendix Table 1.H.2 also shows that the standardized share of potential retirees
delaying retirement out of a firm’s employment (i.e. Ri/Ni) predicts trends in labour
demand in a stronger and statistically significant way in three out of four cases. This
provides ground to the choice of not exploiting variation that captures differences
in the broad demographic composition of firms.
1.5.2.4 Balancing tests
We run balancing tests whereby we regress a rich set of firm characteristics at the
beginning of the period (first quarter of 2009) on Ti, while controlling for province-
sector fixed effects. Appendix Table 1.H.3 shows that the correlations are very weak,
although precisely estimated. This holds true when looking at the gender and age
composition of the firm. Despite the fact that the reform affected on average women
more than men, a 1σ increase of Ti is associated with a decline in the share of male
employees of only around 1 percentage point, against an average of 66 per cent.
The coefficients relative to the share of young, middle-aged and older workers are
0.00, -0.01 and 0.01, against averages of 0.30, 0.58 and 0.12. We nonetheless show
in Subsection 1.7.6 that the results on labour demand adjustments do not change
when including the interactions between firm baseline characteristics and year fixed
effects as controls. Moreover, column 2 of Appendix Table 1.H.3 shows that the
correlations between firm baseline characteristics and Ri/Ni are stronger in almost
all cases, further suggesting that firms with heterogeneous demographics differ along
many other dimensions.29
1.5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Appendix Table 1.H.4 compares the characteristics of firms in our main sample
to other firms with a single Contribution Identification Number, in the same size
class and active in 2009-2015. Firms with at least one potential retiree are on average
three times as large as other firms and older. They are more likely to operate in
the manufacturing sector and have a higher share of blue-collar workers. Their
employees are older, more experienced, have higher tenure and higher daily wages.
Appendix Table 1.H.5 shows that potential retirees are older, more experienced,
and have higher tenure than other full-time employees working in our sample of
firms. They have higher gross daily wages, and are more likely to have a permanent
29For comparability Ti and Ri/Ni are standardized.
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contract. Appendix Table 1.H.6 compares potential retirees to other older employees
who are similar along many dimensions.30 Before the reform, employees closer to
retirement were 5 percentage points more likely to be absent from work because of
sickness and 1 percentage point more likely to be absent due to work-related injuries
or sick leave, suggesting a decline in effort as workers approach retirement.
1.6 Older workers delay retirement after the re-
form
The reform may affect a firm’s labour demand if it prolongs the working lives
of older workers. We first investigate the response of retirement choices to changes
in the full retirement date by estimating an individual-level version of specification
(1.3) on the sample of potential retirees employed in our sample of firms. We use
the worker-level shift in the full retirement date as the treatment (δθ in equation
1.1).31 Figure 1.2 shows that delaying the full retirement date by one year causes
an increase in time spent at work and a decline in time spent on retirement.32 A
1-year increase in δθ is associated with 1.5 more months worked and 2.3 less months
in retirement in 2015. The increase in months spent at work is smaller than the
decrease in months spent on retirement, suggesting that some workers are no longer
employed when they start claiming pension benefits. The decline in time spent
on retirement is smaller than it would have been had if all workers retired at the
predicted post-reform full retirement date (“benchmark”). The difference between
the two lines reflects early retirement responses to the shift in the full retirement
date.
To quantify the response of retirement choices to the policy, we also use the same
treatment δθ in a cross-section regression where the outcome is the difference between
the observed retirement date and the pre-reform predicted full retirement date (Table
1.2). The specification includes age and gender fixed effects. The coefficient on δθ
captures by how much workers delay retirement when they face a 1-year shift in the
full retirement date. Individuals delay retirement by 7.1 months in response to a
1-year delay in the full retirement date. The response is slightly larger for men (7.51
months against 6.97 for women). These figures are close to estimates in Mastrobuoni
(2009) for the US, where a 1-year increase in the normal retirement age causes a
6-month increase in the age at retirement.
30We perform a coarsened exact matching procedure. Matching covariates are: age, gender, type
of contract (open-ended vs fixed-term), occupation, as well as firm’s province, sector and size.
31The regression features individual fixed effects. We also add a vector of controls including
gender and age dummies interacted with year fixed effects.
32Appendix Table 1.H.7 summarizes the results estimating an individual-level version of specifi-
cation (1.4) on the sample of potential retirees employed in our sample of firms.
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1.7 Labour demand responses to the reform
In this section we document how labour demand for co-workers and outsiders
changes when there is a shift in the full retirement date of potential retirees em-
ployed at the firm. We first present estimates based on specification (1.3); we then
summarize the effects by estimating a single post-reform coefficient based on the
more compact specification (1.4). Coefficients show the effect of a 1-year increase
in Ti. Finally, we present estimates from a modified version of specification (1.4),
where Ti is used as an instrument for the number Ri of potential retirees who delay
retirement by at least one year. This allows us to provide a more direct measure
of the extent of substitutability between employees on the cusp of retirement, co-
workers and outsiders.
According to labour demand theory, a drop in demand for other workers caused by
the retention of older employees can be reconciled with complementarity between
the two types of labour only in the case of an increase in other workers’ wages.
We provide the intuition in Appendix Section 1.E, where we develop a labour de-
mand model with heterogenous labour and we incorporate different wage formation
mechanisms. As we document below, a shift in the full retirement date of potential
retirees reduces the demand for co-workers and outsiders. A large wage increase is
inconsistent with the evidence in Subsection 1.9.1 that shows a negative effect on the
earnings of incumbent co-workers. These results suggest that incumbent co-workers
are substitutes for older workers close to retiring. Since the fall in labour demand
also involves younger co-workers, our findings provide evidence of substitutability
across workers of different ages within the firm. In Section 1.8 we discuss how our
results relate to the vast literature on aggregate employment patterns of different
age cohorts.
1.7.1 Layoffs
Firms increase layoffs of permanent employees in response to a shift in the full
retirement date of potential retirees.33 Panel (a) of Figure 1.3 shows results from
specification (1.3).34 Pre-reform coefficients are not significantly different from 0,
providing supporting evidence to the assumption of parallel trends until 2011. In
the post-reform period all coefficients are positive: the effect of an increase in Ti
on layoffs is small and not significant in 2012, when most potential retirees would
have worked even under pre-reform rules; it then grows and becomes significant in
2013 and 2014, when most potential retirees would have retired in absence of the
reform. In 2015, when some of the potential retirees eventually retire, the growth
33Since labour regulations force firms to pay a temporary worker until the contract end date if
he/she is fired for economic reasons, the cheapest way to part from a temporary employee is not
to renew their contract. Thus, we focus on layoffs of permanent workers.
34Appendix Table 1.H.8 shows the estimates reported in all panels of Figure 1.3.
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in the estimated effect flattens out. In that year a 1-year increase in Ti leads to
0.055 more layoffs - 14 per cent of the pre-reform average number of layoffs per year
(0.39). Table 1.3 reports results from the more compact specification (1.4). In the
first row it shows that a 1-year increase in Ti causes on average 0.037 more layoffs
per year in the post-reform period (column 1); a 1σ increase in Ti (a shift of 1.33
years in the full retirement date) is therefore associated to 0.05 more layoffs, which
amounts to 12.6 per cent of the pre-reform average. In the second row we re-scale
the coefficients by using Ti as an instrument for Ri. The first stage coefficient is
positive (0.21), statistically significant, and the associated Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F-statistics is large. For every additional potential retiree who delays retirement by
at least one year, firms fire on average 0.17 more workers per year in the post-reform
period, which amounts to 43.6 per cent of the pre-reform average number of layoffs.
To study the substitutability between incumbent workers, Panel (b) of Figure 1.3
breaks down the effect by workers age. We classify as young the employees of age
35 or below, as middle-aged those aged between 36 and 55, and as old those aged
above 55. Layoffs increase in all age groups due to the reform, providing the first ev-
idence that firings do not only involve potential retirees. Comparing the coefficients
in columns 2 to 4 of Table 1.3 to the group-specific average number of layoffs before
the reform, the percentage increase is highest among older workers and lowest among
young employees. Focusing on re-scaled coefficients, an additional potential retiree
who delays retirement by at least one year causes 0.086 more layoffs of middle-aged
employees and 0.04 more layoffs of old employees; these amount to 43 and 66.7 per
cent of the pre-reform averages, respectively.
We further investigate whether the layoffs adjustment on older workers is concen-
trated within potential retirees or also involves their co-workers (Panel (c) of Figure
1.3 and column 5 of Table 1.3). When focusing only on older workers who are not
potential retirees the coefficients halve, suggesting that half of the response is con-
centrated on this category of workers. The firm’s median share of potential retirees
out of older workers is 66 per cent. Thus, potential retirees are not disproportion-
ately affected relative to other older employees. Since potential retirees and other
older workers earn similar wages, the cost of firing the two types of workers is the
same.35 We find that firms trade them off in a similar fashion, suggesting a strong
substitutability.
Panel (d) of Figure 1.3 shows estimates when the dependent variable is the ratio
between the number of layoffs in every age group and the respective number of in-
cumbent employees at the beginning of the period (first quarter of 2009).36 The
35The cost of layoffs - when ruled unfair by a labour court - is a function of the fired worker’s
wage.
36We therefore estimate this specification on the subset of firms that have at least one employee
in each age group in that quarter-year.
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coefficients therefore can be interpreted as an approximation of the effect of Ti on
the probability of being laid-off. Older workers face a larger probability of being
fired than younger co-workers in the post-reform period.
1.7.2 New Hires
Firms more affected by the reform reduce hiring in the post-reform period relative
to less affected firms, while there is no evidence that they were on different trends
before the reform (Panel (a) of Figure 1.4).37 The pattern of post-reform coefficients
is u-shaped: the negative effect emerges as early as in 2012 and peaks in 2013, when
a 1σ increase of Ti leads to 0.14 fewer new hires, which amounts to a little less than 3
per cent of the pre-reform average (4.79). In 2015 the coefficient is still negative, but
not significantly different from 0. This suggests that firms delay hiring in response to
the reform; new hires decline in its aftermath and bounce back as potential retirees
become eligible to retire under post-reform rules. Table 1.4 shows that a 1σ increase
of Ti on average reduces hiring by almost 0.1 per year (column 1). Re-scaling the
coefficients, we find that for every additional potential retiree who delays retirement
by at least one year, hiring declines on average by 0.35 unit per year, which amounts
to 7.3 per cent of the pre-reform average.
Panel (b) of Figure 1.4 decomposes the effect by new hires’ age. The decline in
hiring affects young and middle-aged outsiders to a similar extent. On the other
hand, there is no significant effect on older workers, who constituted a small share of
new hires in the pre-reform period. For every additional potential retiree who delays
retirement by at least one year, young and middle-aged new hires decline on average
by 0.20 and 0.15 units per year, respectively (columns 2 to 4 of Table 1.4). The
decline only concerns new hires employed with temporary contracts (Panel (c) of
Figure 1.4 and columns 5-6 of Table 1.4). In 2015 the close to 0 effect on total hiring
masks substantial heterogeneity; the effect on new hires under fixed-term contracts
is still negative, while it becomes positive for permanent contracts.38
1.7.3 Do firms respond to retirement delays happening in the future?
All workers experience an increase in years left to full retirement, except those
who become eligible by the end of 2011.39 We have studied the effects of shifting
the full retirement date of workers on the cusp of retirement. In this subsection
we test whether firms respond to changes in the retirement date of workers who
were less close to retire at the time of the reform. Specifically, we estimate our
specifications on the sample of firms that employ no potential retirees, but have at
37Appendix Table 1.H.9 shows the estimates reported in all panels of Figure 1.4.
38Part of this could be caused by a generous package of incentives to foster the use of permanent
contracts that was available to firms in 2015.
39See Section 1.3.3 and Appendix Section 1.B for a list of the other few grandfathered groups.
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least one worker expected to retire in 2015 or 2016 under pre-reform rules. The
treatment is defined as the average shift in the full retirement date of these workers.
Appendix Figure 1.H.5 shows that layoffs do not respond in a significant way. There
is a negative effect on new hires starting from 2013, but it is only significant in one
year. Appendix Table 1.H.10 confirms that there is a virtually null effect on layoffs
and a negative, but not significant, effect on new hires. Overall, there is no clear
evidence that in the immediate aftermath of the reform firms respond to retirement
delays that involve workers who were not close to retiring.
1.7.4 Labour demand adjustments within and across occupation groups
We further explore how the shock to the retirement date of potential retirees is
absorbed within the firm by looking at the decisions of its units. We call unit the
group of employees in a specific occupation (blue-collar, white-collar or manager).
We estimate versions of (1.3) and (1.4) at the firm-unit level. Our specifications
separately include a treatment defined within the group of potential retirees in the
unit as well as one defined within the group of potential retirees in other units of the
same firm. The within-unit treatment generates a larger effect on layoffs and new
hires (Appendix Figure 1.H.6 and Appendix Table 1.H.11). Thus, a shift in the full
retirement date of potential retirees employed in a given unit impacts co-workers
and outsiders in the same occupation group; on the other hand, spillovers across
units in the same firm are limited. Indeed, Appendix Table 1.H.11 shows that for
both outcomes we can reject the hypothesis that the two treatment effects are equal.
Our evidence is consistent with higher substitutability between workers who perform
similar tasks. Similarly, Ja¨ger and Heining (2019) find that labour substitutability
is higher within occupation groups.
1.7.5 Heterogeneity by pre-reform turnover rates
Firms with a higher propensity to separate from workers should be more prone
to adjust labour demand in response to shocks. To test this, we construct a measure
of a firm’s turnover rate by using the average number of separations in the pre-
reform period divided by employment at the beginning of the period (first quarter
of 2009). We define as separations all events of layoffs, terminations of temporary
contracts and voluntary quits. We then split firms into two groups (high and low
turnover) based on whether they fall above or below the median of the distribution of
the turnover measure. We add a triple interaction to our specification where a high
turnover dummy is interacted with the treatment and year fixed effects.40 The effect
on layoffs is significantly larger in high-turnover firms and the difference relative to
low-turnover firms is statistically significant (Appendix Figure 1.H.7 Panel (a) and
40We also interact the high turnover dummy with the set of year fixed effects, to estimate a fully
interacted model.
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Appendix Table 1.H.12). Thus, high-turnover firms manipulate more easily the
margin of layoffs. We also look at new hires and we find some evidence that the
negative effect of the reform is larger in high-turnover firms (Panel b). However, the
difference in the treatment effect between the two groups of firms is not statistically
significant (Appendix Table 1.H.12).
1.7.6 Sensitivity checks
Appendix Figure 1.H.8 shows that results are robust to a battery of robustness
checks. We start by verifying that our estimates do not capture differential labour
demand trends across firms which have different characteristics at the beginning of
the period. We showed in Appendix Table 1.H.3 that the relationship between Ti
and firm baseline characteristics is weak. Nonetheless, we address this concern by
augmenting specification (1.3) with the interaction between year dummies and a
vector of firm covariates measured in the first quarter of 2009. First, we include
in the vector of covariates a set of dummies for the quintiles of the share of female
employees in the firm, because the pension reform affected women to a greater ex-
tent than men. Adding these controls reduces the concern that non-parallel labour
demand trends across firms with a different gender composition confound our esti-
mates. Second, we add to the vector of covariates dummies for quintiles of several
other variables: firm size, firm age, average wage, the share of young (≤ 35), middle-
aged (36 − 55) and older (> 55) workers. Third, we estimate a specification where
year fixed effects are interacted with two-digit sector and province fixed effects to
check that our estimates are not confounded by heterogeneous economic cycles across
sectors and provinces. Estimates based on these augmented specifications are very
similar to the main ones. Fourth, we add one year (2008) to the pre-reform period
to show that labour demand trends were similar up to four years before the reform
in a longer balanced panel. Finally, we check whether results are robust in the uni-
verse of firms employing between 3 to 200 employees in the first quarter of 2009; for
this purpose, we set Ti = 0 if a firm employs no potential retirees.
41 This exercise
reveals that, while heterogeneously treated firms appear to be on parallel trends in
terms of firings before the reform, this is less the case for hiring, consistent with our
conjecture that firms employing a younger workforce are not a good counterfactual
for firms employing potential retirees. Nonetheless, the post-reform coefficients are
similar - if anything larger - to those coming from the baseline specification.
We also check whether results on layoffs could be confounded by other policy
changes. The 2012 Fornero labour market reform and the 2015 Jobs Act have
gradually reduced the costs of unfair dismissals for firms with more than 15 employ-
41Also in this case, we restrict the attention to firms that remain active between 2009 and 2015
and have a single Contribution Identification Number.
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ees.42 We check whether firms below and above this threshold behave differently.
Appendix Figure 1.H.9 shows that the percentage increase in layoffs in firms with
at most 15 employees at the beginning of the period (first quarter of 2009) is very
similar to that of firms with 16 to 30 employees. We conclude that changes in the
cost of layoffs do not seem to be a relevant confounder for our analysis.
1.8 Discussion
In this section we discuss general equilibrium effects and the relationship between
our results and the previous literature.
General equilibrium effects: We conducted a partial equilibrium analysis of
the short-run firm responses to the reform. However, general equilibrium dynamics
could affect our identification threatening the implicit assumption on the absence
of spillovers across firms. The responses of labour demand and supply to a higher
retirement age may affect market tightness and the outside option of different cohorts
of workers. Hence, firms that are not directly affected by the reform can change their
behaviour because of spillovers caused by other firms. However, it takes time for
these dynamics to come into effect, so that general equilibrium effects are not likely
to play a significant role over the horizon of our analysis (i.e. the first 4 years after
the implementation of the reform). The fact that new hires and layoffs respond in
the immediate aftermath of the reform, when general equilibrium effects are likely
less relevant, further reduces these concerns. In addition, reform-induced reductions
in the number of new hires are significant, but tiny when compared to total new
hires and cyclical fluctuations in hiring.43 Finally, we showed in Subsection 1.7.3
that new hires in the aftermath of the reform respond mostly to the shift in the full
retirement date of potential retirees, while future retirement delays do not seem to
have an effect. This reduces the extent to which firms’ responses could affect the
labour market general equilibrium in the four years after the reform.
Relation to the literature on age substitutability: The Fornero reform pro-
vides a neat experiment to document how employers trade-off workers of different
ages within the firm. We exploit a firm-level idiosyncratic shock to uncover firms’
labour complementarities, and our results show evidence of substitutability among
age cohorts within firms. This firm-level substitutability contributes to equilib-
rium allocations in local labour markets, but it is not sufficient to draw definitive
42Appendix Section 1.A provides details about these two policies, discussing their implications
for the cost of dismissals.
43An additional potential retiree who delays retirement by at least one year causes a 0.35 drop
in the number of new hires. There are 61,434 firms in our sample and the average value of Ri is
0.83. A back of the envelope calculation delivers a drop in total new hires of 17,850 units per year,
0.2 per cent of total new hires in 2011 and less than 5 per cent of the average yearly fluctuation in
hires in the period 2012-2015.
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conclusions about the relationship between the employment dynamics of different
cohorts as studied by Gruber and Wise (2010). Documenting age complementarities
in labour markets requires economy-wide demographic shocks instead of firm-level
ones, and a long-run perspective that allows for slow adjustments in workers’ outside
options and employment flows. For instance, a recent work by Mohnen (2019) look-
ing at decade-long horizons shows that the retirement slowdown of older workers is
associated with worse labour market outcomes for younger workers in US counties.
Similar results have been found by Bertoni and Brunello (2017) for Italian provinces
and regions. Our results can be regarded as a first step in uncovering the micro-
level mechanisms that explain patterns of macro-level substitutability among age
cohorts.
1.9 Workers’ earnings and take-up of other social
insurance programs
In this section we study how the reform affects potential retirees and - due to
labour susbtitutability - their co-workers. The information contained in the contri-
bution histories allows us to track workers across jobs and to observe their take-up
of various social insurance programs. We can therefore study the consequences of
the policy for all employees who are incumbent in our sample of firms at the re-
form date, including workers who leave the firm in the post-reform period. We
focus our attention on full-time employees and we document that the reform led
to an increase in labour earnings of potential retirees, whereas it caused a decline
in labour earnings of their co-workers. We then examine the take-up of disability
and unemployment insurance. The literature has documented that older workers
substitute away from pension benefits into other social insurance programs in re-
sponse to reforms that tighten the criteria for pension eligibility (e.g. Duggan et
al., 2007, Staubli and Zweimu¨ller, 2013 and Atalay and Barrett, 2015). We find
similar evidence. Spillovers on younger co-workers caused by labour substitutability
within the firm have received less attention in the literature. This section documents
these spillovers as a preliminary step to the quantification of the short-run revenues
collected by the reform from a firm’s employees.
1.9.1 Earnings of Incumbent Employees
We start by focusing on co-workers earnings. We define co-workers as all full-
time employees who were not expected to retire within 3 years when the reform
is passed and who worked in a firm with at least one potential retiree. We match
every co-worker to the firm where he/she was incumbent at the quarter of the
reform. We then estimate specification (1.3) on our sample of firms using the total
of co-workers’ labour earnings as the dependent variable; specifically, Yit is the total
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labour earnings in year t of all co-workers who were incumbent in firm i in the
last quarter of 2011.44 Labour earnings include income from other private-sector
employers, self-employment, and public-sector employment.45 The reform leads to
a decline in incumbent co-workers’ earnings, which grows over time (Figure 1.5).46
A 1-year shift in the full retirement date of potential retirees at the firm causes
a drop of 11,356 euros in 2015, which is equal to 1.8 per cent of average total
labour earnings pre-reform. When adding non-work subsidies to labour earnings,
the decline becomes smaller (1.3 per cent in 2015). Table 1.5 summarizes the results
based on specification (1.4), reporting an average yearly drop equal to 6,550.7 euros,
reducing to 4,902 when non-work subsidies are taken into account (columns 1 and
2).
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 1.5 show results by co-workers age, focusing on those who
had permanent contracts. It emerges that middle-aged and older co-workers are
the most affected. The average drop in earnings amounts to 4,567 and 1,521 euros
per year respectively (1 per cent and 3.6 per cent of the pre-reform average labour
earnings); the loss experienced by young co-workers amounts to 1,220 euros per year
(0.9 percent). In line with the findings on layoffs described in the first part of the
analysis, adjustments seem to be borne more by older co-workers than younger ones.
Since the negative effect on co-workers earnings moderates after accounting for non-
work subsidies, the increase in layoffs documented in Subsection 1.7.1 can partly
explain this. Within-firm dynamics could also play a role if incumbent co-workers
experience earnings reductions or a slower earnings growth when potential retirees
delay retirement. To quantify the relative contribution of these two channels, we
perform a decomposition exercise. We combine estimates of the effects of the reform
on layoffs with estimates of the cost of a job loss. The ideal experiment to estimate
the effect of being laid-off would randomize such an event across workers. In absence
of this experiment, we match every worker fired after the reform to workers who do
not separate from their firm in the same period.47 We perform a coarsened exact
match (CEM) along several covariates. To assess the cost of layoffs, we then estimate
a difference-in-differences regression on the matched sample whereby the treatment
is a dummy equal to 1 if the worker is fired.48 The estimated earnings drop is 5,455
44We therefore collapse observations from the worker-year level to the firm-year level, by aggre-
gating workers who were incumbents at the same firm in the quarter when the reform was passed.
Regressions are weighted based on firm size at the beginning of the period (first quarter of 2009).
45Earnings are winsorized at the 99th percentile.
46Appendix Table 1.H.13 reports all the coefficients displayed in the figures discussed in this
subsection.
47We only consider the first layoff event that causes a separation from the firm where the worker
was incumbent in the last quarter of 2011.
48We add to the specification the matching covariates interacted with time fixed effects. The
covariates are age, sex, wage, occupation, type of contract, experience, sector, province, firm size.
We also weight controls based on the standard CEM weights (see Iacus et al., 2012). We discuss
the weighting and further details about the match in Appendix Section 1.F.
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euros three years after the separation (Appendix Figure 1.H.10). It amounts to a
19.1 per cent decline, in line with estimates in Couch and Placzek (2010).49
Appendix Figure 1.H.11 presents the result of our calibration exercise. The blue-
shaded area is the share of the total earnings loss of full-time permanent workers
that we can impute to layoffs. It accounts for around 17 per cent of the total effect
of the reform on earnings, suggesting that although layoffs play a relevant role,
within-firm dynamics provide a major contribution. We replicate the exercise for
young, middle-aged, and older workers (Appendix Figure 1.H.12). Some important
heterogeneity emerges. Separations explain a larger part of the earnings losses for
young workers; 25 per cent of the total as opposed to 17 per cent for middle-aged
and 11 per cent for older workers. This heterogeneity is consistent with a model
of seniority where earnings grow with age within the firm, creating career spillovers
across workers (Bianchi et al., 2019). As a consequence, older co-workers are the
closest substitutes to potential retirees and bear the largest adjustments in term of
earnings dynamics.
We also study earnings dynamics for potential retirees. As we did for co-workers,
we match every potential retiree to the firm where she was incumbent at the reform
quarter and we sum up labour earnings across all potential retirees incumbent in
the same firm. Figure 1.5 and Table 1.5 column 6 show an increase in their labour
earnings, which is the natural consequence of a prolonged working life.
1.9.2 Pension benefits and spillovers to other social insurance programs
We also study whether shifts in the full retirement date affect the take-up of
pension benefits as well as of other social insurance programs. Specifically, we focus
on non-work subsidies and disability benefits. We aggregate individual-level out-
comes at the firm level following the procedure described in Subsection 1.9.1. While
the previous literature on program substitution has mostly studied the responses of
workers directly targeted by a given policy change (in this setting, potential retirees),
we also examine the response of co-workers, who can be affected due to labour sub-
stitutability within the firm.
Figure 1.6 reports estimates based on specification (1.3).50 Focusing on potential
retirees (Panel a), the reform-induced shift in the full retirement date significantly
lowers the receipt of pension benefits. As Ti increases by 1 year, the amount of
pension entitlements received by all potential retirees who were incumbent in firm
i drops by 1670 euros in 2012; the decline grows over time to reach 7,000 euros in
49Couch and Placzek (2010) revisit pioneering work by Jacobson et al. (1993). They find that
the earnings loss for displaced workers is around 30 per cent after one year and 9 per cent six years
after the dismissal. See also Davis and von Wachter (2011), Farber (2017), and Schmieder et al.
(2018) for more recent estimates of the cost of job loss.
50Table 1.H.14 displays estimates based on the more compact specification (1.4).
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2015 and the cumulative drop in the first four years after the implementation of the
reform amounts to almost 19,000 euros.51 On the other hand, transfers from other
social insurance programs increase: the cumulative raise in the 2012-2015 period
is equal to 1,253 euros, much smaller in absolute value than the decline of pension
benefits, and reflects higher enrollments both in the disability insurance program
and - to a larger extent - in the unemployment insurance program. These findings
are similar to those of Staubli and Zweimu¨ller (2013), who study the consequences
of an increase in the early retirement age in Austria.
With regards to co-workers (Panel b), the amount of pension benefits received in the
first four years after the passing of the reform changes by a negligible and non signif-
icant amount, which is consistent with the fact that these workers were not eligible
to retire soon under pre-reform rules. On the other hand, delaying the retirement of
potential retirees leads to an increase of social insurance transfers to co-workers. The
cumulative increment in the 2012-2015 period associated to a 1-year increase in Ti is
equal to roughly 7,000 euros, larger than that documented for potential retirees. It
reflects almost entirely the increased receipt of non-work subsidies, while the effect
on the take-up of disability benefits is small.
1.10 Implications of substitutability for the rev-
enues raised on incumbents
Our results document that - due to labour substitutability - the reform caused
large spillovers on all incumbent workers. As a way to prove their relevance in the
analysis of policy incidence, we develop a model to estimate the implications of
these spillovers for the revenues collected on incumbent full-time employees in the
short-run. We estimate the share of public pension savings raised mechanically on
incumbents, which is lost due to the behavioural responses of a firm and of its work-
ers. This is the fiscal externality that stems from the channels that we observe. We
incorporate into our model the spillovers caused by labour substitutability, which
have so far received little attention in the literature. We then discuss the contri-
bution of our results to the analysis of the welfare effect of the reform and their
relevance for other public policies that reduce the incentives of older workers to
leave firms.
1.10.1 An accounting model
We construct a model of government accounting that considers two types of
agents defined as in our empirical analysis with the labels of potential retirees (p)
51The cumulative change is computed as the sum of post-reform coefficients estimated using
specification (1.3) (i.e.
∑2015
k=2012 β
T
k ). Cumulative changes are reported in Appendix Table 1.H.15.
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and co-workers (c). Agents perform different labour-related activities. The main
activity is paid labour in a firm. A positive share of workers receives transfers in the
form of non-work subsidies, disability benefits, or pension entitlements. The budget
constraint for individual i is:
xi ≤ (1− τi)wi lwi + Tˆi (1.6)
xi is consumption. Labor li in a firm is paid a wage wi and taxed at rate τi. The
worker receives total transfers Tˆi that depend on time spent in different labour
and non-labour activities, including retirement. We describe the details of all the
components of Tˆi in Appendix Section 1.G.
The fiscal externality is the share of mechanical revenues raised through the reform
from a firm’s employees that is lost because of behavioural responses:
FE = − Cost of Behavioral Responses
Mechanical Public Pension Savings
(1.7)
The formula is derived in Appendix Section 1.G. The numerator represents the costs
incurred by the government because of behavioural responses. These costs occur
when extra non-work subsidies are paid to fired employees, more workers enroll
into disability insurance, and lower tax revenues are raised from labour income
when incumbent workers experience a drop in earnings. Mechanical revenues in
the denominator are the resources that the government would save from a firm’s
employees because of the policy, absent any change in the behaviour of the workers
and the firm. Hence, they measure the savings that would arise if every potential
retiree retired at the post-reform full retirement date. When FE is between −1 and
0 the reform generates an increase in the revenues collected. If the fiscal externality
falls below −1, the government loses the entire mechanical revenues on incumbents
because of behavioural responses. This is the case of local Laffer effects (Hendren,
2019 and Werning, 2007).
Our framework is highly stylized and ignores some of the general equilibrium effects
of the policy. The model abstracts from the revenues lost on marginal workers who
are not hired due to the reform. However, we provide estimates of these losses based
on conservative assumptions in our calibrations. Due to the lack of balance-sheet
information, we cannot incorporate the effect of the reform on a firm’s performance.
To the extent to which the reform affects revenues and profits, our model misses
their externalities on the government budget. We also lack information on potential
retirees and other workers who are not employed in a firm at the time of the reform,
but on whom the reform generates mechanical savings in pension outlays.52 The
52If a delayed full retirement age increases labour force participation and some of these workers
find a job, extra revenues could be raised by taxing their labour earnings (Carta et al., 2019).
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reform could also affect workers’ health creating externalities for the public health
system, for which we do not have data. Finally, our analysis focuses only on small
and medium firms as in the rest of the paper and on full-time workers.
1.10.2 Empirical implementation and results
The fiscal externality depends on how the reform affects labour earnings and
social insurance transfers (Section 1.9). We provide a detailed description of the
empirical implementation in Appendix Section 1.G, with a discussion on the alter-
native calibrations that we implement.
Table 1.6 presents the main results. Standard errors of the estimates are boot-
strapped via a block bootstrap procedure with 1000 repetitions.53 We start by com-
puting the fiscal externality following the standard approach in the literature. This
exercise illustrates what would happen if we ignored the spillovers on co-workers that
are caused by labour substitutability and focused only on the restricted sample of
potential retirees who are directly affected by the reform. The first column of Table
1.6 shows that all estimates are positive, indicating that the government raises more
money than what is mechanically saved through the policy on a firm’s incumbent
workers. Since the potential retirees work for longer per effect of the reform, they
increase labour earnings (Figure 1.6). Tax revenues from the extra earnings are
sufficient to offset increased transfers from unemployment and disability insurance
programs.
We add the spillovers on co-workers to the model in columns 2 to 4 and we show the
fiscal externality estimates across alternative calibrations of the average tax rate and
of the early retirement pension benefits. Point estimates range from -0.56 to -0.66,
indicating that, even when we add spillovers, the savings on pension outlays over-
come the cost of behavioural responses. However, labour demand spillovers generate
- and entirely explain - a non negligible loss of mechanical revenues. The reason is
twofold. First, co-workers are affected because of labour substitutability, suggesting
its importance for assessing the impact of this reform. In particular, they experi-
ence an increase in non-work subsidies as a consequence of layoffs. Moreover, the
reform has a negative effect on their labour earnings, which results in lower labour
tax revenues. Second, mechanical savings in pension outlays are raised only on the
workers who were expected to retire within our horizon of analysis. As Figure 1.6
suggests, savings only come from potential retirees, who represent a small share of
the workers in the sample. Over a longer time horizon, a larger share of the work-
force will contribute to generating mechanical savings, increasing the revenues from
53We perform a block bootstrap that corrects residuals using the wild bootstrap procedure
introduced by Wu et al. (1986), Liu et al. (1988) and Mammen et al. (1993). This procedure
allows us to obtain asymptotic refinement for standard errors when residuals are correlated within
firm and iid across firms.
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the policy.
We conclude our analysis by extending the model to provide a more conservative
estimate of the fiscal externality. We have so far disregarded the tax revenue losses
on marginally non-hired workers. To provide an estimate of these losses, we assume
that every marginally non-hired worker would earn no labour income for as long as
the median duration (3 months) of a job search for individuals who find a job in
2012-2015. We calibrate earnings losses using the median labour earnings of new
hires in the 3-month period following the hiring event and we calibrate the number
of marginally non-hired workers using estimates from the first part of the analysis.54
In this conservative scenario, the fiscal externality is larger (column 5). It ranges
from -0.65 to -0.70, indicating that about 2/3 of the mechanical savings are lost in
the short-run.
Our results show that spillovers within the firm significantly affect the revenues
raised on incumbent full-time employees. Hence, the behaviour of firms and labour
substitutability are crucial to studying the incidence of this reform. Substitutability
between age cohorts has potentially important implications for other policies that
affect the incentives of older workers in a similar way. Examples are an increase
in the early retirement age, higher penalties for early retirement, higher monetary
incentives for working after the full retirement date, changes in the eligibility crite-
ria for disability insurance. All these policies extend the time that older employees
spend at work, increasing their retention at the employer firm. The response of
firms to an increased retention will affect those incumbent workers who are substi-
tutes for older workers, creating unintended spillovers qualitatively similar to those
documented in our analysis.
1.10.3 Substitutability, spillovers and welfare in the short-run
We conclude by discussing how firms’ behaviour and labour substitutability may
influence the welfare effects of the policy in the short-run. The reform welfare
impact has two components: the first is the fiscal cost of the policy, the second is
the workers marginal willingness to pay for the policy. In the long-run, the reform
will generate large pension savings, and the workers marginal willingness to pay will
largely depend on the extent to which future cohorts benefit from an extension of
the retirement age.55 We cannot estimate these long-run components because we
lack data on an extended time horizon. Even if the data was available, conclusions
would strongly depend on general equilibrium effects that are hard to disentangle.
Yet, we can highlight how the short-term components of welfare are affected by
54See Appendix Section 1.G for more details about this calibration.
55Even though some workers could be willing to pay to avoid the increase in the full retirement
date, the willingness to pay can be high for some others since the policy improves the sustainability
of the Social Security system.
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labour substitutability and firms’ decisions. First, the workers marginal willingness
to pay for the reform is affected by the spillovers caused by adjustments in labour
demand; firm responses have first-order utility effects, which depend on how much
workers value employment. Estimates of the latter are hard to obtain, but we expect
these effects to be relevant given the increase in co-workers’ layoffs. Second, we
quantify part of the other welfare component, by measuring the short-run revenues
collected by the reform on incumbent employees. By estimating the fiscal externality,
we show that spillovers - caused by substitutability - have sizable effects on public
finances.
1.11 Conclusions
This paper studies the importance of labor substitutability and firm’s decisions
when investigating the effects of an increase in the full retirement date. In contexts
where the response of retirement choices to the full retirement age is high, the most
proximate consequence of this policy for a firm is the increase in the retention of
workers on the cusp of retirement. We develop a novel empirical strategy to measure
the reform-induced shock that is particularly effective for small and medium firms.
We show that labor demand responds to the reform in a way that is consistent with
substitutability between workers on the cusp of retirement, their co-workers, and
outsiders. Older co-workers are the closest substitutes for senior employees who
delay retirement. Spillovers within the firm also have significant implications for
the revenues raised on incumbent employees through the reform. They cause all of
the revenue losses in the first four years after implementation, indicating that labor
substitutability and firm’s decisions play an important role in studying the welfare
effects of this and of similar policies.
Since the reform was implemented during a budget crisis, as with many sim-
ilar policies, the fiscal externality that we estimate is a first step to quantifying
the effects of the policy on the short-run government budget. Even though firm’s
responses might have been amplified by adverse economic conditions, the contri-
bution of spillovers to the revenues raised on incumbents is unlikely to vanish in
more favorable phases of the business cycle. In light of these findings, we argue
that firms are an important vector for the passthrough of Social Security policies
and thus should be considered in welfare calculations. Clearly, our estimates cannot
be directly extrapolated to other contexts. Yet, our results on substitutability may
extend to other policies that lower the incentives of older workers to leave a firm.
Examples are increases in the early retirement age (e.g. Staubli and Zweimu¨ller,
2013) or stricter eligibility criteria for disability insurance (e.g. Staubli, 2011).
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1.12 Figures
Figure 1.1: The distribution of the shift in the full retirement date
(a) Worker-level (b) Firm-level
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the distribution of the individual-level shift in the full retirement
date of potential retirees in our sample of firms (Subsection 1.5.3). Panel (b) shows the
distribution of Ti, the firm-level average shift in the full retirement date of potential
retirees, excluding the first and last percentiles. We define potential retirees as those
full-time workers who were expected to retire within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform
rules when the reform is implemented. The predicted full retirement dates of potential
retirees under post-reform rules are capped at December 2020, as dispositions published
in 2012 did not span a longer horizon. The capping, nonetheless, only applies to very few
individuals. Due to the abolition of the “waiting window” few workers face a negative
change, i.e. they can retire sooner under post-reform rules. Number of workers = 98,358.
Worker-level shift mean = 1.36 (std. dev. = 1.4). Number of firms = 61,434. Firm-level
shift mean = 1.37 (std. dev. = 1.33).
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Figure 1.2: The effect of the reform on the working life of potential retirees
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Notes: The figure plots estimates from an individual-level version of specification (1.3),
where the unit of analysis is the single potential retiree in our sample of firms, the
treatment is δθ and there are age-year and gender-year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level. We define potential retirees as those full-time workers
who were expected to retire within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the
reform is implemented. Dots, diamonds and squares represent the effects of a 1-year
increase in the full retirement date on months worked, observed months in retirement
and predicted (benchmark) months in retirement if all workers retired at the predicted
post-reform full retirement date. We define an individual as retired when he/she starts
collecting retirement benefits. Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence intervals, not
available for months spent in retirement due to the null variability of this outcome before
2011. Number of observations = 688,492. Pre-reform mean outcomes: months worked
= 11.28, months in retirement = 0.00, months in retirement (benchmark) = 0.00.
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Figure 1.3: Labour demand adjustments: layoffs
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Notes: The figure reports the effect of a 1-year increase of Ti on total layoffs (Panel a), layoffs by age group (Panel
b), layoffs of older workers (Panel c) and layoffs probability by age group (Panel d). Whiskers represent 95 per
cent confidence intervals. Estimates are based on specification (1.3), which includes firm and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The layoffs probability in Panel (d) is defined as the ratio between
the number of layoffs in every age group in a given year and the respective number of incumbent employees at
the beginning of the period. Ti is the average change in the full retirement date of potential retirees employed at
a given firm when the pension reform is passed. We define potential retirees as those full-time workers who were
expected to retire within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the reform is implemented. Young workers
are aged 35 or below, middle-aged workers are between 36 and 55 years old, old workers are over 55 years old and
old non-potential retirees are old workers who in 2011 were not expected to retire within 3 years under pre-reform
rules. The regressions are estimated on the universe of private sector firms with a single Contribution Identification
Number that: (i) were active every year in the period 2009-2015; (ii) employed between 3 and 200 employees in the
first quarter of 2009; and (iii) employed at least one potential retiree in the last quarter of 2011. In Panel (d) the
sample of firms is further restricted to include only firms with at least one worker in each age group at the beginning
of the period. Number of observations = 430,038 (305,319 in Panel d). Mean outcome pre-reform: total = 0.39;
young = 0.13; middle-aged = 0.2; old = 0.06, old non-potential retirees = 0.04.
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Figure 1.4: Labour demand adjustments: new hires
(a) New hires
-.2
-.1
0
.1
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year
(b) New hires by age
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year
Young (<=35) Middle-aged (36-55) Old (>55)
(c) New hires by type of contract
-.1
5
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year
Permanent Workers Temporary Workers
Notes: The figure reports the effect of a 1-year increase of Ti on total new hires (Panel a), new hires by age group
(Panel b) and new hires by type of contract (Panel c). Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. Estimates
are based on specification (1.3), which includes firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. Ti is the average change in the full retirement date of potential retirees employed at a given firm when
the pension reform is passed. We define potential retirees as those full-time workers who were expected to retire
within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the reform is implemented. Young workers are aged 35 or
below, middle-aged workers are between 36 and 55 years old, old workers are over 55 years old. The regressions are
estimated on the universe of private sector firms with a single Contribution Identification Number that: (i) were
active every year in the period 2009-2015; (ii) employed between 3 and 200 employees in the first quarter of 2009;
and (iii) employed at least one potential retiree in the last quarter of 2011. Number of observations = 430,038. Mean
outcome pre-reform: total = 4.79, young = 2.38, middle-aged = 2.06, old = 0.35, permanent = 1.46, temporary =
3.32.
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Figure 1.5: Incumbents’ labour earnings
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Notes: The figure shows the response of labour earnings of potential retirees and of their
full-time co-workers to a 1-year increase in Ti, the shift in the full retirement date of
potential retirees employed at the firm when the reform is passed. Whiskers represent 95
per cent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Worker-level
observations are aggregated at the level of the firm where workers were incumbents in
the last quarter of 2011. We define potential retirees as those full-time workers who were
expected to retire within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the reform is
implemented. Labour earnings are winsorized at the 99th percentile; non-work subsidies
are winsorized at the 99.99th percentile. The regressions are based on specification (1.3)
and are estimated on the universe of private sector firms with a single Contribution
Identification Number that: (i) were active every year in the period 2009-2015; (ii)
employed between 3 and 200 employees in the first quarter of 2009; and (iii) employed at
least one potential retiree in the last quarter of 2011. Observations are weighted according
to firm size at the beginning of the period. Number of observations = 423,346 (425,971
in the regression for potential retirees). Mean labour earnings pre-reform: co-workers =
647,005.96; potential retirees = 49,951.32.
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Figure 1.6: Incumbents’ labour earnings, pension benefits and social insurance trans-
fers
(a) Potential retirees
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Notes: The figure shows the response of labour earnings, pension benefits and total social insurance
transfers (non-work subsidies and disability benefits) to a 1-year increase in Ti, the shift in the
full retirement date of potential retirees employed at the firm when the reform is passed. Whiskers
represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Labor
earnings, pension benefits and disability benefits are winsorized at the 99th percentile; non-work
subsidies are winsorized at the 99.99th percentile. Worker-level observations are aggregated at the
level of the firm where workers were incumbents in the last quarter of 2011. See notes to Figure
1.5 for further details on these regressions. Number of observations = 423,346 (425,971 in the
regression for potential retirees) Mean outcomes pre-reform: potential retirees’ labour earnings =
49,951.32; potential retirees’ pension entitlements = 4.2; potential retirees’ total transfers = 303.21;
co-workers’ labour earnings = 647,005.96; co-workers’ pension entitlement = 1,337.52; co-workers’
total transfers = 1,702.16.
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1.13 Tables
Table 1.1: Pre- and post-reform pension requirements
Panel (a): Old-age pension
Men Women
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
2011 65YA Not in place 60YA Not in place
2012 65YA 66YA 60YA 62YA
2013 65YA+3MA 66YA+3MA 60YA+3MA 62YA+3MA
2014 65YA+3MA 66YA+3MA 60YA+4MA 63YA+9MA
2015 65YA+3MA 66YA+3MA 60YA+6MA 63YA+9MA
Panel (b): Seniority pension
Pre-reform Post-reform
Men Women
2011 Quota 96 (60YA and 35 YC) or 40 YC Not in place
2012 Quota 96 (60YA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+1MC 41YC+1MC
2013 Quota 97.3 (61YA+3MA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+5MC 41YC+5MC
2014 Quota 97.3 (61YA+3MA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+6MC 41YC+6MC
2015 Quota 97.3 (61YA+3MA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+6MC 41YC+6MC
Notes: The table shows the pre- and post-reform requirements for old-age and seniority
pensions, over the period 2012-2015. YA and MA flag the age requirement in terms of years
and months, respectively. YC and MC flag the contribution requirement in terms of years
and months, respectively. Additional details can be found in Appendix Table 1.H.1.
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Table 1.2: Response of retirement choices to the change in the full retirement date
All Men Women
(1) (2) (3)
δθ (years) 7.07*** 7.51*** 6.97***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Observations 98,355 69,368 28,977
Mean δθ 1.36 1.27 1.58
Std. Dev. δθ 1.4 1.07 1.95
Notes: The table reports estimates from a cross-section regression where the outcome
is the difference (in months) between the observed retirement date and the expected
retirement date under pre-reform rules. The regression also includes age and gender
fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province×sector level.
The treatment is the individual-level change in years left to retirement caused by the
reform (δθ). The sample consists of all potential retirees in our sample of firms. We
define potential retirees as those full-time workers who were expected to retire within
3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the reform is implemented. We define
an individual as retired when he/she starts collecting retirement benefits. If a worker
has not retired by the end of 2017 (the last month of available data on pension claims),
we assume that he/she will retire in January 2018. Column (1) shows the results for
all potential retirees, column (2) and (3) show the results for male and female potential
retirees, respectively.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Fiscal Externality
Potential All All All W/ Loss on
retirees τ = 30 τ = 35 τ = 40 Non-Hired
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
P e = 0.7 · Pmed 0.334 -0.567 -0.592 -0.621 -0.656
(0.020) (0.011) (0.124) (0.143) (0.124)
P e = 0.7 · Pmean 0.327 -0.597 -0.624 -0.655 -0.689
(0.020) (0.109) (0.126) (0.146) (0.126)
P e = 0.9 · Pmed 0.291 -0.611 -0.637 -0.667 -0.70
(0.020) (0.105) (0.122) (0.141) (0.122)
Notes: The table reports estimates of the fiscal externality based on formula (1.7). A negative
externality between -1 and 0 implies that behavioral responses generate costs, but they are
smaller than savings on pension outlays. A positive fiscal externality implies that behavioral
responses generate additional resources for the government on top of mechanical savings on
pension spending. The first row calibrates P e by using the median pension (Pmed,13,127
euros); the second uses the mean pension (Pmean, 16,279 euros); the third uses the median
pension and calibrates P e = 0.9 · Pmed, while P e = 0.7 · Pmed and P e = 0.7 · Pmean in the
first and the second row, respectively. Column 1 reports estimates that ignore the spillover on
co-workers and sets τ = 35 percent. Columns 2 to 4 show calibrations where all spillovers are
included, across alternative calibrations of τ . Column 5 reports estimates from a model that
augments formula (1.7) assuming that every marginally non-hired worker earns zero labor
earnings for as long as the median duration of job search for workers who find a job over
the 2012-2015 period (3 months). We calibrate the foregone earnings by using an estimation
of the median value of labor income earned in the first 3 months after starting a job and
we employ estimates on the effect of the treatment of new hires to calibrate the number of
marginally non-hired workers. In this column, the tax rate is calibrated as τ = 35 percent.
More details on calibrations and estimation are reported in Appendix Section 1.G.
Appendices
1.A The Italian labour market
Firm size: Italy is the European country that features the highest number of
enterprises, totalling around 3.8 millions in 2012.56 95 per cent of Italian firms are
considered micro-enterprises and have less than 9 employees. The share of employees
in firms with less than 250 employees was around 78.7 per cent in 2015, compared
to 62.9 per cent in Germany and 61.4 per cent in France.57 As we conduct our
analysis on firms which have between 3 and 200 employees in the first quarter of
the sample period, we are considering a sample that is highly representative of the
Italian productive landscape.
Workforce demography: The age structure of the Italian workforce underwent
profound changes during the last decade. The share of workers aged between 55
and 64 increased from 10 per cent in 2005 to 16.8 per cent in 2015.58 France and
Germany experienced similar trends, with a 4.9 percentage point (from 10.4 per
cent) and a 6.4 percentage point (from 12.4) increase, respectively. Understanding
the consequences of retaining older workers at firms is therefore of great relevance.
Employment protection legislation: Italy is one of the countries with the
highest degree of employment protection in Europe, together with Germany and
France.59 Two labour reforms - the 2012 Fornero reform (Law 92/2012) and the
2015 Jobs Act (Decree Law 23/2015) - have however progressively reduced the costs
that firms bear in case of unfair dismissals, while increasing their predictability. Be-
fore 2012 a permanent worker who was found to be unfairly dismissed from a firm
with more than 15 employees had the right to be reinstated in the firm. The labour
reforms have substantially narrowed the circumstances that lead to the reinstate-
ment of a worker; they have also limited judges’ discretion in setting the amount
of monetary compensation. For workers hired with an open-ended contract after
March 7, 2015 severance payments in case of unfair dismissal were legislated to be a
56Data from Eurostat, Annual Enterprise Statistics. Financial and insurance sectors are ex-
cluded.
57Figures are the result of authors’ computations based on Eurostat Annual Enterprise Statistics
and National Accounts Statistics.
58Source: Eurostat, Employment Statistics.
59See OECD (2015) data on employment protection legislation.
55
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deterministic and increasing function of tenure: 2 months of the last salary per year
of service, with a minimum of 4 months and a maximum of 24 months. The 2018
labour reform (Decree Law 87/2018) has raised the minimum and the maximum to
6 and 36 months, respectively. Furthermore, a sentence of the Constitutional Court
has deemed unconstitutional that the indemnity in case of unfair dismissals is only
a function of tenure.
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1.B Additional details about the Fornero reform
Grandfathering clauses: The new rules introduced by the Fornero reform do not
apply to individuals who satisfied the requirements for claiming either an old-age or a
seniority pension by the end of 2011. It was furthermore legislated that some specific
categories of employees were grandfathered as well. These are mainly workers who,
during the passage of the reform, were collocated on redundancy schemes or on
short-time work programs. According to the law, the categories of private-sector
employees who could still retire under pre-reform rules are therefore the following:
i) Workers who satisfy the requirements for claiming either an old-age or a se-
niority pension by 12/31/2011;
ii) Workers collocati in mobilita´ according to law 223/91 and based on collec-
tive agreements signed before 12/4/2011. Workers collocati in mobilita´ were
laid-off workers who received specific monetary support and were engaged in
redeployment programs;
iii) Workers who, as of 12/4/2011, were beneficiaries of prestazioni straordinarie
a carico dei fondi di solidarieta´ di settore. These are workers in short-time
work who received monetary support from ad-hoc sectoral solidarity funds;
iv) Workers who, as of 12/4/2011, had ceased to work but had been authorized
to continue paying contributions.
v) Workers who, as of 12/4/2011, had been granted the istituto di esonero dal
servizio.
In the following years, further specific categories of workers where grandfathered (the
so-called salvaguardati). In our analysis, when predicting full retirement dates under
pre- and post-reform rules, we only apply grandfathering clauses to workers listed in
(i), because we do not have the necessary information to identify employees belonging
to categories (ii) to (v). Furthermore, as far as salvaguardati are concerned, we do
not take into account changes to the law that occurred in later periods, because we
aim to build a measure of the shock to the full retirement date at the time when
the reform came into force.
Other provisions: Beyond the changes shown in Table 1.1 and Appendix Table
1.H.1, the Fornero pension reform also introduced the following provisions, which we
take into account when computing the predicted full retirement dates as described
in Subsection 1.5.1.1:
i) Women who were at least 60 years old and had at least 20 years of contributions
by 2012 can exceptionally retire upon turning 64 years old in 2012, 64 and 3
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months old in 2013-2015 and 64 years and 7 months old from 2016 onward.
This possibility is granted to all workers who would have reached “quota 96”
in 2012.
ii) Before 2012, individuals who started working in 1996 or later could also claim
an old-age pension upon satisfying the same age requirement as other indi-
viduals, but it was conditional on a lower contribution requirement: 5 years
of effective contributions, rather than 20. The Fornero reform maintains the
same milder contribution requirement, but substantially raises the age require-
ment: 70 years old in 2012, 70 years and 3 months old in 2013-2015 and 70
years and 7 months old from 2016 onward.
iii) Workers who started working after 1995 can also claim a seniority pension
upon turning 63 years old in 2012, 63 years and 3 months old in 2013-2015
and 63 years and 7 months old from 2016 onward, which is conditional on
having at least 20 years of contributions.
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1.C Procedure to clean matched employer-employee
data
Firm covariates and outcomes come from matched employer-employee data over
the period 2009-2015. The unit of observation is the worker-firm relationship in
a given month. More than one relationship between a worker and firm in a given
month may exist. This is because firms are required to compile two Uniemens
modules for a given employee if a characteristics of his/her contract changes during
the month. In such a case, we isolate and retain only the prevailing relationship,
according to the following multi-step procedure:
i) We drop records where the wage is set equal to 0. If all records have this
feature, we keep one randomly.
ii) If there are records that feature the same contract characteristics (occupation,
duration, full-time or part-time status, type of collective contract) and the
same wage, we drop all but one randomly.
iii) We drop records that feature lower numbers of paid days.
iv) When multiple records arise in a given month, but not in the months imme-
diately before or after that, we look at the characteristics of the worker-firm
relationship in the preceding and in the following month. We then keep the
single record that satisfies the following (ranked) criteria: a) modal occupa-
tion; b) wage closest to the average one in the neighbouring months; c) highest
number of paid days; d) highest wage.60 If more than one record survives cri-
teria (a) to (d), we drop all but one randomly.
v) When multiple records arise in each of a set of consecutive months, within each
month we keep the single record that satisfies the following (ranked) criteria:
a) highest number of paid days; b) highest wages.61 If more than one record
survives criteria (a) to (b), we drop all but one randomly.
60If more than one record satisfies criterion (a), we then use criterion (b), and so on up to
criterion (d).
61If more than one record satisfies criterion (a), we then use criterion (b).
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1.D Computation of years of qualifying contribu-
tions
Contributions are of two types: effective contributions, which arise as a result of
periods of paid work, and figurative contributions, which arise as a result of events
that include sick leave, maternity leave, short-time work, unemployment and disabil-
ity. Figurative contributions are not paid out by the workers, but they nevertheless
accrue on their accounts. Depending on the type of pension, figurative contributions
may not count toward the accrual of the right to retire (while still counting toward
the determination of the amount of the pension benefit).
Workers’ contribution histories record the event giving raise to each contribution
spell, allowing us to distinguish effective contributions from figurative ones. For
every type of pension, we therefore only take into account relevant contributions,
improving the accuracy of predicted retirement dates. We first sum up contribution
spells (expressed in weeks) in any given year, capping them at 52 weeks, which is the
maximum number of weeks of contributions acquirable every year. Following rules
for totalling contributions used at INPS, in case of (partially or totally) overlapping
spells we avoid double counting. We then sum up contributions across years, up to
December 2011. The underlying assumption is that, in case of workers who accrue
contributions across different funds, they choose to (onerously) exercise the so-called
ricongiunzione option, which allows them to bring all contributions together into a
unique fund, so that they can be summed up toward the accrual of pension rights.
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1.E Conceptual framework
To guide our empirical analysis of firms’ responses to pension reforms, we outline
a labour demand model that features a shock to the retention rate of older work-
ers. We focus on firm-driven changes in the employment of their co-workers. We
then investigate how this response relates to the degree of substitutability between
potential retirees and their co-workers. We start by analyzing a standard model
where we remain agnostic about the wage formation process. We then study the
behaviour of labour demand in different wage bargaining settings. First, we analyze
the standard Nash-bargaining model. Second, we introduce Nash-bargaining over
profits to capture the profit-sharing behaviour that has been documented by Card
et al. (2013) in the Italian context. Third, we study a monopsonistic labour market
with constant labour supply elasticity. Consistently across settings, the change in
labour demand is inversely proportional to the degree of substitutability between
potential retirees and co-workers.
1.E.1 Labour demand model
Consider a two-period model where the firm chooses the optimal employment
in period 1 given the employment in period 0. We assume that there are two
types of workers: potential retirees (p) and co-workers (c). In our empirical setting
potential retirees are older workers close to retirement, and co-workers are other
older workers further away from retirement or younger employees in the same firm.
Denote with nc0 and n
c
1 the number of co-workers employed in period 0 and 1,
respectively. Adjustments in the demand for co-workers are referred to as xc, so
that nc1 = n
c
0 + x
c. A cost function c (xc) accounts for the cost - paid in period 0
- of adjusting the co-workers workforce. We require c (·) to be twice continuously
differentiable and we assume that c′ (xc) > 0 for xc > 0, c′ (xc) ≤ 0 for xc < 0,
c′ (0) = 0 and c′′ (·) ≥ 0. This cost function is flexible enough to incorporate any
asymmetry in adjusting downwards or upwards the co-workers’ labour demand. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that no potential retiree can be either hired or
fired. We denote with np0 and n
p
1 = sn
p
0 the number of potential retirees in period 0
and 1, respectively. s ≤ 1 captures the exogenous share of potential retirees who are
left in period 1. We interpret s as a variable incorporating the exogenous separation
rate of potential retirees as well as retirement rules. Output is produced according
to technology F (npt , n
c
t) in every period t = 0, 1, with Fp, Fc ≥ 0, Fpp, Fcc ≤ 0, and
we impose no restriction on cross derivatives. The firm is wage and price taker, and
the price of output is normalized to 1. The demand for co-workers in period 1 is
chosen so as to maximize profits, which are given by
pi = pi0 + β (F (sn
p
0, n
c
0 + x
c)− wpsnp0 − wc (nc0 + xc))− c (xc) (1.8)
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where pi0 are profits in period 0, β is a discount factor, and w
p and wc are the wages
in period 1 of potential retirees and co-workers respectively. Optimality conditions
require the following
β (Fc (sn
p
0, n
c
1)− wc) = c′ (xc) (1.9)
The firm equates the marginal increase in revenues net of wage expenditures to the
marginal cost of adjusting co-workers’ labour demand. A change in retirement rules
that increases the retirement age can be approximated by a smaller than expected
drop in the number of potential retirees in period 1, i.e. an increase in s. The
comparative statics for a change in s is
∂xc
∂s
∝ β
(
Fpcn
p
0 −
∂wc
∂s
)
(1.10)
The sign of the comparative statics depends on two terms. First, the degree of sub-
stitutability between the two types of labour captured by Fpc. Second, the extent to
which wages adjust after the policy shock. If the two types of workers are substitutes
- that is if Fpc < 0 - only a strong decrease in w
c can lead to an increase in the de-
mand for co-workers. Indeed, in order to hire co-workers, the firm must significantly
cut the payroll to compensate the loss in marginal productivity of co-workers that
follows an exogenous increase in the number of potential retirees. However, wages
are usually expected to be sticky, with the implication that when the two types of
workers are substitutes we likely observe a drop in the demand of co-workers. We
present here a few interesting cases. First, if wages are sticky (i.e. ∂wc/∂s = 0),
the response of co-workers’ labour demand depends on the substitutability between
co-workers and potential retirees ; if the two types are substitutes the firm decreases
demand for co-workers. Second, if wages are flexible and partially follow the change
in the marginal productivity of co-workers (i.e. ∂wc/∂s = αnp0Fpc with α < 1),
labour demand decreases as long as the two types of work are substitutes.62 Finally,
in a competitive labour market where wages reflect the marginal productivity of
co-workers we would have no change in labour demand since prices fully adjust to
absorb the shock.
Result 1: Evidence of a drop in labour demand for co-workers can be reconciled
with complementarity between co-workers and potential retirees only in case of a
large increase in the wages of co-workers.
We document in Section 1.7 that the pension reform causes a drop in labour
demand for co-workers. Moreover, a large increase in co-workers’ wages is inconsis-
tent with the evidence we provide in Section 1.9, which shows a drop in earnings for
62There are different explanations for having co-workers’ wages non perfectly reflecting their
marginal productivity. Lazear (1979) shows in a dynamic model that an increasing wage path
where older workers are overpaid can be used to provide incentives to young workers.
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co-workers. We conclude that co-workers are substitutes for potential retirees.
1.E.2 Alternative wage formation models
1.E.2.1 Intrafirm bargaining over total surplus
So far we have been agnostic about the wage formation process. We now consider
the case where wages are set according to Nash bargaining between the firm and
individual workers over the total surplus of the match, as is standard in the labour
search literature. Suppose that co-workers have bargaining power φ and outside
option wc. The surplus generated by a match is a function of the marginal profit
generated by the worker and of the wedge between the wage and the worker’s outside
option. We allow all wages to be re-negotiated in period 1. In equilibrium:
φ
∂pi(snp0, n
c
1)
∂nc1
= (1− φ)(wc − wc) (1.11)
which implies the following expression for the equilibrium wage:
wc = ηFc − η
β
c′(xc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal output net of adjustment costs
+
(1− φ)
φβ
η wc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reservation wage
(1.12)
where η = φβ/(φβ + 1− φ). When co-workers have no power in the bargaining the
wage is set exactly equal to the outside option. The expression is analogous to the
one derived by Cahuc et al. (2008). Co-workers’ wages in equilibrium are a function
of their marginal output net of marginal cost and of their reservation wage. We are
interested in the effect of a change in s on wages that reads:
∂wc
∂s
= η[Fpcn
p
0 + Fcc
∂xc
∂s
]− η
β
c′′(xc)
∂xc1
∂s
(1.13)
The wage change in response to a shock to the retention rate depends on the cross-
marginal product between co-workers and potential retirees (Fpc), as well as on
the slope of co-workers’ marginal product (Fcc). The last term in (1.13) arises
since we do not assume linear adjustment costs. Notice that we implicitly relied
on the assumption that the worker’s outside option does not change per effect of
the reform. This is because we consider - as in our empirical implementation - a
firm-specific shock to the retirement age. The assumption would be violated if the
general equilibrium effects of the reform were large.
By using (1.13) in (1.10) we get the following expression for the adjustment in
labour demand of co-workers in period 1:
∂xc
∂s
= − βFpcn
p
0
βFpp − c′′(xc) (1.14)
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When the reservation wage does not change, the shift in s does not have any first
order effect on the wage. Hence, there is a one to one mapping between workers’
complementarity and the change in labour demand.
Result 2: In a model of intra-firm bargaining where workers and firms bargain
over marginal profits and worker surplus, there is a one-to-one relationship between
changes in the labour demand of co-workers and the complementarity between the
two types of labour. It follows that a drop in co-workers’ labour demand caused by
a change in s is only consistent with substitutability between potential retirees and
co-workers.
1.E.2.2 Intrafirm bargaining over profits
Card et al. (2013) present evidence of substantial profit sharing in Italian firms.
We extend our model to account for profit sharing by allowing firms and workers to
bargain over total profits and co-worker’s surplus. In equilibrium:
φpi = (1− φ) (wc − wc) (1.15)
This implies the following:
(1− φ+ βφnc1)wc = βφ
(
pi0
β
+ (F − wpsnp0)−
1
β
c (xc)
)
+ (1− φ)wc (1.16)
Wages are determined by profits net of co-workers’ costs and by workers’ outside
option. We totally differentiate equation (1.16) assuming that the wage of potential
retirees is sticky to find an expression for the wage response to a change in s:
∂wc
∂s
= η˜ (Fp − wp) (1.17)
where η˜ = (βφnp0)/(1−φ+βφnc1). Because of an envelope argument, the effect of the
reform on co-workers’ wages is proportional to the wedge between potential retirees ’
productivity and wage. Intuitively, a larger gap increases the passthrough of the
reform to co-workers’ wages. In response to the change in profits caused by the
reform, firms decrease the salary of co-workers to preserve the wedge for potential
retirees.63 After replacing (1.17) in (1.10) it follows that if wages for co-workers
decline, labour demand can drop only in the case Fpc < 0.
63If firms where able to adjust potential retirees’ wages the total passthrough on co-workers
would be smaller.
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Result 3: In the case where potential retirees get paid more than their productivity,
the reform causes a drop in co-workers’ salaries. Therefore, evidence of a fall in
co-workers’ labour demand can only be reconciled with substitutability between co-
workers and potential retirees.
1.E.2.3 Monopsonistic labour market
We consider the broadly used model of monopsonistic labour demand and we
solve a simple version with constant elasticity of labour supply. Suppose the firm
was not a wage taker and chose employment knowing the labour supply elasticity
and anticipating the consequences of labour demand on the wage. We further assume
that the labour supply of co-workers is such that nc1 = w
e, where e is the elasticity
of labour supply to the wage and e > 0. The firm’s problem would become:
pi = pi0 + β
(
F (snp0, n
c
1)− wpsnp0 − nc
1+e
e
1
)
− c (xc) (1.18)
The firm’s optimality condition in this model is:
β
(
Fc − 1 + e
e
nc
1
e
1
)
= c′ (xc) (1.19)
From 1.19 we derive a new comparative statics:
∂xc
∂s
= − Fpcn
p
0
Fcc +
1+e
e2
nc
1−e
e
1 − 1β c′′(xc)
(1.20)
The expression above shows a one-to-one mapping between labour demand changes
and the substitutability between potential retirees and co-workers. The extent to
which labour demand drops if Fpc < 0 decreases with the elasticity of labour supply.
When labour supply is more elastic, the firm has limited room to adjust co-workers’
labour demand in response to the reform.
Result 4: A monopsonistic labour market delivers a one-to-one relationship be-
tween co-workers’ labour demand responses and the substitutability between co-workers
and potential retirees. If the two types of work are substitutable, co-workers’ labour
demand falls in response to a positive shock to the retention rate of potential retirees.
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1.F Matching procedure and the cost of layoffs
Matching procedure and estimation: Matching covariates measured in 2009
are: age, sex, wage, occupation, a dummy for permanent contracts, a dummy for
full-time contracts, experience, sector, province and firm size. We partition each
continuous variable in several bins and match only control workers who fall in the
same combination of bins as at least one laid-off worker. We call this combination a
strata. After we match fired workers to workers who do not separate from the firm
where they were incumbent in the last quarter of 2011, we estimate the following
specification:
Yit = λi +
3∑
k=−2
βkγk +
3∑
k=−2
βlkγk · Layoffi +
3∑
k=−2
βxkγk ·Xi + εit (1.21)
Xi is the vector of matching covariates and k = 0 is the event year in which the
layoff takes place. We focus on layoffs occurring in years 2012 and 2013. Since our
sample ends in 2015 we estimate a model with only 3 periods after the layoff to
make sure that all coefficients are identified by the same number of observations.
We then impute the estimate of βl3 in (1.21) as the cost of job losses four years after
the layoff event. The regression is weighted based on the weights defined below.
Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) weights: Let NC and NT be the number
of control and treatment units in the matched sample. Suppose we have S strata
where s = 1, ..., S and each of them contains NTs treated unit and NCs control units.
The CEM weight for a control unit is the following:
wi =
NC
NT
· NTs
NCs
while each treated unit receives weight equal to 1 (see Iacus et al., 2012). This
guarantees that weights sum up to total matched observations:∑
i
wi =
∑
i∈C
wi +
∑
i∈T
wi =
∑
i∈C
wi +NT
=
NC
NT
∑
s
∑
i∈s
NTs
NCs
+NT
= NC +NT
CHAPTER 1. 67
1.G The Fiscal Externality
1.G.1 Derivation of The Fiscal Externality
We consider two types of agents and we define them as in our empirical analysis
with the labels of potential retirees (p) and co-workers (c). Agents perform different
labour-related activities. We call lji the share of individuals of type i performing
activity j. Each agent faces the following budget constraint:
xi ≤ (1− τi)wilwi + (1− τi)
(
NWil
NW
i +Dil
D
i
)
+
(
1− τPi
) (
Pi
(
T¯ − T Pi
) · 1 (T¯ > T Pi ) · 1 (lEi = 0)+ PEi lEi )+ yi (1.22)
where
{
τi, τ
P
i , NWi, Di, Pi, T
P
i , P
E
i
}
is a vector of policies targeting agent i. τi is an
average labour earnings tax rate, τPi is an average tax rate on pension payments,
NWi are non-work subsidies, Di are disability benefits, Pi are regular pension en-
titlements, T Pi is the full retirement date, and P
E
i are pension benefits for workers
who retire early.64 T¯ is our evaluation horizon. wi denotes the wage, zi = wili is
total labour earnings, and yi is income not related to working activities. We model
the reform as a change in the full retirement date T Pi . If after an increase in T
P
i
a worker retires at the previously expected date, she will receive a lower pension
payment because PEi < Pi.
The fiscal externality of the policy is the share of mechanical revenues that is lost
because of the behavioural responses:
FE = −
∑
i=p,c ni
[
(1− τi)
(
NWi
dlNWi
dTPi
+Di
dlDi
dTPi
)
+
(
1− τPi
)
PEi
dlEi
dTPi
− τi dzidTPi
]
∑
i=p,c nidT
P
i (1− τ pi )Pi · 1
(
T¯ > T Pi
) · 1 (lEi = 0)
(1.23)
where np and nc denote the number of potential retirees and co-workers, respec-
tively. The numerator represents the costs incurred by the government because of
behavioural responses. Mechanical revenues in the denominator instead measure
the resources that the government would save through the policy from incumbent
employees, absent any change in the behaviour of workers and firms.
1.G.2 Empirical implementation and results
The fiscal externality is a function of the estimates in Sections 1.7 and 1.9.65
The terms referring to NW and D in the numerator of equation (1.23) measure the
budget consequences of the reform on other policy instruments. We quantify them
using causal estimates of the effect of the reform on these outcomes. The last term in
the numerator of (1.23) is the effect on labour income tax revenues. It is a function of
64Notice that when workers retire early they do not receive the full pension payment Pi.
65Coefficients are reported in Appendix Table 1.H.15.
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the causal effect of the reform on potential retirees and co-workers’ earnings. Finally,
the term PEi
dlEi
dTPi
measures the impact of changing the full retirement age on early
retirement. To quantify it we need
dlEi
dTPi
, which we get by estimating the effect of
the reform on months spent in retirement before the statutory retirement date. We
calibrate PE as a conservative 70 per cent of the average or median value of yearly
pension payments in the data (roughly 13,100 and 16,300 euros, respectively).66 We
check alternative parametrizations of τ ranging from 30 per cent to 40 per cent
for robustness. Notice that the average personal income tax rate for the median
income (roughly 22,000 euros) is 24 per cent without considering tax credits and
social security contributions. We calibrate τPi starting from τi and including the tax
credit available for the median or average value of the pension payment, depending
on the one we use in the calibration.67 Finally, we obtain the mechanical effects in
the denominator of (1.23) by subtracting the behavioural response PEi
dlEi
dTPi
to causal
estimates of the effect of the policy on pension outlays.
To calibrate the foregone earnings of individuals who are not hired in column
5 of Table 1.6 we employ publicly available Labor Force Survey data provided by
the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). We calibrate the median labour
earnings losses using the median labour earnings of new hires in the 3-month period
following the hiring event.68 First, we compute the share of new hired workers for any
combination of full-time/part-time and temporary/permanent contracts. Second, we
compute the median number of hours worked for each of these groups. Third, we
compute the median contract duration for temporary contracts to assess for which
portion of the 3-month period the workers would be employed in the counterfactual
scenario where they would find a temporary contract job. Since the median duration
of temporary contracts is above 3 months, we compute the losses over the entire 3-
month period for both permanent and temporary contracts. We then combine all
these calibrated values with a hourly wage of 9.89 euros (ISTAT).69 Our estimate
for the earnings loss is 2996.18 euros for every worker who is not marginally hired.
66 Workers claiming opzione donna (the main early retirement option) get on average roughly
65 per cent of full pension benefits that an individual would be entitled to if choosing the seniority
retirement option (INPS, 2016). Also, a small number of workers can retire before the statu-
tory date obtaining full pension entitlements thanks to some grandfathering clauses (see Appendix
Section 1.B). Hence, in the latter case our calibration understates the benefit received when em-
ployees retire before the post-reform statutory date. Therefore, we also show a calibration whereby
P e = 0.9 · P .
67For pensions below 15,000 euros the tax credit is equal to 1297+(583×(15000−Pension)/7000).
For pensions between 15,000 and 55,000 euros the formula is 1297× (55000− Pension)/40000.
683 months is the average job search period for workers who find a job in 2012-2015.
69The number is the average of the average hourly wage for new hires in the period 2014-2016.
It is the result of (9.74+9.95+9.99)/3 (ISTAT, I Differenziali Retributivi nel Settore Privato).
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1.H Additional figures and tables
Figure 1.H.1: Share of workers retiring at the full retirement date
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Notes: The figure shows the share of individuals who: (i) retire in a 1-year window around the
earliest among their full retirement dates (“Retired at FRD”); (ii) retire more than 1 year before
reaching the earliest among their full retirement dates (“Retired before FRD”); (iii) retire more
than 1 year after reaching the earliest among their full retirement dates (“Retired after FRD”).The
full retirement dates are the dates when an individual becomes eligible to receive benefits under:
(i) the old-age pension scheme; (ii) the seniority pension scheme. We define an individual as retired
when he/she starts collecting Social Security benefits. Shares are derived from authors calculations
on the INPS register of retirees.
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Figure 1.H.2: Age at retirement and number of new retirees by gender and type of
pension
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(d) Seniority pensions
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show the evolution of age at retirement of new retirees who worked as private-sector
employees, split by gender and type of pension. Panels (c) and (d) plot the evolution of the two-year moving
average (using lags only) of the number of new retirees who worked as private-sector employees, split by gender and
type of pension. We define an individual as retired when he/she starts collecting retirement benefits. The vertical
line represents the year when the Fornero pension reform becomes effective (2012).
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Figure 1.H.3: Reform-induced changes in the full retirement date
20
24
28
32
36
40
55 56 57 58 59 60
Age in 2011 (Years)
Co
nt
rib
u
tio
ns
 in
 2
01
1 
(Ye
a
rs
)
WOMEN
20
24
28
32
36
40
55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Age in 2011 (Years)
Co
nt
rib
u
tio
ns
 in
 2
01
1 
(Ye
a
rs
)
MEN
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Notes: The figure plots heat-maps showing the relationship between the reform-
induced change in the retirement date and the characteristics of the worker in
2011. The characteristics are workers’ gender, age, and years of contributions in
December 2011. The changes are constructed using the rules detailed in Table
1.H.1 under the assumptions listed in Section 1.5.1.1. The figure only reports
changes for workers expected to start collecting pension benefits by 2014 at the
reform date. The blank areas in the bottom left of the two plots are combina-
tions of age and years of contributions that do not ensure eligibility to collect
retirement benefits by 2014. The blank areas in the top right of the two plots are
combinations of age and years of contributions that ensure eligibility to collect
retirement benefits in 2011 or before.
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Figure 1.H.4: Post-reform retirement date - Forecast quality assessment
(a) All workers
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Notes: The figure shows a forecast quality assessment of the prediction of the post-reform retirement date. The
horizontal axis measures the difference (in years) between the observed retirement date and the predicted full
retirement date under post-reform rules. The sample includes all workers who were expected to retire by 2014 under
pre-reform rules and retired in the period 2012-2017. A positive difference implies that a worker retires after his/her
predicted full retirement date, a negative difference means that the individual retires earlier than predicted. We
define an individual as retired when he/she starts collecting Social Security benefits. Panel (a) plots the distribution
for the entire sample of workers, Panel (b) shows the breakdown by gender. Number of workers = 160,527.
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Figure 1.H.5: Do firms respond to retirement delays happening in the future?
(a) Layoffs
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Notes: The figure plots results of a modified version of specification (1.3). Whiskers represent 95
per cent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The treatment is
the firm-level average change in the full retirement date of full-time workers who were expected to
retire either in 2015 or in 2016. The regressions are estimated on the universe of private sector firms
with a single Contribution Identification Number that: (i) were active every year in the period
2009-2015; (ii) employed between 3 and 200 employees in the first quarter of 2009; (iii) employed
at least one worker who was expected to retire in 2015 or 2016; and (iv) employed no potential
retirees, i.e. no full-time workers who were expected to retire by 2014. Number of observations =
265,216. Mean outcomes pre-reform: layoffs = 0.36; new hires = 3.5.
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Figure 1.H.6: Labour demand adjustments within and across occupation groups
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Notes: The figure plots the results of a modified version of specification (1.3), where the unit of analysis is the firm-
occupation group and there are two treatments. The specification also features occupation-year fixed effects and
standard errors are clustered at the firm-occupation level. Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. The
occupation groups are blue-collars, white-collars and managers. The first treatment is the average change in the full
retirement date of potential retirees employed at the firm in the same occupation group when the reform is passed
(“Within”). The second treatment is the average change of the full retirement date of potential retirees who work
in any other occupation group within the firm (”Others”). We define potential retirees as those full-time workers
who were expected to retire within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the reform is implemented. The
regressions are estimated on the universe of private sector firms with a single Contribution Identification Number
that: (i) were active every year in the period 2009-2015; (ii) employed between 3 and 200 employees in the first
quarter of 2009; (iii) had at least two occupation groups with at least three workers in 2009; and (iv) employed at
least one potential retiree in the last quarter of 2011. Number of observations = 580,734. Mean outcomes pre-reform
at the firm-occupation level: layoffs = 0.14; new hires = 2.18.
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Figure 1.H.7: Labour demand adjustments in firms with high and low turnover rates
in the pre-reform period
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Notes: The figure shows the heterogeneous effect of a 1-year increase of Ti on firms with high (above the median)
and low (below the median) turnover rates in the pre-reform period. Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Estimates are based on a modified version of specification
(1.3), which reads:
Yit = λi + γt +
2015∑
k=2009
βTk 1(k = t)× Ti +
2015∑
k=2009
βT,tok 1(k = t)× Ti × TOi +
2015∑
k=2009
βtok 1(k = t)× TOi + εit
Purple dots plot the coefficients βTk s, while light blue dots plot the linear combinations β
T
k +β
T,to
k . TOi is a dummy
that takes value 1 if firm i belongs to the top half of the distribution of pre-refrom turnover rates. We define the
turnover rate as the average number of layoffs, quits and terminations of temporary contracts in the pre-reform
period (2009-2011), normalized by employment at the beginning of the period (first quarter of 2009). Ti is the
average change in the full retirement date of potential retirees employed at a given firm when the pension reform
is passed. We define potential retirees as those full-time workers who were expected to retire within three years
(by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the reform is implemented. The regression is estimated on the universe of
private sector firms with a single Contribution Identification Number that: (i) were active every year in the period
2009-2015; (ii) employed between 3 and 200 employees in the first quarter of 2009; and (iii) employed at least one
potential retiree in the last quarter of 2011. Number of observations = 430,038. Mean outcome pre-reform: layoffs
= 0.39; new hires = 4.79.
CHAPTER 1. 76
Figure 1.H.8: Labour demand adjustments: robustness to alternative specifications
and samples
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Notes: The figure shows the robustness of the main estimates on layoffs (Panel a) and new hires (Panel b). Whiskers
represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Estimates based on
specification (1.3) and reported in figures 1.3 and 1.4 (“Baseline”) are confronted with estimates from augmented
versions of specification (1.3) that feature: (i) the interaction between year fixed effects and quintiles of the share
of female workers at the firm (“Gender controls”); (ii) the interaction between year fixed effects and quintiles of the
share of female workers, firm size, firm age, firm average wage, the share of young (≤ 35), middle-aged (36−55) and
older (> 55) workers (“Additional controls”); (iii) province-year fixed effects and sector-year fixed effects (“Province-
Sector × Year FE”). Furthermore, we estimate versions of specification (1.3) that: (iv) include year 2008 (“Extra
Year”); (v) include firms that did not employ any potential retiree at the time of the reform (“Universe of Firms”).
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Figure 1.H.9: Labour demand adjustments: layoffs by firm size
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Notes: The figure shows the post-reform percentage change in layoffs by firm size at the
beginning of the period (first quarter of 2009). The plotted coefficients are obtained by
re-scaling the coefficients associated to the term Ti × Postt in specification (1.4) by the
pre-reform mean outcome. Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. The vertical red line separates firms where a more
stringent dismissal discipline applies (> 15 employees) from other firms. The treatment Ti
is defined as the average change in the full retirement date of potential retirees employed
at the firm when the pension reform is passed. We define potential retirees as those full-
time workers who were expected to retire within three years (by 2014) under pre-reform
rules when the reform is implemented. The regressions are estimated on the universe
of private sector firms with a single Contribution Identification Number that: (i) were
active every year in the period 2009-2015; (ii) employed between 3 and 200 employees in
the first period of 2009; and (iii) employed at least one potential retiree in the last period
of 2011. Observations: [3,15] = 239,995; (15,30] = 81,354; (30,50] = 50,295; (50,200] =
58,394. Mean outcome pre-reform: [3,15] = 0.26; (15,30] = 0.39; (30,50] = 0.51; (50,200]
= 0.78.
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Figure 1.H.10: Cost of Layoffs
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Notes: The figure shows the effect of separating from a firm because of a layoff on subse-
quent labour earnings. Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. Coefficients
come from a difference-in-differences specification estimated on a sample constructed by
matching fired individuals to similar workers who did not separate from the firm where
they were incumbent at the time of the reform. The matching is achieved through a
coarsened exact matching procedure. The matching covariates are: age, sex, wage, occu-
pation, a dummy for permanent contracts, a dummy for full-time contracts, experience,
sector, province and firm size. Mean outcome pre-reform = 28,532.71.
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Figure 1.H.11: Co-workers’ earnings: the cost of layoffs vs within-firm dynamics
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Notes: The figure shows the share of the earnings decline experienced by full-time per-
manent co-workers that can be imputed to layoffs. Co-workers are full-time permanent
employees who were not expected to retire within 3 years when the reform is passed
and who worked in a firm with at least one potential retiree belonging to the sample
described in Subsection 1.5.2. We define potential retirees as those full-time workers who
were expected to retire within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the reform
is implemented. Worker-level observations are aggregated at the level of the firm where
workers were incumbents in the last quarter of 2011. The black line represents the effect
of a 1-year increase of Ti on total labour earnings. Labor earnings are winsorized at the
99th percentile. The blue-shaded area represents the share of earnings loss imputed to
layoffs. This area is the result of computations combining estimates of the cost of job
losses and estimates of the effect of the reform on total layoffs (Section 1.9.1).
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Figure 1.H.12: Co-workers’ earnings by age: the cost of layoffs vs within-firm dy-
namics
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Notes: The figure shows the share of the earnings decline experienced by full-time permanent
co-workers that can be imputed to layoffs for young workers (≤ 35, Panel a), middle-aged workers
(aged 36-55, Panel b), and older workers (aged over 55, Panel c). See notes to Figure 1.H.11 for
more details.
CHAPTER 1. 81
Table 1.H.1: Pre- and post-reform pension requirements - Additional Details
Panel (a): Old-age pension
Men Women
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
Age requirement
2011 65YA Not in place 60YA Not in place
2012 65YA 66YA 60YA 62YA
2013 65YA+3MA 66YA+3MA 60YA+3MA 62YA+3MA
2014 65YA+3MA 66YA+3MA 60YA+4MA 63YA+9MA
2015 65YA+3MA 66YA+3MA 60YA+6MA 63YA+9MA
2016 65YA+7MA 66YA+7MA 61YA+1MA 65YA+7MA
2017 65YA+7MA 66YA+7MA 61YA+5MA 65YA+7MA
2018 65YA+7MA 66YA+7MA 61YA+10MA 66YA+7MA
Contribution requirement
20YC 20YC 20YC 20YC
Waiting window
12 months No 12 months No
Panel (b): Seniority pension
Pre-reform Post-reform
Men Women
2011 Quota 96 (60YA and 35 YC) or 40 YC Not in place
2012 Quota 96 (60YA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+1MC 41YC+1MC
2013 Quota 97.3 (61YA+3MA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+5MC 41YC+5MC
2014 Quota 97.3 (61YA+3MA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+6MC 41YC+6MC
2015 Quota 97.3 (61YA+3MA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+6MC 41YC+6MC
2016 Quota 97.6 (61YA+7MA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+10MC 41YC+10MC
2017 Quota 97.6 (61YA+7MA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+10MC 41YC+10MC
2018 Quota 97.6 (61YA+7MA and 35 YC) or 40 YC 42YC+10MC 41YC+10MC
Waiting window
12 months No
Notes: The table reports the requirements for claiming old-age (Panel a) and seniority (Panel
b) pensions under pre-reform rules - had they remained in place - and under post-reform rules,
for private sector employees over the period 2012-2018. It takes into account the anticipated
upward adjustments due to increased life expectancy that took place in 2013 and 2016. YA
and MA flag the age requirement in terms of years and months, respectively. YC and MC
flag the contribution requirement in terms of years and months, respectively. The “waiting
window” is the period that elapses between the date when an individual becomes eligible to
claim a pension and the date when he/she can collect the first pension benefits. The “waiting
window” was set to 12 months in 2011 for old-age pensions and seniority pensions under the
“quota” system. For those retiring upon reaching 40 years of contributions, the “waiting
window” was 13 months in 2012, 14 months in 2013 and 15 months from 2014 onward. The
“waiting window” has been abolished by the Fornero reform. For workers with at least 15
years of contributions by 1992, the contribution requirement of the old-age pension is 15 years
rather than 20. Very few workers, among those who were old enough to claim an old-age
pension by 2014 under pre-reform rules and had at least 15 years of contributions in 1992,
had accrued less than 20 years of contribution by 2011. We therefore do not take into account
this exception.
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Table 1.H.2: Placebo tests
Layoffs New Hires
(1) (2)
Panel (a)
Ti · Post 2009 0.013* -0.023
(0.007) (0.036)
(Ri/Ni) · Post 2009 0.002 -0.315***
(0.005) (0.081)
Panel (b)
Ti · Post 2010 0.007 0.002
(0.007) (0.037)
(Ri/Ni) · Post 2010 -0.010** -0.277***
(0.005) (0.060)
Observations 184,302 184,302
Mean outcome pre-2012 0.39 4.79
Mean Ti 1.37 1.37
Std. Dev. Ti 1.33 1.33
Mean Ri/Ni 0.06 0.06
Std. Dev. Ri/Ni 0.09 0.09
Notes: The table reports the coefficients from a set of placebo tests whereby we re-allocate
the reform date to December 2009 (Panel a) or December 2010 (Panel b). The first row of
every panel reports the effect of a 1σ increase of Ti, which is the average change in the full
retirement date of potential retirees employed at the firm when the reform is passed. The
second row of every panel reports the effect of a 1σ increase of Ri/Ni, which is the number
of potential retirees who delay retirement by at least one year with respect to the pre-reform
predicted full retirement date, divided by employment. We define potential retirees as those
full-time workers who were expected to retire within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules
when the reform is implemented. Estimates come from specification (1.4), restricting the
sample to the pre-reform period (2009-2011). The regressions are estimated on the universe
of private sector firms with a single Contribution Identification Number that: (i) were active
every year in the period 2009-2015; (ii) employed between 3 and 200 employees in the first
quarter of 2009; and (iii) employed at least one potential retiree in the last quarter of 2011.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 1.H.3: Balancing tests
Ti Ri/Ni Mean
(1) (2) (3)
Share male employees -0.011*** 0.004*** 0.66
(0.001) (0.001)
Share employees aged ≤ 35 0.000 -0.017*** 0.30
(0.001) (0.001)
Share employees aged (35,55] -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.58
(0.001) (0.001)
Share employees aged > 55 0.010*** 0.028*** 0.12
(0.001) (0.001)
Employees tenure -0.105*** 0.295*** 8.21
(0.020) (0.024)
Employees experience -0.132*** 0.324*** 16.48
(0.002) (0.002)
Employment 0.492*** -7.237*** 25.80
(0.114) (0.152)
Average daily wage 0.665 -1.574*** 92.05
(0.614) (0.373)
Share temporary employees 0.003*** -0.006*** 0.08
(0.001) (0.001)
Share full-time employees -0.002* -0.006*** 0.89
(0.001) (0.001)
Share blue-collars -0.002 0.010*** 0.61
(0.001) (0.001)
Share white-collars 0.001 -0.009*** 0.33
(0.001) (0.001)
Share managers 0.001 -0.002*** 0.02
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm age -0.151** -0.333*** 19.96
(0.051) (0.054)
Observations 60195 60195
Notes: The table reports a set of balancing tests whereby firms’ characteristics at the be-
ginning of the period (first quarter of 2009) are regressed on: (i) Ti, the change in the full
retirement date of potential retirees employed at the firm when the reform is passed (column
1); (ii) Ri/Ni, the number of potential retirees who delay retirement by at least one year with
respect to the predicted pre-reform full retirement date, divided by employment (column 2).
Both Ti and Ri/Ni are standardized to have mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to
1. We define potential retirees as those full-time workers who were expected to retire within
three years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the reform is implemented. All regressions
feature sector-province fixed effects, which in the cross-section of firms leads to the drop of
some singleton observations from the estimation. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are
clustered at the sector-province level. The regressions are estimated on the universe of private
sector firms with a single Contribution Identification Number that: (i) were active every year
in the period 2009-2015; (ii) employed between 3 and 200 employees in the first quarter of
2009; and (iii) employed at least one potential retiree in the last quarter of 2011.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 1.H.4: Firms with at least one potential retiree and other firms
Sample Other Firms
mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm size 25.85 32.05 8.06 9.83
Firm age 19.93 12.78 14.07 10.68
Share in manufacturing 0.44 0.50 0.26 0.44
Share in services 0.34 0.47 0.51 0.50
Share male employees 0.66 0.30 0.55 0.35
Share employees aged ≤ 35 0.30 0.19 0.46 0.28
Share employees aged (35-55] 0.58 0.19 0.49 0.27
Share employees aged > 55 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.11
Avg. employees tenure 8.21 4.82 5.67 4.13
Avg. employees experience 16.46 4.21 12.41 4.94
Share blue collars 0.61 0.32 0.56 0.37
Share white collars 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.36
Share managers 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.06
Share full-time contracts 0.89 0.17 0.74 0.30
Share permanent contracts 0.92 0.15 0.90 0.19
Avg. real daily wage 92.04 146.07 78.89 188.87
Observations 61,434 333,800
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for firms in our sample, as well as for other
firms with a single Contribution Identification Number, in the same size class (3-200) and
that remain active throughout the period 2009-2015. Firms’ characteristics are measured
at the beginning of the period (first quarter of 2009). Workers’ tenure and experience
are truncated at 27 years, because matched employer-employee data have been available
since 1983. Firms in our sample have a single Contribution Identification Number and:
(i) were active every year in the period 2009-2015; (ii) employed between 3 and 200
employees in the first quarter of 2009; and (iii) employed at least one potential retiree in
the last quarter of 2011.
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Table 1.H.5: Potential retirees and other workers
Potential retirees Other workers
mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.71 0.46 0.71 0.45
Age 57.77 2.89 40.91 9.77
Tenure 14.24 9.37 8.81 7.44
Experience in private sector 23.86 8.60 15.30 9.81
Blue collar 0.66 0.47 0.60 0.49
White collar 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.47
Manager 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19
Open-ended contract 0.96 0.20 0.90 0.30
Daily gross real wage 109.74 114.52 102.17 111.78
Observations 98,358 1,434,381
Notes: The table reports the characteristics at the beginning of the period (first quarter
of 2009) of potential retirees and full-time co-workers employed in firms belonging to our
sample. Tenure and experience are truncated at 27 years, because matched employer-employee
data have been available since 1983 only. Firms in our sample have a single Contribution
Identification Number and: (i) were active every year in the period 2009-2015; (ii) employed
between 3 and 200 employees in the first quarter of 2009; and (iii) employed at least one
potential retiree in the last quarter of 2011.
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Table 1.H.6: Potential retirees and other similar older workers: absences from work
Other older workers Potential retirees Difference
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prob. sickness 0.30 0.46 0.35 0.40 0.05***
Prob. work-related injury 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.01***
Prob. leave 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.21 0.01***
Observations 550,108 93,835
Notes: The table reports the probability of being absent from work due to sickness, work-
related injuries or leave in the pre-reform period (2009-2011), for potential retirees and
similar older employees (aged 50 and above) who are matched - via an exact matching
procedure - along several dimensions. Matching covariates are: age, experience, gender,
type of contract (permanent vs. temporary), occupation (blue-collar, white-collar, man-
ager), as well as firm’s province, sector and size. We find a match for 95.4 per cent of
all potential retirees in our sample. The last column reports the difference between the
third and the first column.
*, **, *** indicate that the difference is significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level,
respectively.
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Table 1.H.7: The effect of the reform on the working lives of potential retirees
Months Months Months
Worked in Retirement in Retirement
(Benchmark)
(1) (2) (3)
δθ · Post 1.250*** -1.787*** -2.136***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 688,492 688,492 688,492
Mean outcome pre-2012 11.28 0 0
Mean δθ 1.36 1.36 1.36
Std. Dev. δθ 1.40 1.40 1.40
Notes: The table reports estimates from a richer individual-level version of specification
(1.4), where the unit of analysis is the single potential retiree in our sample of firms, the
treatment is δθ and there are individual, age-year and gender-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. We define potential retirees as those full-time
workers who were expected to retire within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules
when the reform is implemented. Coefficients measure the effect of a 1-year shift in
the full retirement date δθ (as defined in equation (1.1)) on months worked, months in
retirement, and predicted (benchmark) months in retirement if the workers retired at
the post-reform predicted date. We define an individual as retired when he/she starts
collecting retirement benefits.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 1.H.10: Do firms respond to retirement delays happening in the future?
Layoffs New Hires
(1) (2)
T 45i · Post 0.0076 -0.030
(0.0050) (0.028)
Observations 265,216 265,216
Mean outcome pre-2012 0.36 3.5
Mean T 45i 2.01 2.01
Std. Dev. T 45i 1.45 1.45
Notes: The table reports the results of a modified version of specification (1.4). Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. The treatment is the firm-level
average change in the full retirement date of full-time workers who were expected to retire
in either 2015 or 2016 when the reform is passed (T 45i ). The regressions are estimated
on the universe of private sector firms with a single Contribution Identification Number
that: (i) were active every year in the period 2009-2015; (ii) employed between 3 and
200 employees in the first quarter of 2009; (iii) employed at least one worker who was
expected to retire in 2015 or 2016 in the last quarter of 2011; and (iv) employed no
potential retiree, i.e. no full-time worker who was expected to retire by 2014.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 1.H.11: Labour demand adjustments within and across occupation groups
Layoffs New Hires
(1) (2)
Twithini · Post 0.037*** -0.120***
(0.007) (0.040)
T othersi · Post 0.012*** -0.047
(0.003) (0.030)
Observations 580,734 580,734
Mean outcome pre-2012 0.14 2.18
Mean Twithini 0.57 0.57
Std. Dev. Twithini 1.04 1.04
Mean T othersi 1.02 1.02
Std. Dev. T othersi 1.2 1.2
P-value one-sided test 0.00 0.07
Notes: The table reports the results of a modified version of specification (1.4), where
the unit of analysis is the firm-occupation group and there are two treatments. The
specification also features occupation-year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered
at the firm-occupation level. The occupation groups are blue-collars, white-collars and
managers. The first treatment is the average change of the full retirement date of potential
retirees employed at the firm in the same occupation group when the reform is passed
(Twithini ). The second treatment is the average change of the full retirement date of
potential retirees who work in any other occupation group within the firm (T othersi ). We
define potential retirees as those full-time workers who were expected to retire within 3
years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the reform is implemented. The table also
reports the p-value of a one-sided test for the difference between the two coefficients. The
regressions are estimated on the universe of private sector firms with a single Contribution
Identification Number that: (i) were active every year in the period 2009-2015; (ii)
employed between 3 and 200 employees in the first quarter of 2009; (iii) had at least two
occupation groups with at least three workers in 2009; and (iv) employed at least one
potential retiree in the last quarter of 2011.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 1.H.12: Labour demand adjustments in firms with high and low turnover rates
in the pre-reform period
Layoffs New hires
(1) (2)
Ti · Post 0.015*** -0.043**
(0.005) (0.022)
Ti · Post · High Turnover 0.042*** -0.041
(0.012) (0.060)
Observations 430,038 430,038
Mean outcome pre-2012 0.39 4.79
Mean Ti 1.37 1.37
Std. Dev. Ti 1.33 1.33
Notes: The table reports the heterogeneous effect of a 1-year increase of Ti on layoffs and
new hires in firms with high (above the median) and low (below the median) turnover
rates in the pre-reform period. Estimates come from a modified version of specification
(1.4), which reads:
Yit = λi + γt + β
T Ti · Postt + βT,to Ti · Postt × TOi + βto Postt · TOi + εit
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Ti is the average change in the full
retirement date of potential retirees employed at a given firm when the pension reform
is passed. We define potential retirees as those full-time workers who were expected to
retire within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the reform is implemented.
TOi is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if firm i belongs to the top half of the
distribution of turnover in the pre-reform period. Turnover is defined as the average
share of layoffs, quits and terminations of temporary contracts in the pre-reform period
(2009-2011), normalized by employment at the beginning of the period (first quarter of
2009). The regressions are estimated on the universe of private sector firms with a single
Contribution Identification Number that: (i) were active every year in the period 2009-
2015; (ii) employed between 3 and 200 employees in the first quarter of 2009; and (iii)
employed at least one potential retiree in the last quarter of 2011.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 1.H.15: The components of the fiscal externality
Potential retirees Co-workers
(1) (2)
Labour earnings 20,708.28*** -27,416.8***
(1,076.507) (6,281.804)
Pension entitlements -18,752.2*** 81.57
(528.340) (564.589)
Disability benefits 198.010*** 112.562
(22.150) (158.488)
Non-work Subsidies 1,054.629*** 6,908.183***
(152.693) (2,093.375)
Early retirement (months) 2.15*** 0.713***
(0.000) (0.270)
Notes: The table reports the sum of coefficients {βTk }k=2015k=2012 from specification (1.3). The
treatment Ti is defined as the average shift in the full retirement date of potential retirees
employed at the firm when the reform is implemented. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the firm level. We define potential retirees as those full-time workers
who were expected to retire within 3 years (by 2014) under pre-reform rules when the
reform is implemented.Worker-level observations are aggregated at the level of the firm
where workers were incumbents in the last quarter of 2011. Column 1 reports the es-
timates for the sample of potential retirees, while column 2 displays the effect on their
co-workers. Labour earnings, pension benefits and disability benefits are winsorized at
the 99th percentile, while non-work subsidies are winsorized at the 99.99th percentile.
The regressions are estimated on the universe of private sector firms with a single Con-
tribution Identification Number that: (i) were active every year in the period 2009-2015;
(ii) employed between 3 and 200 employees in the first quarter of 2009; and (iii) employed
at least one potential retiree in last quarter of 2011.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Chapter 2
Pension reforms and labour supply: evidence from
Italy
2.1 Introduction
Population ageing is one of the main challenges that many countries are con-
fronted with. The old-age dependency ratio in OECD countries was equal to 27.9 in
2015, up from 19.5 in 1975, and is projected to double by 2075 (OECD, 2017).1 This
demographic transformation exerts mounting pressure on the financial sustainability
of public pension systems: over the 1980-2015 period, public pension spending has
increased from 5.5 per cent to 7.5 per cent of GDP. Spurred by these trends, many
countries have implemented or are considering enacting pension reforms that aim to
encourage elderly labour force participation and contain pension expenditures, by
reducing the generosity of retirement benefits or tightening eligibility criteria.
A rich literature has explored how these changes in the public pension systems affect
employment at older ages, as well as the retirement and benefit claiming decisions.
Individuals, however, sometimes become aware of modifications of retirement rules
at earlier stages of their life and before they come near to making those decisions. A
feature common to many reforms is, indeed, the presence of grandfathering clauses
and gradual phase-in schedules; this means that new provisions do not apply to
workers on the cusp of retirement, while they partially or fully affect younger ones.2
In such circumstances, do individuals start changing their behaviour in the after-
math of the reform announcement? In particular, do they adjust their labour supply
and how do adjustments evolve over time? Have, therefore, pension reforms broader
and further labour supply effects than those documented at the very end of an indi-
vidual’s active life? These are the questions that I attempt to address in this paper.
To do so, I study the labour supply dynamics of a sample of private-sector workers
who were aged 35-45 at the time when a pension reform enacted in Italy changed the
1The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the ratio between the number of individuals aged
65 and above and the number of individuals in the working-age population (ages 20-64).
2As an example, the 1983 amendments to the US Social Security Act gradually raised the normal
retirement age from 65 to 67 for cohorts born after 1937; affected individuals where therefore not
older than 45 at the time of the announcement.
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way in which a portion of their retirement benefits would be calculated. In 1995 the
Dini pension reform, named after the then Prime Minister, started the transition
to a notional defined-contribution (NDC) public pension scheme, whilst retaining a
pay-as-you-go system. The reform affected the expected level of retirement benefits,
likely lowering them for those who planned to claim early, as well as the ability to
forecast their amount, by making them subject to macro-economic and demographic
risks. Furthermore, it tightened the link between contributions paid to Social Secu-
rity and benefits received; it also changed the incentive to delay claiming benefits
past eligibility, thus possibly lengthening the working horizon.
The reform envisaged a long transitional phase and featured grandfathering clauses.
Specifically, those who had accumulated at least 18 years of contributions to Social
Security by 1995 were completely grandfathered: their retirement benefits would
still be computed according to the pre-reform formula. On the other hand, those
with less than 18 years of contributions were only partially grandfathered: the new
NDC formula would apply to contributions accrued from 1996 onward, while the
pre-reform formula would apply to earlier insurance years. I leverage this feature of
the reform by comparing individuals who were barely fully grandfathered, i.e. those
who had slightly more than 18 years of contributions (control), to those who were
barely only partially grandfathered, i.e. those with slightly less than 18 years of
contributions (treated).
I follow individuals from the beginning of the decade when the reform took place
(1990) until 2006, when they are aged 46-56 and are still at least 4 or 5 years away
from reaching benefit claiming eligibility. To do so, I exploit the availability of
individual-level administrative panel data spanning the entire contribution histories
of a random sample of private-sector workers. I leverage this data both to iden-
tify treated and control workers and to build measures of labour supply, by looking
at days covered by (all and work-related only) contributions to Social Security, as
well as the associated earnings. I estimate a generalized version of a difference-in-
differences model. This specification allows me to asses both whether treated and
control individuals were on parallel trends before the reform, as well as how post-
reform labour supply adjustments unfold over time.
The setting provided by the Dini reform is attractive insofar as there are middle-
aged individuals who learn years before coming near the retirement and benefit
claiming decisions that there will be changes to the way in which a part of their
pension benefits will be calculated. At the same time, there are similar individuals,
those who just happen to have made slightly more contributions to Social Security
by the end of 1995, who are not affected by new provisions. On the other hand,
the setting has also some disadvantages. First, the reform was passed in August of
1995 and the variable that separates fully grandfathered to partially grandfathered
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individuals is not a fixed characteristic, such as the year of birth as in many reforms;
it is instead a choice variable. Besides focusing on individuals with very similar con-
tribution histories, in the main specification I exclude those who are in the 4-week
window on either side of the 18-year threshold.
Second, as I explain in detail in Section 2.3, in 1992 there was another pension reform
(the Amato reform) that on average affected to a larger extent treated individuals
than control ones, by lengthening the reference period over which pensionable earn-
ings were computed and by increasing the contribution requirement to claim an old-
age pension. While pre-1995 coefficients in the generalized difference-in-differences
specification show that treated and control individuals were on substantially paral-
lel trends before 1995, I cannot claim that post-1995 coefficients only capture the
impact of the Dini reform or that there would have not been any effect absent the
Dini reform.
I find that treated individuals increase their labour supply by at most a small amount
over the period studied; the effects become statistically significant few years after
the Dini reform and tend to grow over time. For instance, the coefficients associ-
ated to the number of days covered by work-related contributions to Social Security,
a measure of employment, is equal to 3 in 1998 and 5.5 in 2006, compared to an
average of 292 among treated individuals in the pre-1996 period.
I then perform a set of robustness checks. First, I show that results remain very
similar when including observations that are very close to the 18-year threshold.
Second, I run placebo exercises whereby I set the threshold that separates fully
grandfathered from partially grandfathered individuals at 19 or 20 years of contri-
butions, rather than at 18. All individuals in the placebo samples are not affected
by the changes in the computation of pension benefits brought about by the Dini
reform. Post-1995 coefficients in the placebo exercises are in general small and not
significantly different from 0. However, some notes of caution emerge as well.3
Finally, I perform heterogeneity analyses. When looking at each dimension of het-
erogeneity separately, I find that effects seem to be stronger among women and, by
measuring education with a proxy, among high-educated individuals; furthermore,
they tend to be larger among relatively low earners, who are more likely to see their
retirement benefits reduced if they claim early. Results based on age at the time of
the reform are inconclusive. The self-employed are more likely to see their benefits
reduced than employees: while there is no substantial differential response in terms
of days worked, self-reported earnings increase by more. I conclude by considering
all dimensions of heterogeneity together: coefficients preserve their sign, but in most
3In the former exercise (19-year threshold), some of pre-1995 coefficients are significantly differ-
ent from 0, suggesting a deviation from parallel trends before the Dini reform; in the latter exercise
(20-year threshold) post-1995 coefficients relative to earnings are sometimes not much smaller than
the true ones.
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cases attenuate in size and lose statistical significance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related
literature; Section 2.3 explains the institutional setting; Section 2.4 describes the
data; Section 2.5 presents the empirical strategy; Section 2.6 discusses the results;
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
This paper relates to the literature that studies how the design of public pension
systems affects labour supply and that exploits pension reforms as natural experi-
ments: due to grandfathering clauses and gradual phase-in schedules, many pension
reforms allow the identification of groups of otherwise similar individuals who are
subject to different retirement rules.
A seminal example is the work of Krueger and Pischke (1992). They examine the
1977 amendments to the US Social Security Act, which unexpectedly and substan-
tially reduced social security benefits for the “notch” cohorts born in 1917-1921,
while not affecting earlier cohorts. They find that lower social security wealth did
not halt the declining trend in labor force participation of older individuals observed
in the 1970s and 1980s. A number of papers have studied the effect of increasing the
normal retirement age. The focus is mostly on employment, retirement and benefit
claiming decisions of individuals “at risk of retirement” (Hanel and Riphahn (2012),
p. 720), i.e. who are very close or past the eligibility for early retirement. The gen-
eral finding is that a higher normal retirement age leads to delayed labour market
exit and benefit claiming.4 Other studies examine increases in the early retirement
age. In these cases, the focus is mostly on employment and retirement effects at ages
in between the old and the new early retirement age. These works generally report
an increase in labour supply at these ages, but also provide evidence of program
4An example is Mastrobuoni (2009). He analyzes the 1983 amendments to the US Social
Security Act, which gradually raised the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 for cohorts born after
1937: he focuses on individuals aged 61-65 - being 62 the early retirement age - and documents that
the age at retirement increases by around half as a much as the increase in the normal retirement
age. The same reform has been evaluated by Behaghel and Blau (2012); looking at individuals aged
62 and above, they report that the spike in benefit claiming moves from age 65 to the cohort-specific
full retirement age. Another example is the work of Hanel and Riphahn (2012), who examine a
reform that gradually raised the normal retirement age for women from 62 to 64 in Switzerland,
while introducing a penalty for early benefit claiming at age 62. Focusing on women aged 60-65,
they find a decline in retirement probability at the pre-reform normal retirement age. The same
reform has been analyzed in the work of Lalive et al. (2017).
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substitution effects.5,6
Closer to my work, a number of papers study whether pension reforms affect also the
behaviour of individuals who are farther away from retirement and benefit claiming
decisions. French (2005) develops a model of life-cycle labour supply, retirement
and saving behaviour where individuals can save to buffer against health shocks and
wage shocks, as well as to finance retirement, whereas they cannot borrow against
future income, including that from Social Security; furthermore there are fixed costs
of working on the sides of the employees and the employer. In such a model, most
life-cycle labour supply adjustments would occur along the extensive margin; this
implies that the labour supply elasticity of older workers, who are nearest the partic-
ipation margin decision, is higher than that of younger cohorts. Hence, retirement
incentives would affect the former to a larger extent than the latter. For instance,
simulations show that a 20 per cent reduction of social security benefits, framed
within the US Social Security and pension system, would increase the labour supply
at all ages, but especially past the early retirement age (age 62; French, 2005 and
French and Jones, 2012).
Duggan et al. (2007) examine the effect of the 1983 amendments to the US So-
cial Security Act on enrollment into the disability insurance program: they find an
increase in take-up rates not only among individuals aged 55-64, but also among
younger cohorts (of ages between 45 and 54). Other papers evaluate the effect of
changes to the minimum retirement age, which lengthen the working horizon of in-
dividuals. Exploiting changes that took place in Italy between the mid-1990s and
the early 2000s, Brunello and Comi (2015) report that a higher minimum retirement
age increases participation in training programs among private-sector workers aged
40-54.7 Leveraging a pension reform that in 2004 increased the age requirement to
claim a seniority pension from 57 (resp. 58) to 60 (resp. 61) for employees (resp.
self-employed), Bertoni et al. (2018) further show that an expected longer working
horizon increases healthy behaviours among Italian male workers of ages between
5Examples are the works of Atalay and Barrett (2015) and Cribb et al. (2016). The former
studies the effect of gradually extending the female minimum age for claiming the age pension in
Australia from 60 to 65. Restricting the attention to women aged 60-64, it reports a 12 to 19
per cent decline of the probability of retirement per every one-year increase of age eligibility. The
latter assesses the effects of gradually increasing the early retirement age for women in UK from
60 to 62, documenting a positive impact on employment at ages 60 and 61 (6.3 percentage points).
Another example is the work of Staubli and Zweimu¨ller (2013), who evaluate the increase of the
early retirement age in Austria, from 60 to 62 for men and from 55 to 58.25 for women. They
study employment effects in the broader age range 57-64 for the former and 52-59 for the latter:
they document that a one year increase of the early retirement age raises employment of women
and men during that year by 11 and 9.75 percentage points, respectively.
6Other recent papers that study the effect of public pension systems on labour supply are
Liebman et al. (2009), Vestad (2013), Fetter and Lockwood (2018) and Seibold (2019).
7Montizaan et al. (2010) find similar effects when studying participation on training courses
at age 56 for Ducth public-sector employees who were subject to the abolition of pre-pension
plans that would have allowed them to retire at age 62.25; the same workers also experienced a
deterioration of mental health at age 58 (de Grip et al., 2011).
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42 and 51.
Focusing on labour supply, Hairault et al. (2010) exploit the features of the French
pension system and a reform that in 1993 increased the number of insurance quarters
needed to claim a pension. They study how the distance to retirement influences the
employment probabilities of workers aged 50-59, 60 being the minimum retirement
age: they find a positive effect among workers aged 55-59, but not among younger
cohorts. Leveraging a pension reform that suddenly and heterogeneously changed
the minimum retirement age in Italy in 2011, Carta and De Philippis (2019) doc-
ument an increase in labor force participation not only for women aged 55-59, but
also - albeit to a lower extent - for younger ones (of ages between 45 and 54); they
call this effect a “perspective effect”.8 The “anticipation effect” is also studied in
Engels et al. (2017), who analyze the 1992 German pension reform that introduced
deductions when claiming benefits between the early retirement age (60) and the
normal retirement age. They report that employment rose not only for women aged
60 and above, but also for women aged 55-59.9
Finally, there are papers which have studied the effect of the Italian pension reforms
that took place in the 1990s on the accumulation of private wealth. Attanasio and
Brugiavini (2003) examine the 1992 Amato pension reform, which reduced social
security wealth to a larger extent for public sector employees than for private sec-
tor ones and for younger cohorts than for older ones: based on data that spans the
1989-1995 period, they document an increase in private saving rates. As in my work,
Bottazzi et al. (2006) consider differences among workers with more or less than 18
years of contributions by the end of 1995, the threshold that in the 1995 Dini re-
form separates those fully grandfathered from those only partially grandfathered.
They find that individuals partially update their expectations of age at retirement
and the replacement rate following the reform of the 1990s. Furthermore they con-
firm the positive effect on the accumulation of private wealth, particularly among
workers who are better informed about changes brought about by the reforms; the
component that increases more is real estate wealth (Bottazzi et al., 2011).
2.3 Institutional setting
In 1992 public pension spending in Italy, which runs a pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
system, amounted to 12.5 per cent of GDP, almost two times as large as the OECD
average. This figure reflected a combination of factors: a high old-age dependency
ratio (25); generous rules governing both the computation of pension benefits and
eligibility for early and full retirement, especially for public sector employees.
8Before the reform, private sector female employees became eligible for an old-age pension upon
turning 60.
9They also find that unemployment decreases before age 60, while increasing after that age.
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In September 1992 Italy experienced a foreign-exchange crisis; in 1993 real GDP
fell by 0.7 per cent, recording the first contraction since 1975, and employment
decreased by 2.8 per cent, the largest drop since the post-war period (Banca d’Italia,
1993). Against this backdrop of deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals and high
pension spending, two reforms of the pension system were implemented: the 1992
Amato reform and the 1995 Dini reform. Both reforms envisaged grandfathering
clauses and long transitional periods before reaching a complete phase-in. Due to
this, there are otherwise similar workers who have been affected by new provisions
to a different extent.
The existence of full and partial grandfathering clauses created a web of complex
rules for the computation of benefits during the transitional phases. Nonetheless, it
is always possible to re-write the formula that computes first year annual pension
benefits (b) as a generalization of the following expression:
b = yield rate · pensionable earnings = γ · f(yth , yth+1 , ..., yR−1, yR; Π) (2.1)
where, borrowing the terminology adopted by Hamann (1997), γ and Π are the
yield rate and the accrual rate, respectively. Earnings y from year th to the last
contribution year R are re-evaluated according to the accrual rate Π and transformed
into pensionable earnings based on a certain function f . Pensionable earnings are
then converted into pension benefits using the yield rate γ.10 The Amato reform
lengthened the reference period (th : R) over which to compute pensionable earnings.
Within the framework of a PAYG system, the Dini reform started the transition
to a notional defined-contribution (NDC, henceforth) regime, which also implied
changes to γ, f and Π.
The following subsections describe the main features of the pension system before
the reforms and review the main regulatory changes for private sector workers, who
are the focus of the analysis in this paper. I distinguish, where applicable, provisions
which affected all individuals in a similar way from those that had a heterogeneous
impact due to grandfathering clauses. Further details on the formulae that are used
to compute pension benefits can be found in Appendix Section 2.A.
2.3.1 The pre-1993 regime
Female (resp. male) employees became eligible for an old-age pension upon
turning 55 (resp. 60) years old, conditional on having 15 years of contributions
to Social Security (SS contributions, henceforth).11 35 years of SS contributions,
regardless of age, entitled workers to a seniority pension. First year annual pension
10The accrual rate and the yield rate are therefore the rates used to re-evaluate past earnings
and to convert pensionable earnings into first year pension benefits, respectively.
11For female and male self-employed the age requirement for an old-age pension was being at
least 60 and 65 years old, respectively.
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benefits were computed according to the following version of equation (2.1):
b = k ·min(Nt0:R, 40) · y¯tl:R
= k ·min(Nt0:R, 40) ·
1
(L/52)
·
(
R∑
t=tl
ytΨt
)
(2.2)
with:
Ψt =
R∏
j=t
(1 + pij) for t = tl, ..., R− 2 and ΨR−1 = ΨR = 1 (2.3)
tl :
R∑
j=tl+1
nj
52
<
L
52
≤
R∑
j=tl
nj
52
(2.4)
where nj are weeks covered by SS contributions in year j. Pensionable earnings
were computed according to a complex function f . Earnings made in the final L
weeks covered by SS contributions were: re-evaluated according to the accrual rate
Ψ (coefficiente di rivalutazione), which reflected inflation (pi); averaged ( 1
L/52
); and
multiplied by lifetime years of SS contributions, which were however capped at 40
(min(Nt0:R, 40)). L was equal to 260 weeks (5 years) for employees and to 520 weeks
(10 years) for the self-employed.12
k, the yield rate (aliquota di rendimento), was 2 per cent for individuals whose av-
erage earnings in the final L weeks covered by SS contributions were below a certain
threshold. The threshold was adjusted upward every year to take into account infla-
tion. The average yield rate then declined, due to the fact that the marginal yield
rate was a decreasing step-way function of average earnings. This implied a lower
replacement rate for high-earners. Pension benefits for low-earners, on the other
hand, could amount to as much as 80 per cent of their final L-week average earnings
(2 per cent × 40 years of SS contributions).
While in the formula outlined in (2.2) pension benefits are a function of earnings and
not of money paid as SS contributions, years covered by SS contributions concur to
determine pensionable earnings, thus making the entire contribution history up to
the fortieth year relevant for the computation of benefits. The fact that years of SS
contributions beyond the fortieth were not taken into account lowered the incentive
to continue working past that date.
Pension benefits after the first year were indexed by taking into account both the
inflation rate and the real growth rate of earnings.
12Notice that if there are gaps in the contribution history of an individual, the final 260 (520)
weeks covered by SS contributions do not coincide with the last 260 (520) calendar weeks. In year
tl only the portion of earnings that is made during the weeks that are needed to reach the 260
(520) threshold is included in the summation term of (2.2).
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2.3.2 The 1992 Amato reform
The 1992 Amato reform intervened both on eligibility criteria for old-age pensions
and on the computation of pension benefits.
2.3.2.1 Provisions that affected all individuals in a similar way
The age requisite for old-age pensions of private sector employees was gradually
increased, over the period 1993-2000, from 55 to 60 for women and from 60 to 65
for men. Pension benefits after the first year were indexed only to inflation. First
year annual pension benefits became the sum of two “quotas”, Quota A and Quota
B:
b = kA ·NA · y¯tl:R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quota A
+ kB ·NB · y¯tq :R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quota B
(2.5)
The yield rate of Quota A (kA) was the same as before; with respect to pensionable
earnings, the only difference was that the average final L-week annual earnings were
no longer multiplied by lifetime years of SS contributions, but only by years of SS
contributions up to 1992 (NA).
With regards to Quota B, the yield rate (kB) started at 2 per cent as for Quota
A, but its decline at higher levels of average earnings followed a slightly different
trajectory than that of kA.
13 The years of SS contributions that concurred to deter-
mine pensionable earnings were those from 1993 to retirement (NB). If total years of
SS contributions (NA +NB) exceeded 40, the excess years beyond the fortieth were
subtracted from the computation of the “quota” that featured the lowest average
earnings. Furthermore, earnings were re-evaluated according to a higher accrual
rate ΨB, that took into account inflation and added a fixed 1 per cent for every year
until retirement.14
2.3.2.2 Provisions that affected workers differently due to grandfather-
ing clauses
With regards to average earnings in the Quota B part of pension benefits (y¯tq :R),
the Amato reform aimed at extending the reference period to the entire contribution
life. On this matter, however, the reform envisaged different grandfathering clauses
for three group of workers: (i) those with at least 15 years of SS contributions by
1992 (T1-92; mostly grandfathered); (ii) those with less than 15 years of SS contri-
13For those who started collecting pension benefits in 1993, for instance, the marginal yield
rates of Quota A were the following: 2 per cent in the [0, 53,475,000] bracket; 1.50 per cent in
the (53,475,000-71,121,750] bracket; 1.25 per cent in the (71,121,750; 88,768,500] bracket; 1 per
cent above 88,768,500. The marginal yield rates of Quota B were the following: 2 per cent in the
[0, 53,475,000] bracket; 1.60 per cent in the (53,475,000-71,121,750] bracket; 1.35 per cent in the
(71,121,750; 88,768,500]; 1.10 per cent in the (88,768,500-101,602,500] bracket; 0.9 per cent above
101,602,500. Money amounts are expressed in Italian Liras.
14Appendix Section 2.A provides the formal expressions of NA, NB and ΨB .
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butions by 1992 (T2-92; partially grandfathered); (iii) those who started accruing
contributions from 1993 onward (T3-92; not grandfathered).
Specifically, for individuals in the T1-92 group the reference period was gradually
lengthened to encompass the last 520 (resp. 780) weeks covered by SS contributions
for employees (resp. self-employed). For workers belonging to the T2-92 group the
reference period was further extended, to include all weeks covered by SS contri-
butions from 1993 to retirement and the last 260 (resp. 520) weeks covered by SS
contributions before 1993 for employees (resp. self-employed). Finally, for individ-
uals who entered the labour market after 1992 (T3-92) there was no Quota A, and
the reference period of Quota B spanned the entire contribution history.
Furthermore, the contribution requisite for claiming an old-age pension was grad-
ually raised from 15 years to 20 years over the 1993-2001 period for most workers,
but those belonging to group T1-92 were grandfathered.15
2.3.3 The 1995 Dini reform
The 1995 Dini reform intervened both on eligibility criteria for early retirement
and, in a more radical way than the Amato reform, on the method to compute first
year pension benefits. All these changes affected workers differently depending on
years of contributions by 1995.
Specifically, the reform legislated that SS contributions would accrue into a notional
account where they would be capitalized according to the 5-year moving average of
nominal GDP growth rate (g) and then summed to form the individual’s notional
capital. The accumulated capital would then be converted into first year annual
pension benefits by applying a transformation coefficient (βa, coefficiente di trasfor-
mazione), which is an increasing function of the benefit claiming age, as it reflects
the lower residual life expectancy of individuals who start claiming benefits later.
It was also legislated that the transformation coefficient had to be periodically ad-
justed to reflect the evolution of life expectancy. Assuming a constant social security
tax rate (τ), the formula for computing first year annual pension benefits once the
NDC regime is completely phased-in can be written as:
b = τ · βa ·
(
R∑
t=t0
ytGt
)
(2.6)
15The two other grandfathered groups were the following: first, those who had started accumu-
lating contributions at least 25 years before 1992 and had worked less than a full year for at least
ten years; second, those who had started accumulating contributions before 1992 and could not
reach 20 years of SS contributions by the time they would have satisfied the age requisite for an
old-age pension.
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with:
Gt =
R∏
j=t
(1 + gj) for t = t0, ..., R− 2 and GR−1 = GR = 1 (2.7)
The social security tax rate is equal to 33 per cent for employees, while it has grad-
ually risen from 20 to 24 per cent for the self-employed.16 G is the accrual rate
(coefficiente di capitalizzazione), which is a function of nominal GDP growth; τ · βa
can be thought as the yield rate. The function f is simpler than in the Quota A and
Quota B formulae, as pensionable earnings are just the sum of re-evaluated earnings
from year t0 to the last contribution year R.
The transition to the NDC regime was, however, very gradual. Specifically, the re-
form identified three groups of workers, who were subject to different grandfathering
clauses: (i) those with at least 18 years of SS contributions by 1995 (C95); (ii) those
with less than 18 years of SS contributions by 1995 (T1-95); (iii) those who started
contributing after 1995 (T2-95). Individuals belonging to group C95 were fully
grandfathered: pension benefits would still be computed using the formula modified
by the Amato reform. Workers belonging to the T1-95 group were only partially
grandfathered: the NDC system would apply pro-rata only to contributions accrued
from 1996 onward. Finally, individuals entering the labour market after 1995 were
fully covered by the new provisions.
In 2011 a major pension reform, the Fornero pension reform, extended the NDC
method pro-rata (i.e. to SS contributions made after 2011) also to individuals be-
longing to group C95. However, since my analysis spans over a period that does
not include that reform (1990-2006), I do not consider these further changes to the
formulae used to compute pension benefits.
Therefore, abstracting from the Fornero reform, following the 1995 Dini pension
reform social security benefits of individual i are computed in the following way:
b =

kA ·NA · y¯tl:R + kB ·NB · y¯tv :R, if i ∈ C95
kA ·NA · y¯tl:R+
+kB ·N1993:1995 · (y¯tv :R · 1(i ∈ T1-92) + y¯tw:R · 1(i ∈ T2-92) + y¯t0:R · 1(i ∈ T3-92)) +
+τ · βa ·
(∑R
t=1996 ytGt
)
, if i ∈ T1-95
τ · βa ·
(∑R
t=t0
ytGt
)
, if i ∈ T2-95
(2.9)
16For notational simplicity and to make the comparison with other formulae easier, τ is assumed
to be constant in equation (2.6). With a time-varying social security tax rate, the NDC formula
reads:
b = βa ·
(
R∑
t=t0
τtytGt
)
(2.8)
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where the explicit expressions for y¯tv :R, y¯tw:R and y¯t0:R are provided in Appendix
Section 2.A. As explained before, for individuals with at least 18 years of contri-
butions nothing changed with respect to what had been envisioned by the Amato
reform. On the other hand, for individuals with less than 18 years of contributions,
the weight of Quota B was greatly reduced, as it was only applied to contributions
made between 1993 and 1995 (N1993:1995).
For individuals entering the labour market after 1995, the seniority pension was
abolished and retirement benefits could be claimed from age 57, conditional on hav-
ing 5 years of effective contributions (see Section 2.4). For individuals belonging
to groups T1-95 and T2-95 a seniority pension could be claimed upon reaching 57
years of age and 35 years of SS contributions, or upon reaching 40 years of SS
contributions, regardless of age.17
2.3.4 How grandfathering clauses made similar workers different
After reviewing the main changes brought about by the 1992 and 1995 pension
reforms, I conclude this section by describing how the existence of grandfathering
clauses made otherwise similar workers subject to different regimes for the compu-
tation of pension benefits. I also discuss how such differences could affect labour
supply decisions. I restrict the attention to individuals barely assigned to the C95
group (i.e. workers with 18 or slightly more than 18 years of contributions by 1995)
and individuals barely assigned to the T1-95 group (i.e. workers with slightly less
than 18 years of contributions by 1995). These workers will be the focus of the
analysis carried out in the next sections.
The first thing to notice is that individuals belonging to the C95 group in 1995 were
in the T1-92 group three years before.18 Among individuals belonging to the T1-95
group, on the other hand, there are all individuals who are part of the T2-92 group,
because workers with less than 15 years of SS contributions by 1992 could not have
at least 18 years of SS contributions by 1995, and some workers - those who had
large enough contribution gaps between 1993 and 1995 - who belonged to the T1-92
group. Figure 2.1 depicts this graphically.
The 1992 Amato reform therefore affected individuals belonging to groups C95 and
T1-95 in a different way: first, the reference period over which to compute pension-
able earnings was lengthened on average to a lower extent for the former than for
the latter. The degree to which an extended reference period affects the level of first
year pension benefits depends on the steepness of the earnings-age profile: given that
17The age requisite for the seniority pension with 35 years of contributions and the contribution
requisite for the seniority pension with 40 years of contributions were phased-in gradually, over the
period 1996-2008.
18Workers who had at least 18 years of contributions by 1995 also had at least 15 years of
contributions by 1992.
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earnings in the Quota B formula are re-evaluated based on the inflation rate and
a fixed 1 per cent premium, including earlier earnings would increase pensionable
earnings for individuals who experience a null or feeble real earnings growth, whereas
it would reduce pensionable earnings for individuals with a more dynamic career.
While the incentive to work and contribute to social security throughout an indi-
vidual’s life was already present for everybody in the pre-1992 formula (due to the
presence of the term min(Nt0:R, 40)), extending the reference period for computing
pensionable earnings could increase the incentive to report high earnings earlier in
life. This could be especially relevant for the self-employed, who, unlike employees,
are not subject to double-reporting of earnings by third parties, and might therefore
more easily under-report them.
Second, the contribution requirement to claim an old-age pension increased more for
individuals in the T1-95 group (from 15 to 20 insurance years). A higher contribu-
tion requirement can result in increased labour supply, in order to meet it. However,
since I will focus my analysis on individuals who already have slightly more or less
than 18 years of SS contributions by 1995, this further difference may not have a
major differential effect on labour supply decisions.
The 1995 Dini reform then generated further and larger differences among the two
groups of individuals: while it did not affect individuals belonging to the C95 group,
it further changed the way in which pension benefits are computed for individuals
in the T1-95 group. Hamann (1997) provides a discussion of the long-run properties
of the Amato and the Dini systems, in a scenario where they would have both com-
pletely been phased-in. I elaborate on it and adapt it to assess the implications of
having SS contributions made from 1996 onward contribute to determine first year
pension benefits according to the NDC formula, rather than through the Quota B
formula.
First, for individuals belonging to the T1-95 group the level of pension benefits can
change. As explained in Subsection 2.3.3, the Dini reform has changed the yield
rate (τβa as opposed to kB) and the accrual rate (G as opposed to ΨB). Further-
more, it has changed the function f , i.e. the way in which earnings over the period
(th : R) are transformed into pensionable earnings, as well as the starting year of
the reference period (th).
Figure 2.2 compares the accrual rate in the Quota B and in the NDC regimes. On
the x-axis, there is the year when one euro is paid into SS contributions (contri-
bution year), while on the y-axis there is the value of this euro in the year when
the individual starts claiming benefits (first benefit claiming year). As I will focus
on individuals aged 35-45 at the time of the Dini reform, and given the eligibility
criteria for old-age and seniority pensions prevailing at that time, the first benefit
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claiming years span from 2011 to 2026.19 Figure 2.2 shows that the accrual rate
is higher in the NDC regime for earlier contribution years and in the earliest first
benefit claiming years; this is due to the relatively good performance of nominal
GDP growth in the 1990s, apart from the 1992-1993 crisis. For individuals retiring
later, the fewer are the contribution years for which the accrual rate is higher in
the NDC system and the larger is the difference in favour of the Quota B accrual
rate. This shows that periods of subdued macro-economic performance, such as
the one that started following the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the 2011 sovereign
debt crisis, negatively affect the level of pension benefits in the NDC system. In my
analysis, I focus on labour supply responses over the 1996-2006 period: the 5-year
moving average of the real GDP growth rate peaked at the beginning of the 2000s
and then started to decline. The extent to which individuals could foresee that the
performance of the Italian economy would further worsen is unknown and likely
varies based on individual characteristics such as education and occupation.
Figure 2.3 compares the yield rate in the Quota B and in the NDC regimes.20 The
figure features two panels because employees and self-employed have different yield
rates in the NDC regime.21 It shows that for employees, the yield rate under the
NDC regime is higher than the one under the Quota B regime only for high-earner
individuals (i.e. those for whom the marginal yield rate in the Quota B regime
is below 2 per cent) who start collecting retirement benefit relatively late (as the
transformation coefficient in the NDC regime increases with the benefit claiming
age). For the self-employed, given the reduced social security tax rate, the yield
rate of the NDC regime is always lower.
Overall, given the performance of the Italian economy, individuals belonging to the
T1-95 group are likely to experience a decline in first year annual pension benefits if
they are not high-earners and if they start collecting retirement benefits early; the
drop could be particularly pronounced for the self-employed, due to the lower yield
rate. On the other hand, high-earners and individuals who retire late could benefit
from the transition to the NDC regime, in which the yield rate increases with age at
19This interval is obtained assuming that individuals would start claiming benefits on January
1st of the year after the first one in which they reach eligibility for either an old-age or a seniority
pension, according to rules prevailing at the time of the Dini reform.
20The yield rate in the NDC regime is an increasing function of the benefit claiming age and
was revised downward in 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019 to reflect increases in life expectancy. The
yield rate in the Quota B regime does not vary with the benefit claiming age, but it starts at 2
per cent and then declines as average earnings grow and surpass various thresholds. In the figure
I plot the yield rate for average earnings below the first threshold, as well as the average yield rate
for average earnings that equal exactly the following thresholds. As an example, let the marginal
yield rate be 2 per cent in the bracket [0, x1] and 1.6 per cent in the bracket (x1, x2]. The average
yield rate (kB) for an individual whose average earnings (y¯tq :R) are equal to x2 is found by solving
the equation kB ·NB · x2 = 0.02 ·NB · x1 + 0.016 ·NB · (x2 − x1).
21The social security tax rate for the self-employed has gradually increased from 20 to 24 per
cent; the yield rate in Figure 2.3 is computed assuming a social security tax rate equals to 24 per
cent.
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retirement. Furthermore, there are two features of the Quota B formula that penal-
ize them: the yield rate which declines as average earnings grow and the 40-year cap
on years of SS contributions that can be taken into account. In Appendix Section
2.B, I describe how I simulate the expected change in annual pension benefits expe-
rienced by individuals barely assigned to the T1-95 group. I find that across several
alternative scenarios, whereby I vary the assumptions about real earnings growth,
the number of days worked and retirement decisions, the majority of individuals in
my sample (see Section 2.6) would experience a negative change.
Second, the transition to the NDC regime affects an individual’s ability to forecast
the level of pension benefits. In the Quota B regime the accrual rate is a function
of inflation and a fixed 1 per cent premium. In the NDC regime, on the other hand,
it is a function of the nominal GDP growth rate: besides reflecting changes in the
cost of living, it depends on the performance of the Italian economy and is therefore
subject to macro-economic risks. With regards to the accrual rate, while it is fixed
(within a given income bracket) in the Quota B regime, it is periodically adjusted
to reflect changes in life expectancy in the NDC regime and is thus subject to de-
mographic risks.
Third, in the NDC regime the link between SS contributions and pension benefits is
tighter. In the Quota B regime only years covered by SS contributions, but not the
amount paid, matter for the computation of pension benefits. In the NDC regime,
on the other hand, pension benefits are a function of money paid as SS contribu-
tions.
Fourth, the 1995 reform affects the incentives to delay collecting retirement benefits
past eligibility. In the Quota B regime, an additional year of work increases first
year pension benefits insofar as it translates into higher pensionable earnings. How-
ever, the yield rate does not vary with the benefit claiming age; furthermore, years
of contributions beyond the fortieth year are not taken into account, thus creating
an implicit disincentive to work past that date. In the NDC regime, on the other
hand, the transformation coefficient is a positive function of the benefit claiming age,
which increases the incentives to work an additional year and delay labour market
exit.
The changes described above can affect through multiple channels the labour sup-
ply decisions of individuals in their prime-age and, in general, of those not yet near
to retirement eligibility. The Amato and Dini pension reforms likely generated in-
come effects, insofar as they affected the level of pension benefits at any given benefit
claiming age. If most individuals belonging to the T1-95 group expect lower pension
benefits, which would typically be the case for the self-employed and for individuals
in the low and middle part of the earnings distribution planning to retire relatively
early, in order to maintain adequate levels of income when old they may increase
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labour supply not only near or past retirement eligibility, but also during middle-
age. The fact that in the NDC regime the transformation coefficient is an increasing
function of age at retirement and that years of contributions after the fortieth year
are not discarded also generates a price effect, increasing the incentives to continue
working an additional year. A longer working horizon may induce individuals to
increase labour supply also during prime-age. A number of reasons are discussed by
Carta and De Philippis (2019). They find that an extended working horizon, due
to an increase of the full retirement age brought about by the 2011 Fornero pension
reform, has a positive effect on the labour supply of middle-aged Italian women: by
increasing the expected duration of a job, a longer working horizon raises the value
of searching for it while younger and then retaining it; individuals may prefer to
supply more labour at younger ages rather than at older ages, if the probability of
experiencing negative health or productivity shocks and the cost of working increase
with age.
Furthermore, the increase in uncertainty about the expected level of pension benefits
could induce individuals to increase savings for “precautionary” motives.22 One way
to save more is to increase labour supply. Giavazzi and McMahon (2012), for ex-
ample, find that German household heads who worked part-time extended working
hours in the period around the close 1998 election, a time that was characterized by
uncertainty, among other things, as to whether a pension reform that had lowered
pension benefits would have been confirmed or revoked. Finally, the tighter link be-
tween contributions paid and benefits received could reduce the distortionary effect
of Social Security taxation on labour supply decisions, if individuals perceive con-
tributions not as pure taxes but as deferred earnings (e.g. Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1985), Hamann (1997)).
2.4 Data
I leverage and link on account of unique individual identifiers administrative
data provided by the Italian Institute of Social Security (Istituto Nazionale della
Previdenza Sociale, INPS). The main dataset contains full contribution histories for a
random sample of Italian private-sector workers. Auxiliary demographic information
(gender, year and country of birth) is recorded in the workers register. The unit of
observation in the main dataset is the triple individual-contribution spell-year. The
information provided is the following: (i) the start and the end dates of the spell; (ii)
the length of the period, which can be expressed in days, weeks or months, covered
by SS contributions; (iii) the event (e.g. paid work, short-time work, maternity
leave) and the earnings associated to the contribution spell; (iv) the pension fund
contributions are paid into (e.g. the fund for private sector employees, the fund for
22Carroll and Kimball (2008) provide a review of the literature on precautionary savings.
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self-employed).
The events that lead to the accrual of SS contributions are of two types: effective
and figurative. Effective events consist of paid work, on which the Social Security tax
is levied. Figurative events are circumstances of suspended or reduced work activity,
which nonetheless result in contributions being credited to workers’ accounts; the
main figurative events are maternity, sickness or work-related injury, unemployment
and short-time work.
The importance of observing full contribution histories is twofold. First, it allows
the identification of workers belonging to the groups T1-95 and C95, by computing
years of SS contributions accumulated by the end of 1995 (see Appendix Section
2.C for details). Second, it allows the construction of various measures of labour
supply (see Appendix Section 2.D for details). Specifically, I build five measures.
The first two are proxies for labour market participation: (i) a dummy that takes
value 1 if at least one day in the year is covered by SS contributions; and (ii) the
number of days covered by SS contributions per year.23 The other three are meant
to measure employment: (iii) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in the
year is covered by work-related SS contributions, as can be inferred from the event
associated to the contribution spell; (iv) the number of days covered by work-related
SS contributions per year; and (v) yearly labour earnings, expressed in 2016 euros.24
2.5 Empirical strategy
On the one hand, the institutional context described in Section 2.3 provides an
attractive setting to study whether changes to the public pension system affect the
labour supply of individuals who were in their prime-age when they learned about
them: following the 1995 Dini pension reform, otherwise similar workers - those
with slightly less or more than 18 years of SS contributions by the end of 1995 - are
subject to different regimes for the computation of pension benefits.
On the other hand, some features of the setting make the identification of causal
effects challenging. First of all, the extent to which workers are affected by the
Dini reform does not depend on a fixed characteristic, such as the date of birth,
but on a choice variable - years of SS contributions by 1995. This also implies
23Contributions related to the redemption of periods spent in the army or in higher education
are not considered, although estimates are virtually unchanged when they are taken into account.
These variables are just a proxy of labour market participation because, according to the ILO
definition, an individual is defined as active in the labour market if he/she has worked or searched
for a job in a reference period. The information contained in contribution histories does not allow
to build this exact measure of labour market participation; as an example, an individual who is
searching for a job but is not receiving any kind of social insurance benefits would be classified as
inactive.
24For some individual-contribution-spell-years the information on labour earnings is missing.
This explains the lower number of observations in regressions presented in Section 2.6.
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that the assignment to the T1-95 (treated, henceforth) or C95 (control, henceforth)
groups depends on the lagged realizations of the outcome that I wish to study -
labour supply. This complicates the task of separating the effect of the reform from
unrelated differences in post-reform labour supply trajectories of individuals who
supplied a different amount of labour in the pre-reform period.
I attempt to mitigate this concern by focusing on individuals aged 35-45 in 1995
with a similar contribution history up to that year: I compare individuals barely
assigned to the control group, which I define as those with 18 (included) to 19 years
of SS contributions by the end of 1995, to individuals barely assigned to the treated
group, which I define as those with 17 to 18 (excluded) years of SS contributions by
the end of 1995.25 Table 2.1 reports some relevant statistics, as of 1995. Individuals
in the treated and control groups are very similar in terms of demographics. The
former are only 2 percentage points less likely to be male and are slightly more than
one month younger. They are as likely as the latter to be born in Italy and to work
as self-employed. On the other hand, individuals in the treated group contributed
less and worked less in 1995, as measured by days covered by SS contributions and
by days covered by work-related SS contributions, respectively. As a consequence,
their earnings were lower. These differences have to be taken into account.
To this end, I take advantage of the availability of individual-level panel data to
estimate the following generalized version of a difference-in-differences model with
individual fixed effects:
yit = λi + γt +
t1∑
k=t0
βkTi · 1(year = k) + εit (2.10)
i indexes the worker and t indexes the year; yit is one among the various measures
of labour supply (see Section 2.4); Ti is a dummy variable taking value 1 if individ-
ual i belongs to the treated group. λi and γt are individual and year fixed effects,
respectively. Individual fixed effects allow control for time-invariant sources of het-
erogeneity across workers; year fixed effects further account for year-specific shocks
that affect all individuals. εit is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at
the individual level. βk are the coefficients of interest; I set β1995 equal to 0, so
that a given coefficient βk measures how different the labour supply is of individuals
belonging to the treated and control groups in year k relative to year 1995, when
the difference is normalized to 0.
25I exclude individuals who have contribution spells before 1996 in pension funds that are not
those of private sector employees and self-employed, as different rules apply. This leads to dis-
carding 10.6 per cent of observations. As my sample period spans from 1990 to 2006, I also drop
individuals who die before 2007, which amounts to 2.3 per cent of the remaining observations.
Finally, I discard workers who receive an old-age or seniority pension before 2007: this leads to
a drop of only 0.27 per cent of observations, as individuals aged 35-45 in 1995 and with 17 to 19
years of contributions were in principle not eligible to obtain those types of pensions by 2006.
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I follow workers from the beginning of the decade when the pension reforms take
place (1990, t0) to 2006 (t1). During this period, individuals aged 35-45 and with 17
to 19 years of contributions by 1995 were not eligible to collect retirement benefits:
in 2006 women (resp. men) could claim an old-age pension upon turning 60 (resp.
65) years old; a seniority pension could be obtained upon accumulating at least 35
years of contributions, and conditional on being at least 57 years old, or upon ac-
cumulating 39 years of contributions regardless of age.26 I, therefore, study labour
supply responses during a period that substantially coincides with the middle-age
phase of life and terminates when individuals are still at least 4 or 5 years away from
gaining eligibility to collect pension benefits.
A second issue is that, as explained in Subsection 2.3.4, individuals belonging to
the treated and the control groups were already affected to a different extent by
the 1992 Amato reform. The visual inspection of coefficients {βk}k=1994k=1990 in Section
2.6 will show that for most outcomes they are not significantly different from 0,
meaning that individuals in the treated and control groups appear to have been on
substantially parallel trends in terms of labour supply in the years preceding the
Dini reform. This, however, does not imply that the Amato reform would not have
had an effect, had the Dini reform not been passed, or that differences in labour
supply decisions after 1995 are only due to the provisions of the Dini reform. This
has to be taken in mind when interpreting the results. I also estimate the following
more compact difference-in-differences specification:
yit = λi + γt + βTi · Postt + εit (2.11)
where Postt is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the years following the Dini
reform.
The Dini pension reform was passed in August 1995. This raises the concern that
individuals could already change their behaviour in the fall of 1995 in order to end
up on the preferred side of the 18-year threshold. Figure 2.4 plots the density his-
togram of years of SS contributions by the end of 1995 for the sample of individuals
who were aged 35-45 at that time and who had accumulated 14 to 22 years of
contributions. The spike observed at around 18 years of contributions is not of a
substantially different magnitude with respect to the spikes observed around other
integer years of contributions. These spikes are likely due to the fact that many
job relationships start in January, so that a disproportionate share of individuals
will have an integer number of years of contributions by the end of any given year.
Nonetheless, I attempt to mitigate this concern by estimating as the preferred spec-
ification a “donut” difference-in-differences specification (Baltrunaite et al., 2018),
26The age requirement for the seniority pension with 35 years of contributions was 58 for self-
employed.
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whereby I exclude workers lying in the 4-week window on either side of the 18-year
threshold.27 In a robustness check I will show that results are however very similar
when including those individuals.
After presenting the main results on the entire sample, I look whether labour supply
responses are heterogeneous depending on individual socio-demographics character-
istics. To this end, let d = {0, 1} define a given binary characteristic of the individual
measured in 1995 (such as his/her gender or whether he/she works as an employee
or a self-employed). For every possible dimension of heterogeneity, I estimate the
following fully interacted versions of specifications (2.10) and (2.11):28
yitd = λi + γtd +
t1∑
k=t0
βkTi · 1(year = k) +
t1∑
k=t0
βdkTi · 1(year = k) · d+ εit (2.12)
and
yitd = λi + γtd + βTi · Postt + βdTi · Postt · d+ εit (2.13)
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Main effects
Figure 2.5 displays estimates based on specification (2.10).29 The five outcomes
are: the probability that at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contri-
butions (panel a); the number of days per year covered by SS contributions (panel
b); the probability that at least one day in a given year is covered by work-related
SS contributions (panel c); the number of days per year covered by work-related SS
contributions (panel d); yearly labour earnings (panel e). In 4 out of 5 cases pre-
1995 coefficients, which are mostly positive, are small and not significantly different
from 0: this suggests that treated and control individuals were on substantially par-
allel trends before the Dini reform. In panel (a) one of the pre-1995 coefficients is
significantly different from 0 at the 5 per cent level and three are at the 10 per cent
level: in this case there appear to exist small deviations from parallel trends in the
period preceding the Dini reform. Focusing on post-1995 coefficients, in the first
four panels they are positive and significantly different from 0 starting from 1997 or
1998; moreover, coefficients increase over time, although the growth flattens out in
the final years of the sample period. This pattern suggests that there is a positive
effect on labour supply. The size of the effect is small, resulting in a narrower gap
in labour supply between treated and control individuals than that documented in
27This choice of the window allows one to maintain a large enough sample size while excluding
individuals very close to the threshold.
28These fully interacted specifications deliver results that are the same as those that would be
obtained by running separate regressions on the relevant sub-samples; they make it easier to assess
whether the effects found in the various sub-groups of the population are significantly different.
29Coefficients are also reported in Appendix Table 2.E.1.
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1995 (Table 2.1): with regards to the number of days covered by work-related SS
contributions, for instance, the estimated coefficient is equal to almost 3 in 1998 and
to 5.5 in 2006, against an average of 292 days per year among treated individuals
in the pre-1996 period. Focusing on labor earnings, standard errors are bigger, but
post-reform coefficients also in this case are positive, increasing over time and sig-
nificantly different from 0 at the 5 or 10 per cent level in most years.30
Table 2.2 reports results from the more compact specification (2.11): the probabil-
ity of having at least one day in a given year covered by SS contributions or by
work-related SS contributions increases on average in the post-1995 period by 0.6
and 0.9 percentage points, respectively. The coefficient relative to the number of
days covered by SS contributions is 3.3, amounting to 1.08 per cent of the pre-1996
average value among treated individuals; the same figure for the number of days cov-
ered by work-related SS contributions is 3.8 (1.28 per cent). Finally, labour earnings
increase by 198 euros per year, although the coefficient is not statistically significant
at conventional levels.
Overall, these results suggest that changes to the way of calculating Social Security
benefits may induce small labour supply responses from individuals who are still
relatively far away from retirement benefit eligibility. The fact that post-1995 coef-
ficients increase over time could reflect a number of reasons. First, there could be
adjustments costs of a various nature that make changes to labour supply happen
gradually. Second, rules for computing retirement benefits are complex: it may,
therefore, also takes time to fully understand the changes brought to them. At the
same time, as individuals get older, the way in which their public pension is calcu-
lated may become more salient. Third, over 1996-2006 the 5-year moving average
of the real GDP growth rate peaked at the beginning of the 2000s and then started
to decline. Some treated individuals may have recognized that this would impact
negatively the NDC portion of their pension benefits.
2.6.2 Robustness checks
First, I check whether results change when including observations very close to
the 18-year threshold that separates treated individuals from control ones. Figure 2.6
and Table 2.3 present results based on specifications (2.10) and (2.11), respectively.31
They show that results are virtually unchanged when including these individuals.32
Second, I perform two placebo exercises. In the first one, I pretend that the Dini
reform had set the threshold that separates fully grandfathered individuals from par-
tially grandfathered ones at 19 rather than at 18 years of SS contributions: placebo
30As explained in Section 2.4, the number of observations in the regression for labour earnings
is lower due to some missing values.
31Coefficients displayed in Figure 2.6 are also reported in Appendix Table 2.E.2.
32Pre-1995 coefficients in panel (a) are slighly farther away from 0.
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treated are individuals with 18 to 19 (excluded) years of SS contributions, whereas
placebo controls are workers with 19 (included) to 20 years of SS contributions. In
the second one, I assume that the threshold had been set at 20 years of contri-
butions: placebo treated are then individuals with 19 to 20 (excluded) years of SS
contributions, whereas placebo controls are workers with 20 (included) to 21 years
of SS contributions. I continue restricting the attention to individuals aged 35-45 in
1995 and excluding observations in the 4-week window on either side of the placebo
thresholds. All individuals in the placebo samples are not affected by changes to
the way of calculating retirement benefits brought about by the Dini reform.
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 display the results of these exercises. Focusing on outcomes
in panels (a) to (d), in both figures post-1995 coefficients are smaller than those
coming from the estimates based on the true 18-year threshold and in virtually all
cases they are not statistically significant.33 Also estimates based on the more com-
pact specification (2.11) deliver coefficients that are smaller and non statistically
significant (Table 2.4). However, there are two notes of caution. First, in the exer-
cise that sets the placebo threshold at 19 years of contributions β1990 and β1991 are
significantly different from 0, weakening the assumption that placebo treated and
placebo controls were on parallel trends since the beginning of the sample period
before the Dini reform. Second, in the exercise that sets the placebo threshold at
20 years of contributions, coefficients relative to earnings (panel e) are in some cases
not much smaller than the true ones. Overall, placebo exercises suggest that the
effects documented in Subsection 2.6.1 are at least partially reflecting responses to
the changes in the computation of pension benefits, and not only differential trends
in labour supply among individuals with slightly different contribution histories up
to 1995. At the same time, some caution in the interpretation of results is required.
2.6.3 Heterogeneous effects
Having discussed the main findings in Subsection 2.6.1 and a battery of robust-
ness checks in Subsection 2.6.2, in this subsection I perform a series of heterogeneity
analyses. First, I consider each possible dimension of heterogeneity separately, by
estimating specifications (2.12) and (2.13); then, using an enriched version of specifi-
cation (2.13), I estimate an “horserace” regression whereby I consider all dimensions
of heterogeneity together.
I start by checking whether the strength of labour supply responses varies by gender.
Figure 2.9 shows that the adjustments along the margin of days covered by (all and
work-related only) SS contributions documented in the whole sample seem to en-
tirely reflect the behaviour of women, while men do not seem to adjust their labour
supply in a significant way.34 Post-1995 female coefficients are significantly larger
33Coefficients are also reported in Appendix Tables 2.E.3 and 2.E.4.
34Coefficients displayed in Figure 2.9 are also reported in Appendix Table 2.E.5.
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than male ones: as an example, with regards to days covered by work-related SS
contributions, the coefficient in 2006 is 10.9 for women, while it is less than one third
of this (2.8) for men. This also clearly emerges in Table 2.5, which displays results
based on the more compact specification (2.11). With respect to labour earnings,
the picture is more nuanced and coefficients are more similar to each other; column
5 of Table 2.5 shows that the percentage increase is larger for women, who earned
less before 1996.35
Among the cohorts of workers studied, the older ones may pay more attention to
changes of the public pension system. Furthermore, older individuals have less time
left to adjust their labour supply relatively to younger ones. For all these reasons,
I study whether labour supply responses differ across narrower age groups: specifi-
cally, I separate the youngest cohorts - i.e. those aged 35-37 - from the other ones.
Figure 2.10 displays the results.36 With respect to days covered by SS contributions,
the post-1995 coefficients of older cohorts are very similar to those of younger ones
in all but the last two years, when the difference becomes positive. However, the
coefficients relative to the years 1990-1992 of the younger cohorts are significantly
different from 0, suggesting a deviation from parallel trends. For this reason, the
positive differential effect found in Table 2.6, which is based on the more compact
pre-post 1995 comparison, should be interpreted with caution. When focusing on
days covered by work-related SS contributions, the pre-1995 coefficients of younger
cohorts are closer to 0 and the post-1995 coefficients are lower than those of older
cohorts, although the difference is not statistically significant. Also in this case, the
positive differential effect that emerges from Table 2.6 should, therefore, be inter-
preted with caution. Furthermore, when looking at labour earnings, it seems that
the response is concentrated among younger individuals. Overall, this heterogeneity
exercise provides inconclusive results.
As shown in Section 2.3, grandfathering clauses embedded in the 1992 and 1995
pension reforms created a complex web of rules for computing retirement benefits.
It would therefore be interesting to study whether labour supply adjustments vary
depending on the level of education and financial literacy. For instance, Banks et
al. (2015) document that financial literacy is an important determinant of annuiti-
zation choices over private DC pension wealth made by older English individuals.
Unfortunately, administrative data does not record information about financial lit-
eracy or the highest educational attainment. I build a proxy of education based
on the age at which an individual has the first year-round (i.e. covering 52 weeks)
contribution spell. If this happens before age 25, I classify an individual as having
35However, such difference has to be interpreted with caution as it also reflects a different be-
haviour of earnings among men and women in the pre-reform period: while female coefficients are
negative, although not significantly different from 0, male coefficients are positive and significantly
different from 0 in 1993 and 1994.
36Coefficients are also reported in Appendix Table 2.E.6.
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a low or medium level of education; if this happens between age 25 and age 32, I
define an individual as having a high level of education.37 This measure of education
is a crude proxy and is subject to classification error: however, individuals labeled
as highly educated earn more than others in the pre-1996 period, which would be
consistent with the existence of a positive return to education. Another inevitable
drawback is that, given the cohorts studied, more educated individuals are also on
average older: hence, it is difficult to separate the effect of education from the effect
of age. This is one of the reasons why at the end of this subsection I also estimate a
regression whereby I consider all dimensions of heterogeneity together. Figure 2.11
display estimates based on specification (2.12).38 Labour supply responses seem to
be of similar magnitude in the immediate aftermath of the Dini reform. Starting
from year 2001 they, however, become larger among highly-educated individuals and
the difference is statistically significant in the final years of the sample period. As
an example, with regards to the number of days covered by SS contributions, the
coefficient in 2006 is 12.8 for highly-educated individuals and 4.4 for other workers.
This significant heterogeneity also emerges from Table 2.7, which reports results
based on the more compact specification (2.13).
Due to the fact that the yield rate declines with earnings in the Quota B formula,
having part of retirement benefits computed according to the NDC method is likely
to penalize less or benefit high earners (see Section 2.3). It is, therefore, interesting
to divide individuals based on the earnings they were making in the pre-1996 period:
I create two groups depending on whether workers belong to the bottom and mid-
dle tercile or to the top tercile of the distribution.39 Figure 2.12 displays estimates
based on specification (2.12).40 It shows that labour supply responses documented
in the whole sample seem to reflect the behaviour of individuals belonging to the
bottom and middle terciles of the earnings distribution: neither the number of days
nor labour earnings of high earners change significantly in the post-1996 period.41
These findings are confirmed in Table 2.8, which reports estimates based on the
more compact specification (2.13).
As explained in Section 2.3, the yield rate in the NDC system is smaller for the
self-employed than for employees, due to the lower social security tax rate. As a
result, the former are affected to a larger extent than the latter from having part
37I do not classify individuals who have the first full year covered by SS contributions after age
32. This is the reason why this set of regressions features fewer observations.
38These coefficients are also reported in Appendix Table 2.E.7.
39Specifically, individuals are ranked according to their labour earnings in year z, the last pre-
reform year in which they had worked at least one day; these earnings are adjusted by expressing
them in 1995 euros and by applying a penalty factor that is quadratic in the distance between year
z and 1995, to take into account that periods of non-employment often cause skill depreciation.
40These coefficients are also reported in Appendix Table 2.E.8.
41With respect to the number of days covered by SS contributions, the difference between high
earners and others is significant in most post-reform years; with respect to earnings, coefficients
are similar but those of high earners are not statistically different from 0.
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of retirement benefits computed according to the NDC formula. I therefore study
whether labour supply adjustments are different across salaried workers and inde-
pendent ones. With regards to the number of days covered by (all and work-related
only) SS contributions, Figure 2.13 shows that there are no substantial differences in
the post-1995 period; moreover, pre-1995 coefficients are instead in some instances
different across employees and self-employed, so that the overall results look fuzzy.
Nonetheless, earnings of the self-employed increase by more. The difference, al-
though substantial, only becomes significant in the very final years of the sample
period, partly due to the larger standard errors surrounding the estimates for the
self-employed.42 The same pattern emerges also from Table 2.9. While no conclusive
answer can be given, it could be that the tighter link between benefits and contri-
butions incentives the self-employed, who could more easily avoid declaring some
income, to report more labour earnings.
So far, I have investigated each possible dimension of heterogeneity separately. How-
ever, differences along one dimension could be correlated with differences in other
ones. As an example women, who have been found to be more responsive than men,
are also slightly older and have lower earnings in the pre-1996 period. I, therefore,
conclude this subsection by considering all dimensions of heterogeneity together,
based on an enriched version of specification (2.13), whereby I interact the term
T · Post and year fixed effects with a set of dummy variables capturing all such
dimensions. Table 2.10 shows the results of this exercise. In general, coefficients
retain the same sign, but decrease in magnitude. The difference between females
and males remains significant at the 10 per cent level with respect to the probability
of having at least one day covered by work-related contributions and the number of
such days. The same holds true for the difference in terms of earnings between em-
ployees and the self-employed. Apart from those, the only coefficients that preserve
their significance are the ones related to age - suggesting a stronger response of older
cohorts - when looking at the number of days covered by (all and work-related only)
days of contributions. However, given the issues described above with the exercise
that divides individuals by age, I also present a version of this exercise whereby I
exclude age as an interaction term. Appendix Table 2.E.10 shows that, in this case,
differences between women and men and between low-medium and high educated
individuals in terms of days covered by SS contributions would remain significant.
2.7 Conclusions
Spurred by the pressures that population ageing exerts on the sustainability of
public pension systems, many countries have implemented reforms that reduce the
generosity of retirement benefits and tighten eligibility criteria. While the ultimate
42These coefficients are also reported in Appendix Table 2.E.9.
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goal of these reforms is to foster labour market participation at older ages, they are
often announced years before affected individuals come close to the decision of when
to retire and claim benefits. Due to grandfathering clauses and gradual phase-in
schedules, new provisions indeed often do not apply to workers on the cusp of re-
tirement, whilst partially or fully affecting younger ones. It is therefore interesting
to study not only the effects of pension reforms on labour supply at mature ages,
but also since the time of the announcement, as well as to asses how adjustments
unfold over time.
In this paper I have attempted to address these questions by observing over the
period 1990-2006 the labour supply trajectories of a sample of Italian private-sector
workers who were aged 35-45 in 1995, when a pension reform changed the way
in which a part of their retirement benefits would be calculated. The reform was
likely to lower the level of retirement benefits at early benefit claiming ages. More-
over, it increased the difficulty of forecasting such level, by making it subject to
macro-economic and demographic risks. Furthermore, it tightened the link between
contributions paid to Social Security and benefits received, on top of increasing in-
centives to delay claiming benefits past eligibility.
I have leveraged administrative data on full contribution histories and, within a
difference-in-differences framework, I have compared these individuals with same-
age ones who were entirely grandfathered because they happened to have slightly
more contributions to Social Security by the end of 1995. While estimates have to
be taken with some caution, I found over the period of the analysis modest positive
effects on labour supply of affected workers, as measured by days covered by (all
and work-related only) contributions to Social Security and by labour earnings. The
effects tend to grow over time. This pattern may stem from a variety of reasons that
is not possible to disentangle with the available data. It could be due to adjustment
costs embedded in labour supply decisions; it could also reflect a process of gradual
learning, whereby individuals become more aware about their retirement prospects
and the features of the public pension system as they age.
It would be interesting to see if these findings generalize to other reform episodes
and countries. Furthermore, in my data I cannot observe hours worked, which are
however an important margin of labour supply; having data on them available in
other settings would shed more light on the anatomy of labour supply adjustments.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: The 1992 Amato and the 1995 Dini pension reforms
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
[T1-92]
≥ 15 years
of SSC
[C95]
≥ 18 years
of SSC
[T2-92]
< 15 years
of SSC
[T1-95]
< 18 years
of SSC
Amato Reform Dini Reform
Notes: This figure reports the timeline of the 1992 Amato and the 1995 Dini reform, as well as
the different groups created by grandfathering clauses.
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Figure 2.2: Accrual rate in the Quota B and in the NDC regimes
Notes: The figure plots the accrual rate in the Quota B and in the NDC regimes, by first benefit
claiming year.
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Figure 2.3: Yield rate in the Quota B and in the NDC regimes
(a) Employees (b) Self-employed
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) plot the yield rate in the Quota B and in the NDC regimes for employees
and for the self-employed, respectively. In the Quota B regime the yield rate does not vary with
the age at retirement, but it starts at 2 per cent and then declines as average earnings grow and
surpass various thresholds. In the figure I plot the yield rate for average earnings below the first
threshold, as well as the average yield rate for average earnings that equal exactly the following
thresholds. In the NDC system the yield rate is the product between the social security tax rate,
if constant, and the transformation coefficient (i.e. the coefficient that transforms the notional
capital into an annuity). The social security tax rate is 33 per cent for employees and has grown
from 20 to 24 per cent for the self-employed: in the figure and in the formulae in the text, the Social
Security tax rate for the self-employed is assumed constant and set to 24 per cent. This explains
why the yield rate is larger for the former than for the latter. The transformation coefficient is an
increasing function of the age at retirement, thus making the yield rate higher for individuals who
start claiming retirement benefits later. The transformation coefficient was revised downward, to
account for increases in life expectancy, in 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of years of Social Security contributions by 1995 for workers
aged 35-45 and with 14 to 22 years of contributions
Notes: The figure plots the density histogram of years of Social Security contributions by the end
of 1995. The sample consists of individuals aged 35-45 in 1995 who had accumulated by that time
14 to 22 years of SS contributions.
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Figure 2.5: Main results
(a) Contributions to SS (1=yes) (b) Contributions to SS (days)
(c) Work-related contributions to SS (1=yes) (d) Work-related contributions to SS (days)
(e) Yearly labour earnings (euros)
Notes: Panels (a) to (e) plot coefficients βks from specification (2.10), which includes individual and year fixed
effects. Dots show the difference between treated and control workers in year k relative to the year when the Dini
reform was passed (1995). Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. The outcomes are: (a) a dummy
that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (b) the number of days per
year covered by SS contributions; (c) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by
work-related SS contributions; (d) the number of days per year covered by work-related SS contributions; (e) yearly
labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window on either side of the 18-year threshold are excluded.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Figure 2.6: Main results, including observations very close to the threshold
(a) Contributions to SS (1=yes) (b) Contributions to SS (days)
(c) Work-related contributions to SS (1=yes) (d) Work-related contributions to SS (days)
(e) Yearly labour earnings (euros)
Notes: Panels (a) to (e) plot coefficients βks from specification (2.10), which includes individual and year fixed
effects. Dots show the difference between treated and control workers in year k relative to the year when the Dini
reform was passed (1995). Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. The outcomes are: (a) a dummy
that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (b) the number of days per
year covered by SS contributions; (c) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by
work-related SS contributions; (d) the number of days per year covered by work-related SS contributions; (e) yearly
labour earnings. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Figure 2.7: Placebo threshold at 19 years of SS contributions
(a) Contributions to SS (1=yes) (b) Contributions to SS (days)
(c) Work-related contributions to SS (1=yes) (d) Work-related contributions to SS (days)
(e) Yearly labour earnings (euros)
Notes: The blue dots show the difference between true treated and true control individuals in year k relative to
the year when the Dini reform was passed (1995). The light green squares capture the difference between placebo
treated and placebo control individuals when the placebo threshold is set at 19 years of contributions. The definition
of placebo treated and placebo controls is provided in Subsection 2.6.2. Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence
intervals. The outcomes are: (a) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS
contributions; (b) the number of days per year covered by SS contributions; (c) a dummy that takes value 1 if at
least one day in a given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (d) the number of days per year covered
by work-related SS contributions; (e) yearly labour earnings. Estimates are based on the difference-in-differences
specification (2.10), which includes individual and year fixed effects. Observations lying in the 4-week window on
either side of the 18-year or the 19-year thresholds are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
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Figure 2.8: Placebo threshold at 20 years of SS contributions
(a) Contributions to SS (1=yes) (b) Contributions to SS (days)
(c) Work-related contributions to SS (1=yes) (d) Work-related contributions to SS (days)
(e) Yearly labour earnings (euros)
Notes: The blue dots show the difference between true treated and true control individuals in year k relative to
the year when the Dini reform was passed (1995). The light green squares capture the difference between placebo
treated and placebo control individuals when the placebo threshold is set at 20 years of contributions. The definition
of placebo treated and placebo controls is provided in Subsection 2.6.2. Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence
intervals. The outcomes are: (a) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS
contributions; (b) the number of days per year covered by SS contributions; (c) a dummy that takes value 1 if at
least one day in a given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (d) the number of days per year covered
by work-related SS contributions; (e) yearly labour earnings. Estimates are based on the difference-in-differences
specification (2.10), which includes individual and year fixed effects. Observations lying in the 4-week window on
either side of the 18-year or the 20-year thresholds are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
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Figure 2.9: Main results, heterogeneity by gender
(a) Contributions to SS (1=yes) (b) Contributions to SS (days)
(c) Work-related contributions to SS (1=yes) (d) Work-related contributions to SS (days)
(e) Yearly labour earnings (euros)
Notes: Panels (a) to (e) plot coefficients βks and (βk +β
d
k)s from specification (2.12), which includes individual and
year-gender fixed effects. Diamonds and squares show the difference between treated and control workers in year k
relative to the year when the Dini reform was passed (1995). Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence intervals.
The outcomes are: (a) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions;
(b) the number of days per year covered by SS contributions; (c) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in
a given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (d) the number of days per year covered by work-related
SS contributions; (e) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window on either side of the 18-year
threshold are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Figure 2.10: Main results, heterogeneity by age in 1995
(a) Contributions to SS (1=yes) (b) Contributions to SS (days)
(c) Work-related contributions to SS (1=yes) (d) Work-related contributions to SS (days)
(e) Yearly labour earnings (euros)
Notes: Panels (a) to (e) plot coefficients βks and (βk +β
d
k)s from specification (2.12), which includes individual and
year-age group fixed effects. Diamonds and squares show the difference between treated and control workers in year
k relative to the year when the Dini reform was passed (1995). Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence intervals.
The outcomes are: (a) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions;
(b) the number of days per year covered by SS contributions; (c) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in
a given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (d) the number of days per year covered by work-related
SS contributions; (e) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window on either side of the 18-year
threshold are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Figure 2.11: Main results, heterogeneity by (a proxy of) education
(a) Contributions to SS (1=yes) (b) Contributions to SS (days)
(c) Work-related contributions to SS (1=yes) (d) Work-related contributions to SS (days)
(e) Yearly labour earnings (euros)
Notes: Panels (a) to (e) plot coefficients βks and (βk +β
d
k)s from specification (2.12), which includes individual and
year-education group fixed effects. Diamonds and squares show the difference between treated and control workers
in year k relative to the year when the Dini reform was passed (1995). Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence
intervals. The outcomes are: (a) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS
contributions; (b) the number of days per year covered by SS contributions; (c) a dummy that takes value 1 if at
least one day in a given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (d) the number of days per year covered
by work-related SS contributions; (e) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window on either
side of the 18-year threshold are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Figure 2.12: Main results, heterogeneity by pre-1996 labour earnings
(a) Contributions to SS (1=yes) (b) Contributions to SS (days)
(c) Work-related contributions to SS (1=yes) (d) Work-related contributions to SS (days)
(e) Yearly labour earnings (euros)
Notes: Panels (a) to (e) plot coefficients βks and (βk +β
d
k)s from specification (2.12), which includes individual and
year-income group fixed effects. Diamonds and squares show the difference between treated and control workers
in year k relative to the year when the Dini reform was passed (1995). Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence
intervals. The outcomes are: (a) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS
contributions; (b) the number of days per year covered by SS contributions; (c) a dummy that takes value 1 if at
least one day in a given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (d) the number of days per year covered
by work-related SS contributions; (e) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window on either
side of the 18-year threshold are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Figure 2.13: Main results, heterogeneity by pre-1996 occupation
(a) Contributions to SS (1=yes) (b) Contributions to SS (days)
(c) Work-related contributions to SS (1=yes) (d) Work-related contributions to SS (days)
(e) Yearly labour earnings (euros)
Notes: Panels (a) to (e) plot coefficients βks and (βk + β
d
k)s from specification (2.12), which includes individual
and year-occupation fixed effects. Diamonds and squares show the difference between treated and control workers
in year k relative to the year when the Dini reform was passed (1995). Whiskers represent 95 per cent confidence
intervals. The outcomes are: (a) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS
contributions; (b) the number of days per year covered by SS contributions; (c) a dummy that takes value 1 if at
least one day in a given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (d) the number of days per year covered
by work-related SS contributions; (e) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window on either
side of the 18-year threshold are excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Sample summary statistics
Control Treated
mean sd mean sd
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender (1=male) 0.64 0.48 0.62 0.48
Age in 1995 39.25 2.97 39.15 2.99
Place of birth (1= Italy) 0.98 0.13 0.98 0.14
Occupation (1=self-employed) 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46
Work-related SSCs (1=yes) 0.86 0.34 0.83 0.38
Work-related SSCs (days) 296.33 132.64 280.97 143.29
SSCs (1=yes) 0.89 0.32 0.85 0.35
SSCs (days) 308.23 121.49 293.89 133.67
Labour earnings (euros) 20649.84 15292.91 19679.73 15700.65
Observations 17955 17188
Notes: The table reports summary statistics as of 1995 for individuals belonging to the treated
and the control groups. The information about the place of birth is missing for around 15 per cent
of individuals and the share of those born in Italy is computed over non-missing observations.
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Table 2.2: Main results
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · Post 0.006** 3.313*** 0.009*** 3.755*** 197.672
(0.003) (1.052) (0.003) (1.101) (123.104)
Observations 543507 543507 543507 543507 538773
R-squared 0.586 0.627 0.592 0.628 0.767
y¯Tpre 0.90 307.39 0.86 292.31 19990.01
Percentage effect 0.65 1.08 1.02 1.28 0.99
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficient β from specification (2.11), which includes
individual and year fixed effects. The outcomes are: (1) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least
one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (2) the number of days per year covered
by SS contributions; (3) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered
by work-related SS contributions; (4) the number of days per year covered by work-related SS
contributions; (5) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window on either side
of the 18-year threshold are excluded. In the row “Percentage effect” coefficients are divided by
the average value of the outcome among treated workers in the pre-1996 period (y¯Tpre). Standard
errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Main results, including observations very close to the threshold
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · Post 0.005* 3.203*** 0.008*** 3.755*** 207.721*
(0.003) (1.004) (0.003) (1.050) (117.549)
Observations 597431 597431 597431 597431 592095
R-squared 0.585 0.626 0.591 0.626 0.768
y¯Tpre 0.90 308.15 0.87 293.30 20115.30
Percentage effect 0.57 1.04 0.96 1.28 1.03
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficient β from specification (2.11), which includes
individual and year fixed effects. The outcomes are: (1) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least
one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (2) the number of days per year covered
by SS contributions; (3) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered
by work-related SS contributions; (4) the number of days per year covered by work-related SS
contributions; (5) yearly labour earnings. In the row “Percentage effect” coefficients are divided
by the average value of the outcome among treated workers in the pre-1996 period (y¯Tpre). Standard
errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Placebo thresholds at 19 and 20 years of SS contributions
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel a: placebo threshold at 19 years of contributions
T · Post -0.003 -0.621 -0.002 -0.124 -41.792
(0.003) (1.009) (0.003) (1.062) (121.628)
Observations 540056 540056 540056 540056 535730
R-squared 0.573 0.614 0.581 0.615 0.763
y¯Tpre 0.92 320.27 0.89 306.51 21013.52
Percentage effect -0.37 -0.19 -0.19 -0.04 -0.20
Panel b: placebo threshold at 20 years of contributions
T · Post -0.001 0.054 0.001 0.538 68.651
(0.003) (0.991) (0.003) (1.045) (122.292)
Observations 521815 521815 521815 521815 517568
R-squared 0.563 0.602 0.569 0.603 0.764
y¯Tpre 0.94 329.18 0.92 315.88 21994.53
Percentage effect -0.08 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.31
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficient β from specification (2.11), which includes in-
dividual and year fixed effects. In panel (a) the placebo threshold of the Dini reform that separates
fully grandfathered from partially grandfathered individuals is set at 19 years of contributions; in
panel (b) it is set at 20 years of contributions. The outcomes are: (1) a dummy that takes value 1
if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (2) the number of days per year
covered by SS contributions; (3) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is
covered by work-related SS contributions; (4) the number of days per year covered by work-related
SS contributions; (5) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window on either
side of the 18-year threshold are excluded. In the row “Percentage effect” coefficients are divided
by the average value of the outcome among placebo treated workers in the pre-1996 period (y¯Tpre).
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Main results, heterogeneity by gender
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · Post 0.016*** 7.598*** 0.022*** 8.458*** 326.337**
(0.006) (2.027) (0.006) (2.099) (161.911)
T · Post ·Male -0.014** -6.303*** -0.020*** -7.134*** -143.707
(0.006) (2.334) (0.007) (2.434) (234.177)
Observations 543507 543507 543507 543507 538773
R-squared 0.589 0.629 0.594 0.628 0.768
y¯T,Fpre 0.83 275.99 0.77 255.84 14596.88
y¯T,Mpre 0.94 326.46 0.92 314.45 23239.41
Percentage effect F 1.88 2.75 2.86 3.31 2.24
Percentage effect M 0.19 0.40 0.24 0.42 0.79
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficients β and βd from specification (2.13), which
includes individual and year-gender fixed effects. The outcomes are: (1) a dummy that takes value
1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (2) the number of days per year
covered by SS contributions; (3) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is
covered by work-related SS contributions; (4) the number of days per year covered by work-related
SS contributions; (5) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window on either
side of the 18-year threshold are excluded. In the rows “Percentage effect F” and “Percentage
effect M” coefficients are divided by the average value of the outcome among treated female and
male workers in the pre-1996 period (y¯T,Fpre and y¯
T,M
pre ). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
and are clustered at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Main results, heterogeneity by age in 1995
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · Post 0.000 0.542 0.002 0.836 643.157***
(0.004) (1.486) (0.004) (1.584) (186.101)
T · Post · Age 38-45 0.008 4.188** 0.011* 4.440** -700.767***
(0.005) (2.045) (0.006) (2.155) (245.638)
Observations 543507 543507 543507 543507 538773
R-squared 0.586 0.628 0.592 0.628 0.767
y¯T,35−37pre 0.98 342.13 0.95 329.62 22381.98
y¯T,38−45pre 0.85 287.67 0.81 271.13 18617.32
Percentage effect 35-37 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.25 2.87
Percentage effect 38-45 0.99 1.64 1.54 1.95 -0.31
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficients β and βd from specification (2.13), which
includes individual and year-age group fixed effects. The outcomes are: (1) a dummy that takes
value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (2) the number of days
per year covered by SS contributions; (3) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a
given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (4) the number of days per year covered
by work-related SS contributions; (5) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week
window on either side of the 18-year threshold are excluded. In the rows “Percentage effect 35-37”
and “Percentage effect 38-45” coefficients are divided by the average value of the outcome among
treated younger and older workers in the pre-1996 period (y¯T,35−37pre and y¯
T,38−45
pre ). Standard errors
are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Main results, heterogeneity by (a proxy of) education
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · Post 0.004 2.735** 0.007** 3.201** 194.399
(0.003) (1.193) (0.003) (1.245) (141.013)
T · Post · High edu 0.013* 4.667* 0.014** 5.370* 385.088
(0.007) (2.640) (0.007) (2.775) (304.831)
Observations 532746 532746 532746 532746 528251
R-squared 0.589 0.630 0.595 0.629 0.767
y¯preT,low-medium 0.88 302.22 0.85 287.86 19598.89
y¯preT,high 0.93 323.91 0.90 308.99 21746.60
Percentage effect low-med. edu. 0.40 0.91 0.80 1.11 0.99
Percentage effect high edu. 1.81 2.29 2.36 2.77 2.66
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficients β and βd from specification (2.13), which
includes individual and year-education group fixed effects. The outcomes are: (1) a dummy that
takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (2) the number of
days per year covered by SS contributions; (3) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a
given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (4) the number of days per year covered by
work-related SS contributions; (5) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window
on either side of the 18-year threshold are excluded. In the rows “Percentage effect low-med. edu.”
and “Percentage effect high edu.” coefficients are divided by the average value of the outcome
among treated low-medium and high educated workers in the pre-1996 period (y¯preT,low-medium and
y¯preT,high). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.8: Main results, heterogeneity by pre-1996 labour earnings
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · Post 0.010** 5.075*** 0.012*** 5.261*** 383.812***
(0.004) (1.451) (0.004) (1.513) (127.355)
T · Post · Top tercile -0.007 -4.491** -0.010** -4.911** -170.636
(0.005) (1.834) (0.005) (1.964) (300.208)
Observations 531845 531845 531845 531845 530008
R-squared 0.583 0.620 0.584 0.615 0.768
y¯T,bottom and middlepre 0.87 292.22 0.83 274.12 14067.25
y¯T,toppre 0.98 353.97 0.98 350.12 34303.34
Percentage effect bot./mid. 1.12 1.74 1.50 1.92 2.73
Percentage effect top 0.26 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.62
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficients β and βd from specification (2.13), which
includes individual and year-income group fixed effects. The outcomes are: (1) a dummy that
takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (2) the number of
days per year covered by SS contributions; (3) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a
given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (4) the number of days per year covered by
work-related SS contributions; (5) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window
on either side of the 18-year threshold are excluded. In the rows “Percentage effect bot./mid.” and
“Percentage effect top” coefficients are divided by the average value of the outcome in the pre-1996
period among treated workers in the bottom and middle terciles or in the top tercile of the earnings
distribution (y¯T,bottom and middlepre and y¯
T,top
pre ). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are
clustered at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Main results, heterogeneity by pre-1996 occupation
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · Post 0.002 2.581** 0.007** 3.412*** 14.249
(0.003) (1.206) (0.003) (1.274) (140.129)
T · Post · Self-emp. 0.011* 2.594 0.007 1.358 622.626**
(0.006) (2.408) (0.007) (2.485) (285.006)
Observations 543507 543507 543507 543507 538773
R-squared 0.586 0.628 0.593 0.629 0.767
y¯T,employeepre 0.90 304.08 0.85 283.45 21478.64
y¯T,self-emppre 0.89 315.10 0.89 312.95 16531.74
Percentage effect employee 0.27 0.85 0.80 1.20 0.07
Percentage effect self-emp. 1.54 1.64 1.56 1.52 3.85
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficients β and βd from specification (2.13), which
includes individual and year-occupation fixed effects. The outcomes are: (1) a dummy that takes
value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (2) the number of days
per year covered by SS contributions; (3) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a
given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (4) the number of days per year covered by
work-related SS contributions; (5) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window
on either side of the 18-year threshold are excluded. In the rows “Percentage effect employees”
and “Percentage effect self-emp.” coefficients are divided by the average value of the outcome
among treated employees and the self-employed in the pre-1996 period (y¯T,employeepre and y¯
T,self-emp
pre ).
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.10: Main results, heterogeneity along all dimensions together
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · Post 0.003 3.650 0.009 4.658* 481.999**
(0.007) (2.565) (0.007) (2.702) (241.884)
T · Post ·Male -0.009 -3.979 -0.012* -4.268* -22.240
(0.007) (2.442) (0.007) (2.563) (245.619)
T · Post · Age 38-45 0.011* 4.927** 0.013** 4.665* -424.610
(0.006) (2.283) (0.006) (2.408) (270.850)
T · Post · High edu. 0.009 2.589 0.010 3.534 455.439
(0.008) (2.896) (0.008) (3.051) (334.738)
T · Post · Self emp. 0.009 1.381 0.005 0.118 567.492*
(0.007) (2.549) (0.007) (2.647) (302.021)
T · Post · Top terc. -0.002 -2.408 -0.005 -3.029 -18.856
(0.005) (2.008) (0.006) (2.163) (324.787)
Observations 521611 521611 521611 521611 519824
R-squared 0.588 0.625 0.589 0.619 0.770
Notes: The table reports estimates based on an enriched version of specification (2.13), where the
term Ti · Postt and year fixed effects are also interacted with: a dummy that takes value 1 if the
individual is male; a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is aged 38-45 in 1995; a dummy
that takes value 1 if the individual is high-educated (as measured by a proxy); a dummy that takes
value 1 if the individual belongs to the top tercile of the distribution of pre-1996 labour earnings; a
dummy that takes value 1 if the individual worked as a self-employed in the last occupation before
1996. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Appendices
2.A Additional details on the retirement benefit
formulae
Following the 1992 Amato reform, first year annual pension benefits were com-
puted as the sum of two “quotas”, Quota A and Quota B:
b = kA ·NA · y¯tl:R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quota A
+ kB ·NB · y¯tq :R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quota B
(2.14)
NA were years of SS contributions up to 1992, while NB were years of SS contribu-
tions from 1993 to retirement R. If the sum of NA and NB exceeded 40, the excess
years beyond the fortieth were not taken into account for computing the “quota”
that featured the lowest average earnings. Therefore:
NA = Nt0:1992 · 1(Nt0:R <= 40 ∨ y¯tl:R >= y¯tq :R)+ (2.15)
+ (40−N1993:R) · 1(Nt0:R > 40 ∧ y¯tl:R < y¯tq :R)
NB = N1993:R · 1(Nt0:R <= 40 ∨ y¯tq :R >= y¯tl:R)+ (2.16)
+ (40−Nt0:1992) · 1(Nt0:R > 40 ∧ y¯tq :R < y¯tl:R)
The accrual rate in the Quota B part of (2.14) was higher than the accrual rate in
the Quota A part: beyond taking into account inflation, it added a fixed 1 per cent
premium for every year until retirement. Therefore:
ΨB,t =
R∏
j=t
(1 + pij + 1%) for t = tq, ..., R− 2 and ΨB,R−1 = ΨB,R = 1 (2.17)
The Amato reform aimed at gradually lengthening the reference period over which
to compute average earnings. Specifically, for individuals with at least 15 years of SS
contributions by 1992 (T1-92), the reference period of Quota B was extended to the
last M weeks covered by SS contributions, being M equal to 520 for employees and
to 780 for self-employed. For individuals with less than 15 years of SS contributions
by 1992 (T2-92), it included all O weeks covered by SS contributions between 1993
and retirement, and the last P weeks covered by SS contributions before 1993, being
P equal to 260 for employees and to 520 for self-employed. Finally, for individuals
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who started contributing in 1993 or after (T3-92), the reference period was the entire
contribution life. Therefore, for a given individual i:
y¯tq :R =

y¯tv :R =
1
M/52
∑R
t=tv
ytΨB,t, if i ∈ T1-92
y¯tw:R =
1
((O+P )/52)
∑R
t=tw
ytΨB,t, if i ∈ T2-92
y¯t0:R =
1
Q/52
∑R
t=t0
ytΨB,t, if i ∈ T3-92
(2.18)
with:
tv :
R∑
j=tv+1
nj
52
<
M
52
≤
R∑
j=tv
nj
52
and tw :
R∑
j=tw+1
nj
52
<
O + P
52
≤
R∑
j=tw
nj
52
(2.19)
Q represents the number of weeks covered by SS contributions from the beginning
of the contribution history to its end.
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2.B Simulation of the change of first year pension
benefits
I simulate the expected change, as of 1995, of first year pension benefits due to
the Dini reform. I focus on individuals belonging to the T1-95 group and I restrict
the attention to the portion of first year pension benefits associated to post-1995
contributions to Social Security. I then proceed according to the following steps:
1. I assume that daily earnings (yd) and the number of days worked (d) in a given
post-1995 year t are given by the following formulae:
ydt = y
d
0
j=t∏
j=1996
(1 + pij + µ) where y
d
0 = y
d
z
(
1 +
z − 1995
100
)2
(2.20)
dt = k (2.21)
z is the last pre-1996 year such that at least x days are covered by work-related
contributions to Social Security, with x = {1,90,180}. The starting daily earn-
ings yd0 are daily earnings made in year z, expressed in 1995 euros and adjusted
for a penalty that is quadratic in the distance between year z and 1995, to ac-
count for the fact that periods of suspended or reduced activity in the labour
market can cause skill depreciation and thus lead to a lower labour income
when an individual starts working again. Daily earnings yd0 then grow every
year at a rate that equals the sum of the realized inflation pi and a parameter
µ that captures real earnings growth. In alternative parametrizations, µ can
take the following values: 0 per cent; 1 per cent; 1.5 per cent; 2 per cent; 2.5
per cent; 3 per cent.
Individuals are assumed to work a fixed number of days per year (k) in the
post-1995 period. k can take two values: first, k = dz, i.e. individuals work
the same number of days as they did in year z; alternatively, it is assumed
that all individuals hold year-round jobs in the post-reform period (d = f).
2. I assume that individuals start collecting retirement benefits from January, 1st
of year R + 1. I make two alternative assumptions about R, which is the last
contribution year. First, I assume it is the earliest year in which individuals
become eligible to claim either an old age or a seniority pension under the
rules prevailing in 1995. Hence R = min(to, ts), where to is the year when
women (resp. men) turn 60 (resp. 65) and ts is the first year when individuals
have both at least 57 years of age and at least 35 years of contributions, or
40 years of contributions regardless of age. Second, I assume that workers
stop contributing once they become eligible to claim an old-age pension, i.e.
R = to. Given that the master sample consists of workers aged 35 to 45 in
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1995, R spans from 2010 to 2025.
3. I assume that every worker will contribute in the post-1995 period into the
same pension fund (i.e. the fund of employees or the funds of self-employed)
as he/she did in year z. This assumption is needed because different funds
feature different Social Security tax rates τ . I am therefore implicitly assuming
no switches from salaried employment to self-employment, or the other way
around, in the post-1995 period.
4. I assume that workers foresee the evolution over time of the parameters embed-
ded in the Quota B and NDC formulae of yearly pension benefits. I therefore
assume that {ΨB, kB} and {G, τ , βa} take the realized values. For cohorts
of workers who retire past 2019, I predict the values that these parameters
will take by relying on available forecasts of the inflation rate and the nominal
GDP growth rate.
5. Given {ydt , dt, pit, µ,ΨB,t, kB,t}t=Rt=1996, I compute first year annual pension ben-
efits stemming from post-1995 contributions to Social Security that workers
belonging to the T1-95 group would have been entitled to, had the Dini reform
not passed. In this counterfactual scenario, post-1995 contributions would con-
cur to determine first year pension benefits according to the following formula:
b¯post-95 = kB ·N1996:R · y¯tq :R (2.22)
where the definition of y¯tq :R is provided in Appendix Section 2.A.
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6. Given {ydt , dt, pit, µ,Gt, τt, βa,t }t=Rt=1996, I compute first year annual pension ben-
efits stemming from post-1995 contributions to Social Security that a worker
belonging to the T1-95 group is entitled to after the Dini reform. Post-1995
contributions concur to determine first year pension benefits according to the
following NDC formula:
bˆpost-95 = βa ·
(
R∑
t=1996
τtytGt
)
(2.23)
7. I express the change θ in the portion of first year pension benefits stemming
from post-1995 contributions to Social Security in the following way:
θ = 100 · bˆpost-95 − b¯post-95
b¯post-95
(2.24)
43For individuals with less than 15 years of contributions by the end of 1992, computing y¯tq :R also
requires to know earnings between 1993 and 1995 as well as in the last 5 years of contributions to
Social Security before 1993 (10 years for self-employed). I retrieve this information from observed
pre-1996 contribution histories.
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Table 2.B.1 shows the results of the simulations under the different parametrizations
of µ, d and R. x is set equal to 1.44 It shows the average change (column 1), as
well changes corresponding to the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the distribution
(column 2-4); it also reports the share of individuals who would experience a negative
change (column 5). The average and the median changes are negative across all
simulations; moreover the percentage of individuals who would receive lower benefits
is always higher than 70 per cent. The loss is lower under the assumption that
individuals wait to claim retirement benefits until they become eligible to obtain an
old-age pension. This is due to three main reasons. First, by retiring weakly later
than under the alternative assumption, pensionable earnings are higher and thus
are more likely to surpass the threshold above which the average yield rate in the
Quota B system declines. This is also the reason why the loss is lower at higher
values of the growth rate of real earnings. Second, retiring weakly later implies a
higher probability of hitting and surpassing the 40-year threshold after which years
of SS contributions are not taken into account in the Quota B formula.45 Third, the
5-year moving average of the nominal GDP growth rate, which defines the accrual
rate in the NDC system, has been particularly low in the mid-2010s, following the
double dip recession that hit Italy, while it is expected to increase in the early 2020s
as the economy recovers.
44Simulations under the alternative values of x deliver very similar results.
45This happens if average earnings in the Quota B formula are lower than average earnings in
the Quota A formula.
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Table 2.B.1: Simulation of the change in first year annual pension benefits stemming
from post-1995 contributions
mean p25 p50 p75 % neg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
x =1, µ =0, d =f, R = min(to, ts) -36.30 -50.80 -32.34 -26.86 1.00
x =1, µ =0, d =f, R = to -29.79 -45.32 -24.06 -19.92 0.99
x =1, µ =0, d =dz, R = min(to, ts) -36.40 -51.02 -32.68 -26.79 0.99
x =1, µ =0, d =dz, R = to -30.80 -46.21 -25.01 -20.43 0.99
x =1, µ =1, d =f, R = min(to, ts) -35.46 -50.07 -31.07 -26.49 1.00
x =1, µ =1, d =f, R = to -26.03 -39.44 -22.93 -18.10 0.91
x =1, µ =1, d =dz, R = min(to, ts) -34.94 -49.79 -30.98 -25.76 0.99
x =1, µ =1, d =dz, R = to -26.33 -42.37 -22.95 -17.94 0.91
x =1, µ =1.5, d =f, R = min(to, ts) -35.01 -49.67 -30.69 -26.12 1.00
x =1, µ =1.5, d =f, R = to -21.61 -33.66 -22.82 -5.54 0.82
x =1, µ =1.5, d =dz, R = min(to, ts) -34.18 -49.10 -30.28 -25.11 0.99
x =1, µ =1.5, d =dz, R = to -21.60 -35.13 -22.31 -5.55 0.82
x =1, µ =2.0, d =f, R = min(to, ts) -34.53 -49.21 -30.06 -25.65 0.99
x =1, µ =2.0, d =f, R = to -19.52 -32.02 -20.51 -3.21 0.79
x =1, µ =2.0, d =dz, R = min(to, ts) -33.40 -48.37 -29.53 -24.40 0.99
x =1, µ =2.0, d =dz, R = to -19.70 -33.31 -20.74 -3.49 0.79
x =1, µ =2.5, d =f, R = min(to, ts) -34.02 -48.44 -29.47 -24.96 0.99
x =1, µ =2.5, d =f, R = to -18.58 -32.36 -20.63 -1.75 0.77
x =1, µ =2.5, d =dz, R = min(to, ts) -32.60 -47.66 -28.74 -23.55 0.98
x =1, µ =2.5, d =dz, R = to -18.39 -32.55 -20.16 -1.73 0.77
x =1, µ =3.0, d =f, R = min(to, ts) -33.49 -47.59 -28.92 -24.14 0.99
x =1, µ =3.0, d =f, R = to -17.40 -32.92 -20.60 -0.11 0.75
x =1, µ =3.0, d =dz, R = min(to, ts) -31.77 -46.85 -27.95 -22.64 0.98
x =1, µ =3.0, d =dz, R = to -16.96 -32.20 -19.52 0.02 0.75
Notes: The table reports the results of simulations of the expected change in first year annual
pension benefits stemming from post-1995 contributions, under alternative parametrization of µ,
d and R. x is set equal to 1.
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2.C Computing years of SS contributions by the
end of 1995
To identify workers belonging to the C95 and T1-95 groups, I need to compute
weeks of qualifying contributions to Social Security by the end of 1995. Given that
the unit of observation of the main dataset is the individual-contribution spell-year,
I first need to compute the number of weeks of qualifying contributions in any given
year before 1996 and then sum them up. To this end, I follow strictly the disposi-
tions provided by the Italian Institute of Social Security (INPS), whereby in case of
overlapping contribution spells in any given year only one of them shall be consid-
ered useful toward the acquisition of pension rights and overlapping contributions
shall not be summed.
Let dsijy be the recorded start date of a given spell i of individual j in year y and d
e
ijy
be the recorded end date; cijy are the recorded weeks of contributions associated to
that spell. In some cases, the number of days between the recorded start and end
dates of a given spell is different from the recorded days of contributions to Social
Security associated to such a spell. To take into account the rule about overlapping
spells, I proceed in the following way:
1. For every contribution spell [dsijy, d
e
ijy] I compute the average number of con-
tribution weeks accrued in a given day dijy belonging to such a spell (c¯
d
ijy),
that is:
∀dijy ∈ [dsijy, deijy], c¯dijy =
cijy
deijy − dsijy
(2.25)
2. If a given day d is contained in m spells (i.e. in case of partially or fully over-
lapping spells as defined by their recorded start and end dates), I assign that
day only to the spell featuring the maximum number of average contributions
per day. Therefore, the day d is assigned to the spell i∗ such that:
i∗ = argmax
i∈{1,...,m}
c¯dijy (2.26)
If a day belongs to a unique spell i, then i∗ = i.
3. After having applied this procedure to all days in a given year, I compute
weeks of qualifying contributions to Social Security in that year (cjy) as:
cjy =
k∑
d=1
c¯di∗jy (2.27)
where k takes value 365 but in leap years (when k is set to 366).
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4. The number of years of contributions by 1995 (N1995) is then:
Nj,y0:1995 =
1
52
·
1995∑
y=y0
cjy (2.28)
Notice that, in years that feature a single contribution spell, this procedure recovers
the weeks of contributions associated to that spell; in years that features multiple but
non-overlapping spells, this procedure recovers the sum of the weeks of contributions
associated to those spells; if there exist two spells with the same start and end dates,
the procedure recovers the weeks of contributions of the spell that features more
weeks of contributions.
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2.D Building measures of labour supply
To derive various measures of labour supply in any given year, I need to identify
whether any single day is covered by contributions to Social Security and whether
such contributions are work-related. To this end, I proceed in the following way:
1. I define dsijy and d
e
ijy as the start date and the end dates of the contribution spell
i of individual j in year y, as recorded in the dataset; cijy are the recorded weeks
of contributions associated to that spell. I then define de∗ijy as the end date of
the spell that would result by summing the recorded days of contributions
to the recorded start date of the spell. As mentioned in Appendix Section
(2.C), there are instances in which de∗ijy 6= deijy. To identify workers belonging
to the C95 and T1-95 groups (Appendix Section 2.C) I had to rely on INPS-
recorded start and end dates, because I had to follow their dispositions to
manage overlapping spells. To compute measures of labour supply I instead
need to identify for each day whether a contribution exists and the type of
contribution.
2. I consider a day d as covered by contributions to Social Security if it belongs
to any given contribution spell [dsijy, d
e∗
ijy]:
ccijyd = 1(d is covered by SSCs) if d ∈ [dsijy, de∗ijy] (2.29)
3. I consider a day d as covered by work-related contributions to Social Security
if it belongs to any work-related contribution spell [ds,Wijy , d
e∗,W
ijy ], while at the
same time not being comprised also in any non-work related contribution spell
[ds,NWijy , d
e∗,NW
ijy ] :
ccWijyd = 1(d is covered by work-related SSCs) if d ∈ [ds,Wijy , de∗,Wijy ] (2.30)
and d /∈ [ds,NWijy , de∗,NWijy ]
4. The number of days covered by contributions (ccjy) and the number of days
covered by work-related contributions (ccWjy ) in any given year are then com-
puted as:
ccjy =
k∑
d=1
ccijyd (2.31)
ccWjy =
k∑
d=1
ccWijyd (2.32)
where k takes value 365 but in leap years (when k is set to 366).
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2.E Additional figures and tables
Table 2.E.1: Main results
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · 1(Year = 1990) 0.008** 0.657 0.003 0.270 78.123
(0.004) (1.402) (0.004) (1.512) (123.357)
T · 1(Year = 1991) 0.005 -0.179 0.001 -0.325 70.178
(0.004) (1.306) (0.004) (1.415) (117.503)
T · 1(Year = 1992) 0.006* 1.095 0.004 1.539 123.312
(0.003) (1.193) (0.004) (1.306) (107.113)
T · 1(Year = 1993) 0.005* 1.006 0.003 0.402 87.689
(0.003) (1.024) (0.003) (1.144) (92.470)
T · 1(Year = 1994) 0.004* 0.155 0.003 0.310 77.909
(0.002) (0.739) (0.002) (0.840) (70.139)
T · 1(Year = 1996) -0.000 -0.206 -0.001 0.041 8.756
(0.002) (0.769) (0.003) (0.848) (82.004)
T · 1(Year = 1997) 0.005 1.943* 0.005* 1.906* 163.922
(0.003) (1.038) (0.003) (1.122) (116.690)
T · 1(Year = 1998) 0.009*** 2.787** 0.008** 2.965** 231.287*
(0.003) (1.169) (0.004) (1.251) (125.219)
T · 1(Year = 1999) 0.008** 3.098** 0.008** 3.782*** 228.954*
(0.004) (1.245) (0.004) (1.318) (135.536)
T · 1(Year = 2000) 0.010*** 4.390*** 0.011*** 4.790*** 299.741**
(0.004) (1.307) (0.004) (1.384) (142.512)
T · 1(Year = 2001) 0.014*** 4.873*** 0.014*** 5.140*** 307.309**
(0.004) (1.364) (0.004) (1.448) (151.055)
T · 1(Year = 2002) 0.015*** 5.509*** 0.015*** 5.583*** 289.090*
(0.004) (1.411) (0.004) (1.503) (155.908)
T · 1(Year = 2003) 0.013*** 4.951*** 0.015*** 5.610*** 341.054**
(0.004) (1.458) (0.004) (1.553) (162.605)
T · 1(Year = 2004) 0.012*** 4.183*** 0.013*** 4.509*** 422.644**
(0.004) (1.494) (0.004) (1.587) (166.725)
T · 1(Year = 2005) 0.016*** 5.341*** 0.017*** 5.455*** 386.227**
(0.004) (1.525) (0.004) (1.622) (172.975)
T · 1(Year = 2006) 0.015*** 4.588*** 0.017*** 5.549*** 296.183
(0.004) (1.559) (0.005) (1.655) (183.434)
Observations 543507 543507 543507 543507 538773
R-squared 0.586 0.627 0.592 0.628 0.767
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficients βks from specification (2.10), which includes individual and
year fixed effects. The outcomes are: (1) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered
by SS contributions; (2) the number of days per year covered by SS contributions; (3) a dummy that takes value
1 if at least one day in a given year is covered by work-related SS contributions; (4) the number of days per year
covered by work-related SS contributions; (5) yearly labour earnings. Observations lying in the 4-week window on
either side of the 18-year threshold are excluded. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at
the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.E.2: Main results, including observations very close to the threshold
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · 1(Year = 1990) 0.009** 1.476 0.003 0.759 91.983
(0.004) (1.333) (0.004) (1.435) (117.320)
T · 1(Year = 1991) 0.007* 0.603 0.002 0.227 78.747
(0.003) (1.244) (0.004) (1.345) (111.838)
T · 1(Year = 1992) 0.007** 1.564 0.004 1.830 122.633
(0.003) (1.137) (0.003) (1.242) (102.412)
T · 1(Year = 1993) 0.006** 1.474 0.003 0.687 64.540
(0.003) (0.973) (0.003) (1.086) (88.460)
T · 1(Year = 1994) 0.005** 0.446 0.002 0.403 52.473
(0.002) (0.703) (0.002) (0.796) (66.884)
T · 1(Year = 1996) 0.000 -0.112 -0.001 0.124 6.004
(0.002) (0.732) (0.003) (0.806) (78.594)
T · 1(Year = 1997) 0.005* 2.216** 0.005 2.190** 183.652*
(0.003) (0.990) (0.003) (1.070) (111.395)
T · 1(Year = 1998) 0.009*** 3.049*** 0.007** 2.990** 192.668
(0.003) (1.114) (0.003) (1.191) (119.558)
T · 1(Year = 1999) 0.008** 3.464*** 0.007** 3.900*** 181.650
(0.003) (1.190) (0.004) (1.258) (129.507)
T · 1(Year = 2000) 0.010*** 4.499*** 0.011*** 4.854*** 273.103**
(0.003) (1.247) (0.004) (1.320) (135.714)
T · 1(Year = 2001) 0.013*** 5.147*** 0.014*** 5.444*** 338.128**
(0.004) (1.303) (0.004) (1.382) (144.072)
T · 1(Year = 2002) 0.014*** 5.632*** 0.014*** 5.764*** 319.154**
(0.004) (1.349) (0.004) (1.437) (148.610)
T · 1(Year = 2003) 0.013*** 5.261*** 0.014*** 5.834*** 371.285**
(0.004) (1.394) (0.004) (1.484) (154.899)
T · 1(Year = 2004) 0.013*** 4.721*** 0.013*** 4.984*** 436.591***
(0.004) (1.429) (0.004) (1.516) (159.265)
T · 1(Year = 2005) 0.016*** 5.880*** 0.017*** 5.953*** 391.024**
(0.004) (1.457) (0.004) (1.548) (165.181)
T · 1(Year = 2006) 0.017*** 5.674*** 0.018*** 6.434*** 343.818**
(0.004) (1.491) (0.004) (1.582) (175.027)
Observations 597431 597431 597431 597431 592095
R-squared 0.585 0.626 0.591 0.626 0.768
Notes: The table reports estimates of the coefficients βks from specification (2.10), which includes
individual and year fixed effects. The outcomes are: (1) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least
one day in a given year is covered by SS contributions; (2) the number of days per year covered
by SS contributions; (3) a dummy that takes value 1 if at least one day in a given year is covered
by work-related SS contributions; (4) the number of days per year covered by work-related SS
contributions; (5) yearly labour earnings. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are
clustered at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.E.3: Placebo threshold at 19 years of SS contributions
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · 1(Year = 1990) 0.011*** 3.803*** 0.012*** 3.702*** 244.198**
(0.003) (1.291) (0.004) (1.411) (122.374)
T · 1(Year = 1991) 0.011*** 3.797*** 0.011*** 2.893** 77.109
(0.003) (1.210) (0.003) (1.336) (117.489)
T · 1(Year = 1992) 0.005* 1.531 0.004 0.800 -16.488
(0.003) (1.106) (0.003) (1.235) (108.072)
T · 1(Year = 1993) -0.001 -0.029 0.001 1.322 -26.477
(0.003) (0.953) (0.003) (1.095) (95.062)
T · 1(Year = 1994) -0.001 0.124 0.001 1.140 -11.467
(0.002) (0.694) (0.002) (0.812) (70.569)
T · 1(Year = 1996) 0.002 0.602 0.003 0.430 67.734
(0.002) (0.736) (0.003) (0.821) (80.849)
T · 1(Year = 1997) 0.003 1.089 0.006* 1.852* 95.958
(0.003) (0.982) (0.003) (1.076) (110.962)
T · 1(Year = 1998) 0.003 1.487 0.005 2.093* 85.517
(0.003) (1.103) (0.003) (1.193) (122.031)
T · 1(Year = 1999) 0.001 0.885 0.003 1.609 55.259
(0.003) (1.178) (0.003) (1.263) (156.278)
T · 1(Year = 2000) 0.002 0.536 0.004 1.201 72.494
(0.003) (1.241) (0.004) (1.326) (137.911)
T · 1(Year = 2001) 0.003 1.492 0.006 1.987 -11.504
(0.004) (1.303) (0.004) (1.391) (147.107)
T · 1(Year = 2002) -0.001 0.666 0.001 1.003 -5.778
(0.004) (1.343) (0.004) (1.437) (150.827)
T · 1(Year = 2003) -0.000 0.737 0.002 0.486 -106.467
(0.004) (1.389) (0.004) (1.492) (159.489)
T · 1(Year = 2004) 0.001 1.041 0.003 1.796 -82.849
(0.004) (1.428) (0.004) (1.533) (163.763)
T · 1(Year = 2005) 0.000 0.838 0.004 2.217 -55.723
(0.004) (1.455) (0.004) (1.566) (170.758)
T · 1(Year = 2006) -0.004 0.711 -0.001 2.030 -83.943
(0.004) (1.489) (0.004) (1.600) (181.213)
Observations 540056 540056 540056 540056 535730
R-squared 0.573 0.614 0.581 0.615 0.763
Notes: The table reports estimates of coefficients βks from specification (2.10), which includes
individual and year fixed effects. The placebo threshold of the Dini reform that separates fully
grandfathered from partially grandfathered individuals is set at 19 years of contributions, rather
than at 18. See notes to table 2.E.1 for details on the sample and the outcomes.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.E.4: Placebo threshold at 20 years of SS contributions
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · 1(Year = 1990) 0.005 1.328 0.003 0.877 122.339
(0.003) (1.237) (0.004) (1.367) (122.103)
T · 1(Year = 1991) 0.003 1.019 -0.000 0.980 149.954
(0.003) (1.166) (0.003) (1.309) (118.391)
T · 1(Year = 1992) 0.003 0.931 0.002 0.618 91.558
(0.003) (1.066) (0.003) (1.207) (108.533)
T · 1(Year = 1993) 0.002 -0.305 0.001 -0.751 119.421
(0.002) (0.931) (0.003) (1.084) (94.489)
T · 1(Year = 1994) 0.001 -0.066 -0.001 0.151 92.158
(0.002) (0.688) (0.002) (0.804) (70.797)
T · 1(Year = 1996) 0.001 0.401 0.001 0.701 -14.383
(0.002) (0.714) (0.002) (0.806) (80.552)
T · 1(Year = 1997) 0.002 0.298 0.001 0.351 146.072
(0.003) (0.962) (0.003) (1.062) (107.115)
T · 1(Year = 1998) -0.001 -0.769 -0.002 -0.554 137.386
(0.003) (1.074) (0.003) (1.167) (120.465)
T · 1(Year = 1999) 0.001 0.593 0.001 0.234 134.530
(0.003) (1.153) (0.003) (1.240) (154.808)
T · 1(Year = 2000) -0.000 0.172 -0.002 -0.369 11.008
(0.003) (1.205) (0.003) (1.293) (139.050)
T · 1(Year = 2001) 0.000 -0.042 -0.001 0.229 60.946
(0.003) (1.258) (0.004) (1.351) (146.615)
T · 1(Year = 2002) 0.002 0.751 0.001 1.202 180.991
(0.004) (1.296) (0.004) (1.397) (150.329)
T · 1(Year = 2003) 0.002 0.397 -0.001 0.578 253.305
(0.004) (1.330) (0.004) (1.439) (158.463)
T · 1(Year = 2004) 0.000 0.483 0.001 1.321 208.595
(0.004) (1.374) (0.004) (1.498) (164.790)
T · 1(Year = 2005) 0.005 1.531 0.006 2.398 312.811*
(0.004) (1.413) (0.004) (1.542) (174.760)
T · 1(Year = 2006) 0.007* 2.102 0.008* 3.267** 378.568**
(0.004) (1.447) (0.004) (1.579) (183.955)
Observations 521815 521815 521815 521815 517568
R-squared 0.563 0.602 0.569 0.603 0.764
Notes: The table reports estimates of coefficients βks from specification (2.10), which includes
individual and year fixed effects. The placebo threshold of the Dini reform that separates fully
grandfathered from partially grandfathered individuals is set at 20 years of contributions, rather
than at 18. See notes to table 2.E.1 for details on the sample and the outcomes.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.E.5: Main results, heterogeneity by gender
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · 1(Year = 1990) 0.020*** 2.166 0.013* 0.776 11.860
(0.007) (2.672) (0.008) (2.883) (179.278)
T · 1(Year = 1991) 0.012* 1.150 0.005 1.395 -58.672
(0.007) (2.477) (0.007) (2.675) (171.945)
T · 1(Year = 1992) 0.014** 1.731 0.009 1.781 -67.726
(0.006) (2.208) (0.007) (2.403) (151.675)
T · 1(Year = 1993) 0.004 -0.751 0.002 -2.259 -170.003
(0.006) (1.850) (0.006) (2.030) (132.859)
T · 1(Year = 1994) 0.007* -1.074 0.004 -1.561 -139.231
(0.004) (1.297) (0.004) (1.466) (96.783)
T · 1(Year = 1996) 0.008* 2.313* 0.010** 2.927** 101.169
(0.004) (1.291) (0.005) (1.433) (102.282)
T · 1(Year = 1997) 0.016*** 5.444*** 0.017*** 4.846** 122.468
(0.005) (1.764) (0.006) (1.929) (141.012)
T · 1(Year = 1998) 0.019*** 5.160** 0.019*** 5.340** 47.450
(0.006) (2.029) (0.006) (2.185) (160.310)
T · 1(Year = 1999) 0.021*** 6.540*** 0.022*** 6.859*** 120.434
(0.007) (2.221) (0.007) (2.337) (173.144)
T · 1(Year = 2000) 0.021*** 8.191*** 0.023*** 8.262*** 248.617
(0.007) (2.362) (0.007) (2.477) (184.497)
T · 1(Year = 2001) 0.028*** 9.273*** 0.030*** 9.492*** 303.967
(0.007) (2.493) (0.007) (2.608) (189.880)
T · 1(Year = 2002) 0.034*** 11.387*** 0.036*** 11.315*** 393.919*
(0.008) (2.592) (0.008) (2.721) (203.079)
T · 1(Year = 2003) 0.034*** 11.819*** 0.037*** 12.460*** 517.846**
(0.008) (2.697) (0.008) (2.826) (206.747)
T · 1(Year = 2004) 0.029*** 9.183*** 0.033*** 9.728*** 418.605**
(0.008) (2.772) (0.008) (2.897) (212.129)
T · 1(Year = 2005) 0.034*** 10.695*** 0.040*** 11.121*** 375.586*
(0.008) (2.834) (0.008) (2.963) (221.165)
T · 1(Year = 2006) 0.031*** 9.477*** 0.037*** 10.925*** 162.728
(0.008) (2.902) (0.009) (3.039) (236.154)
T · 1(Year = 1990) ·Male -0.021** -2.752 -0.017* -0.927 77.506
(0.008) (3.100) (0.009) (3.347) (243.546)
T · 1(Year = 1991) ·Male -0.012 -2.399 -0.007 -2.796 191.983
(0.008) (2.881) (0.008) (3.119) (232.690)
T · 1(Year = 1992) ·Male -0.013* -1.226 -0.010 -0.411 298.307
(0.007) (2.603) (0.008) (2.844) (209.727)
T · 1(Year = 1993) ·Male 0.002 2.627 0.002 4.131* 402.981**
(0.006) (2.209) (0.007) (2.448) (181.944)
T · 1(Year = 1994) ·Male -0.005 1.890 -0.002 2.918 341.803**
(0.005) (1.574) (0.005) (1.785) (136.075)
T · 1(Year = 1996) ·Male -0.013** -3.916** -0.017*** -4.533** -135.995
(0.005) (1.607) (0.006) (1.778) (154.108)
T · 1(Year = 1997) ·Male -0.017*** -5.397** -0.018** -4.524* 99.061
(0.006) (2.179) (0.007) (2.368) (217.254)
T · 1(Year = 1998) ·Male -0.015** -3.587 -0.018** -3.617 328.193
(0.007) (2.477) (0.008) (2.659) (236.898)
T · 1(Year = 1999) ·Male -0.020*** -5.209* -0.022*** -4.676* 218.331
(0.008) (2.671) (0.008) (2.820) (256.113)
T · 1(Year = 2000) ·Male -0.016** -5.735** -0.018** -5.269* 131.889
(0.008) (2.819) (0.008) (2.973) (270.345)
T · 1(Year = 2001) ·Male -0.021** -6.648** -0.024*** -6.640** 59.301
(0.008) (2.957) (0.009) (3.119) (284.075)
T · 1(Year = 2002) ·Male -0.029*** -8.932*** -0.033*** -8.778*** -113.896
(0.009) (3.066) (0.009) (3.245) (296.399)
T · 1(Year = 2003) ·Male -0.032*** -10.489*** -0.034*** -10.514*** -220.321
(0.009) (3.179) (0.009) (3.361) (306.688)
T · 1(Year = 2004) ·Male -0.026*** -7.495** -0.032*** -7.898** 74.400
(0.009) (3.261) (0.010) (3.439) (314.416)
T · 1(Year = 2005) ·Male -0.026*** -8.059** -0.034*** -8.597** 86.959
(0.009) (3.332) (0.010) (3.516) (326.788)
T · 1(Year = 2006) ·Male -0.023** -7.276** -0.032*** -8.080** 296.485
(0.010) (3.408) (0.010) (3.596) (347.004)
Observations 543507 543507 543507 543507 538773
R-squared 0.589 0.629 0.594 0.628 0.768
Notes: The table shows coefficients βks and β
d
ks from specification (2.12), which includes individual and year-gender
fixed effects. See notes to Figure 2.9 for further details on the outcomes and the sample.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.E.6: Main results, heterogeneity by age in 1995
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · 1(Year = 1990) 0.016*** 5.380*** 0.010** 2.741 -199.898
(0.004) (1.799) (0.005) (2.139) (181.725)
T · 1(Year = 1991) 0.013*** 3.631** 0.007 2.433 -128.379
(0.004) (1.721) (0.005) (2.067) (176.562)
T · 1(Year = 1992) 0.014*** 4.570*** 0.009* 3.250* 2.180
(0.004) (1.631) (0.005) (1.970) (162.716)
T · 1(Year = 1993) 0.008** 2.271 0.002 0.962 79.693
(0.004) (1.510) (0.004) (1.840) (144.838)
T · 1(Year = 1994) 0.003 0.662 0.002 0.555 -73.162
(0.003) (1.098) (0.004) (1.360) (111.362)
T · 1(Year = 1996) -0.000 -0.167 -0.001 -0.513 108.675
(0.003) (1.118) (0.004) (1.343) (124.778)
T · 1(Year = 1997) 0.003 1.430 0.001 -0.302 333.717*
(0.004) (1.507) (0.005) (1.750) (175.198)
T · 1(Year = 1998) 0.008* 1.960 0.002 0.277 320.566*
(0.005) (1.708) (0.005) (1.917) (188.871)
T · 1(Year = 1999) 0.008 2.686 0.004 1.747 370.404*
(0.005) (1.801) (0.005) (1.995) (203.672)
T · 1(Year = 2000) 0.010** 3.695* 0.008 2.041 511.119**
(0.005) (1.897) (0.005) (2.091) (216.334)
T · 1(Year = 2001) 0.011** 3.989** 0.007 2.665 534.378**
(0.005) (1.959) (0.006) (2.176) (229.151)
T · 1(Year = 2002) 0.014*** 5.752*** 0.012* 4.813** 806.136***
(0.005) (2.045) (0.006) (2.262) (234.788)
T · 1(Year = 2003) 0.015*** 5.885*** 0.015** 5.888** 1,019.041***
(0.006) (2.104) (0.006) (2.321) (246.207)
T · 1(Year = 2004) 0.012** 4.344** 0.011* 4.330* 858.189***
(0.006) (2.130) (0.006) (2.348) (258.453)
T · 1(Year = 2005) 0.007 3.801* 0.006 3.568 767.319***
(0.006) (2.180) (0.006) (2.396) (271.706)
T · 1(Year = 2006) 0.010* 2.866 0.008 2.906 856.967***
(0.006) (2.217) (0.006) (2.429) (285.022)
T · 1(Year = 1990) · age 38-45 -0.010 -6.408** -0.009 -3.019 485.314**
(0.007) (2.629) (0.008) (2.937) (243.468)
T · 1(Year = 1991) · age 38-45 -0.010 -5.226** -0.007 -3.696 349.909
(0.006) (2.473) (0.007) (2.785) (233.941)
T · 1(Year = 1992) · age 38-45 -0.010* -4.925** -0.007 -2.246 222.137
(0.006) (2.291) (0.007) (2.606) (214.314)
T · 1(Year = 1993) · age 38-45 -0.004 -1.810 0.001 -0.697 33.914
(0.005) (2.024) (0.006) (2.344) (187.358)
T · 1(Year = 1994) · age 38-45 0.002 -0.770 0.001 -0.368 234.263
(0.004) (1.465) (0.005) (1.727) (142.917)
T · 1(Year = 1996) · age 38-45 0.001 0.077 0.000 0.982 -141.839
(0.005) (1.511) (0.005) (1.727) (164.124)
T · 1(Year = 1997) · age 38-45 0.004 1.046 0.007 3.642 -244.242
(0.006) (2.039) (0.006) (2.270) (232.249)
T · 1(Year = 1998) · age 38-45 0.001 1.592 0.009 4.416* -120.287
(0.006) (2.302) (0.007) (2.512) (249.617)
T · 1(Year = 1999) · age 38-45 0.001 0.924 0.007 3.394 -203.209
(0.007) (2.443) (0.007) (2.634) (270.005)
T · 1(Year = 2000) · age 38-45 0.001 1.366 0.006 4.484 -309.423
(0.007) (2.567) (0.008) (2.763) (285.093)
T · 1(Year = 2001) · age 38-45 0.006 1.682 0.012 4.138 -330.823
(0.007) (2.668) (0.008) (2.884) (301.930)
T · 1(Year = 2002) · age 38-45 0.002 0.003 0.006 1.554 -774.455**
(0.008) (2.770) (0.008) (2.996) (310.617)
T · 1(Year = 2003) · age 38-45 -0.003 -1.078 0.002 -0.063 -1,021.691***
(0.008) (2.858) (0.008) (3.087) (324.627)
T · 1(Year = 2004) · age 38-45 0.001 0.026 0.004 0.581 -665.242**
(0.008) (2.914) (0.008) (3.141) (336.221)
T · 1(Year = 2005) · age 38-45 0.015* 2.595 0.018** 3.144 -585.712*
(0.008) (2.978) (0.009) (3.207) (350.808)
T · 1(Year = 2006) · age 38-45 0.008 2.750 0.014 4.185 -878.637**
(0.008) (3.038) (0.009) (3.265) (370.059)
Observations 543507 543507 543507 543507 538773
R-squared 0.586 0.628 0.593 0.628 0.767
Notes: The table shows coefficients βks and β
d
ks from specification (2.12), which includes individual and year-age
group fixed effects. See notes to Figure 2.10 for further details on the outcomes and the sample.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.E.7: Main results, heterogeneity by (a proxy of) education
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · 1(Year = 1990) 0.012*** 2.189 0.006 1.004 80.327
(0.004) (1.640) (0.005) (1.759) (141.223)
T · 1(Year = 1991) 0.008** 0.450 0.004 -0.031 36.063
(0.004) (1.520) (0.004) (1.640) (134.429)
T · 1(Year = 1992) 0.009** 1.911 0.006 2.073 95.451
(0.004) (1.384) (0.004) (1.513) (122.052)
T · 1(Year = 1993) 0.006* 1.044 0.001 -0.051 24.718
(0.003) (1.184) (0.004) (1.318) (104.473)
T · 1(Year = 1994) 0.003 -0.330 0.002 -0.334 6.029
(0.003) (0.840) (0.003) (0.957) (78.646)
T · 1(Year = 1996) 0.000 0.051 0.001 0.573 70.315
(0.003) (0.867) (0.003) (0.960) (92.537)
T · 1(Year = 1997) 0.007** 2.618** 0.007* 2.431* 201.750
(0.003) (1.177) (0.004) (1.273) (131.194)
T · 1(Year = 1998) 0.009** 3.290** 0.009** 3.394** 271.593*
(0.004) (1.325) (0.004) (1.415) (143.642)
T · 1(Year = 1999) 0.010** 3.818*** 0.010** 4.022*** 209.395
(0.004) (1.408) (0.004) (1.487) (155.230)
T · 1(Year = 2000) 0.010** 4.211*** 0.011** 3.915** 255.724
(0.004) (1.481) (0.004) (1.568) (164.086)
T · 1(Year = 2001) 0.012*** 4.396*** 0.011** 4.312*** 241.307
(0.004) (1.542) (0.005) (1.632) (174.012)
T · 1(Year = 2002) 0.013*** 4.885*** 0.012*** 4.461*** 215.296
(0.004) (1.598) (0.005) (1.694) (178.698)
T · 1(Year = 2003) 0.012*** 4.632*** 0.014*** 4.716*** 317.746*
(0.005) (1.648) (0.005) (1.746) (185.562)
T · 1(Year = 2004) 0.009** 3.603** 0.010** 3.505** 317.947*
(0.005) (1.683) (0.005) (1.779) (190.656)
T · 1(Year = 2005) 0.013*** 4.500*** 0.014*** 4.413** 251.178
(0.005) (1.715) (0.005) (1.819) (197.911)
T · 1(Year = 2006) 0.012** 3.732** 0.013** 4.351** 230.509
(0.005) (1.749) (0.005) (1.851) (210.088)
T · 1(Year = 1990) · high edu. -0.015* -5.087 -0.011 -3.190 -4.009
(0.008) (3.221) (0.009) (3.528) (305.959)
T · 1(Year = 1991) · high edu. -0.007 -1.810 -0.009 -1.354 83.467
(0.008) (3.058) (0.009) (3.334) (290.919)
T · 1(Year = 1992) · high edu. -0.009 -2.904 -0.012 -2.867 12.845
(0.007) (2.794) (0.008) (3.075) (266.799)
T · 1(Year = 1993) · high edu. 0.000 0.015 0.007 1.335 171.932
(0.007) (2.430) (0.008) (2.729) (235.155)
T · 1(Year = 1994) · high edu. 0.004 2.187 0.002 2.514 269.208
(0.005) (1.837) (0.006) (2.076) (182.807)
T · 1(Year = 1996) · high edu. 0.001 -0.135 -0.008 -1.117 -145.361
(0.006) (1.937) (0.007) (2.112) (213.057)
T · 1(Year = 1997) · high edu. -0.004 -0.582 -0.001 -0.105 31.247
(0.007) (2.596) (0.008) (2.807) (303.474)
T · 1(Year = 1998) · high edu. 0.004 0.973 0.002 1.037 95.859
(0.008) (2.929) (0.009) (3.154) (308.447)
T · 1(Year = 1999) · high edu. -0.003 -0.452 -0.002 1.128 293.990
(0.009) (3.133) (0.009) (3.344) (333.769)
T · 1(Year = 2000) · high edu. 0.005 2.933 0.008 5.845* 445.105
(0.009) (3.293) (0.010) (3.505) (347.175)
T · 1(Year = 2001) · high edu. 0.013 5.194 0.019* 6.469* 608.662*
(0.009) (3.469) (0.010) (3.700) (369.637)
T · 1(Year = 2002) · high edu. 0.011 4.903 0.015 7.467* 652.080*
(0.010) (3.548) (0.010) (3.825) (386.871)
T · 1(Year = 2003) · high edu. 0.009 4.168 0.014 7.194* 488.744
(0.010) (3.687) (0.011) (3.978) (409.704)
T · 1(Year = 2004) · high edu. 0.020* 5.878 0.022** 7.821* 899.426**
(0.010) (3.813) (0.011) (4.090) (416.848)
T · 1(Year = 2005) · high edu. 0.020* 7.253* 0.022* 8.334** 1,069.746**
(0.011) (3.910) (0.011) (4.177) (431.152)
T · 1(Year = 2006) · high edu. 0.024** 7.277* 0.025** 8.471** 771.465*
(0.011) (4.009) (0.012) (4.279) (455.667)
Observations 532746 532746 532746 532746 528251
R-squared 0.589 0.630 0.595 0.629 0.767
Notes: The table shows coefficients βks and β
d
ks from specification (2.12), which includes individual and year-
education group fixed effects. See notes to Figure 2.11 for further details on the outcomes and the sample.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.E.8: Main results, heterogeneity by pre-1996 labour earnings
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · 1(Year = 1990) 0.006 -1.580 0.000 -1.962 -157.512
(0.005) (1.964) (0.006) (2.105) (127.159)
T · 1(Year = 1991) 0.004 -2.138 -0.001 -1.949 -225.635*
(0.005) (1.832) (0.005) (1.971) (125.141)
T · 1(Year = 1992) 0.005 0.037 0.001 0.542 -128.091
(0.005) (1.679) (0.005) (1.826) (115.038)
T · 1(Year = 1993) 0.007* 0.770 0.003 0.032 -115.284
(0.004) (1.439) (0.004) (1.594) (100.868)
T · 1(Year = 1994) 0.006* 0.308 0.004 0.705 -47.544
(0.003) (1.040) (0.004) (1.174) (75.771)
T · 1(Year = 1996) 0.002 0.313 0.001 0.278 -2.062
(0.003) (1.079) (0.004) (1.182) (87.938)
T · 1(Year = 1997) 0.008* 2.797* 0.007 2.388 174.998
(0.004) (1.441) (0.004) (1.542) (126.294)
T · 1(Year = 1998) 0.013*** 3.787** 0.011** 3.737** 266.913*
(0.005) (1.616) (0.005) (1.716) (137.952)
T · 1(Year = 1999) 0.010** 3.836** 0.008* 4.116** 261.702*
(0.005) (1.727) (0.005) (1.816) (150.382)
T · 1(Year = 2000) 0.015*** 5.663*** 0.015*** 5.921*** 322.433**
(0.005) (1.806) (0.005) (1.906) (155.144)
T · 1(Year = 2001) 0.017*** 5.371*** 0.017*** 5.602*** 294.372*
(0.005) (1.882) (0.006) (1.989) (163.062)
T · 1(Year = 2002) 0.019*** 6.012*** 0.017*** 5.970*** 267.733
(0.005) (1.946) (0.006) (2.065) (164.999)
T · 1(Year = 2003) 0.016*** 5.362*** 0.017*** 6.058*** 275.670
(0.006) (2.010) (0.006) (2.133) (167.762)
T · 1(Year = 2004) 0.016*** 4.775** 0.015** 4.970** 341.267**
(0.006) (2.060) (0.006) (2.178) (170.601)
T · 1(Year = 2005) 0.020*** 6.930*** 0.020*** 6.856*** 390.748**
(0.006) (2.102) (0.006) (2.224) (173.843)
T · 1(Year = 2006) 0.022*** 6.204*** 0.022*** 7.146*** 392.627**
(0.006) (2.143) (0.006) (2.263) (184.216)
T · 1(Year = 1990) · top terc. -0.005 1.798 0.000 2.070 -93.114
(0.006) (2.332) (0.007) (2.579) (277.526)
T · 1(Year = 1991) · top terc. -0.002 2.203 0.002 1.699 334.245
(0.006) (2.189) (0.006) (2.437) (269.461)
T · 1(Year = 1992) · top terc. -0.004 0.132 0.001 0.385 305.240
(0.005) (2.003) (0.006) (2.258) (247.402)
T · 1(Year = 1993) · top terc. -0.008* -1.362 -0.005 -0.570 260.916
(0.005) (1.742) (0.005) (2.027) (212.725)
T · 1(Year = 1994) · top terc. -0.006* -0.982 -0.005 -1.478 161.851
(0.004) (1.253) (0.004) (1.485) (163.936)
T · 1(Year = 1996) · top terc. -0.003 -1.218 -0.003 -0.942 -50.898
(0.004) (1.335) (0.005) (1.535) (198.982)
T · 1(Year = 1997) · top terc. -0.006 -3.058* -0.005 -2.839 -55.285
(0.005) (1.811) (0.006) (2.034) (283.354)
T · 1(Year = 1998) · top terc. -0.010* -3.976* -0.011* -4.421* -134.548
(0.006) (2.063) (0.006) (2.276) (300.056)
T · 1(Year = 1999) · top terc. -0.008 -3.571 -0.004 -3.148 -104.182
(0.006) (2.190) (0.006) (2.376) (323.019)
T · 1(Year = 2000) · top terc. -0.014** -5.793** -0.014** -6.247** -76.047
(0.006) (2.316) (0.007) (2.497) (345.968)
T · 1(Year = 2001) · top terc. -0.012* -3.723 -0.013* -4.717* -16.107
(0.007) (2.425) (0.007) (2.618) (368.306)
T · 1(Year = 2002) · top terc. -0.013* -4.099 -0.014* -4.682* -6.048
(0.007) (2.505) (0.007) (2.712) (385.914)
T · 1(Year = 2003) · top terc. -0.010 -3.615 -0.013* -4.446 195.438
(0.007) (2.602) (0.007) (2.809) (407.955)
T · 1(Year = 2004) · top terc. -0.013* -3.626 -0.012 -4.049 291.000
(0.007) (2.666) (0.008) (2.876) (420.332)
T · 1(Year = 2005) · top terc. -0.014* -6.765** -0.015* -6.943** 43.182
(0.007) (2.727) (0.008) (2.947) (441.727)
T · 1(Year = 2006) · top terc. -0.021*** -6.681** -0.022*** -7.726** -188.526
(0.008) (2.803) (0.008) (3.026) (468.856)
Observations 531845 531845 531845 531845 530008
R-squared 0.583 0.620 0.585 0.615 0.768
Notes: The table shows coefficients βks and β
d
ks from specification (2.12), which includes individual and year-income
group fixed effects. See notes to Figure 2.12 for further details on the outcomes and the sample.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.E.9: Main results, heterogeneity by pre-1996 occupation
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · 1(Year = 1990) 0.012*** 1.883 0.007 1.426 143.411
(0.004) (1.605) (0.005) (1.780) (141.388)
T · 1(Year = 1991) 0.010** 1.462 0.006 1.552 150.537
(0.004) (1.498) (0.004) (1.674) (130.110)
T · 1(Year = 1992) 0.011*** 2.266* 0.009** 3.118** 228.439**
(0.004) (1.374) (0.004) (1.553) (115.797)
T · 1(Year = 1993) 0.008** 2.159* 0.006 1.283 148.027
(0.003) (1.202) (0.004) (1.390) (99.974)
T · 1(Year = 1994) 0.008*** 0.406 0.006* 0.365 104.436
(0.003) (0.877) (0.003) (1.037) (73.880)
T · 1(Year = 1996) -0.000 -0.219 -0.001 0.190 -40.539
(0.003) (0.898) (0.003) (1.032) (83.236)
T · 1(Year = 1997) 0.003 1.264 0.005 1.483 34.645
(0.003) (1.202) (0.004) (1.340) (116.204)
T · 1(Year = 1998) 0.009** 2.526* 0.009** 3.149** 158.875
(0.004) (1.358) (0.004) (1.492) (130.420)
T · 1(Year = 1999) 0.009** 2.980** 0.010** 4.199*** 124.575
(0.004) (1.446) (0.004) (1.566) (142.684)
T · 1(Year = 2000) 0.009** 4.080*** 0.012** 5.058*** 253.114*
(0.004) (1.509) (0.005) (1.636) (152.276)
T · 1(Year = 2001) 0.012*** 4.956*** 0.013*** 5.572*** 206.982
(0.004) (1.569) (0.005) (1.706) (162.119)
T · 1(Year = 2002) 0.015*** 5.579*** 0.015*** 6.049*** 138.601
(0.005) (1.615) (0.005) (1.765) (171.064)
T · 1(Year = 2003) 0.015*** 5.593*** 0.018*** 6.642*** 176.240
(0.005) (1.662) (0.005) (1.817) (181.895)
T · 1(Year = 2004) 0.014*** 5.152*** 0.016*** 5.794*** 249.418
(0.005) (1.704) (0.005) (1.856) (187.884)
T · 1(Year = 2005) 0.017*** 6.082*** 0.020*** 6.500*** 190.216
(0.005) (1.739) (0.005) (1.894) (196.385)
T · 1(Year = 2006) 0.016*** 5.385*** 0.020*** 7.089*** 84.518
(0.005) (1.781) (0.005) (1.934) (208.589)
T · 1(Year = 1990) · self-emp -0.015* -4.120 -0.013 -3.840 -202.824
(0.009) (3.225) (0.009) (3.365) (283.372)
T · 1(Year = 1991) · self-emp. -0.014* -5.550* -0.016* -6.328** -257.964
(0.008) (3.000) (0.008) (3.132) (280.183)
T · 1(Year = 1992) · self-emp. -0.016** -3.971 -0.018** -5.332* -352.322
(0.007) (2.726) (0.008) (2.871) (261.360)
T · 1(Year = 1993) · self-emp. -0.010 -3.880* -0.011 -3.004 -225.726
(0.006) (2.291) (0.007) (2.437) (224.798)
T · 1(Year = 1994) · self-emp. -0.013*** -0.843 -0.011** -0.202 -103.291
(0.005) (1.629) (0.005) (1.747) (174.439)
T · 1(Year = 1996) · self-emp. 0.000 0.043 -0.001 -0.501 160.270
(0.006) (1.729) (0.006) (1.807) (210.448)
T · 1(Year = 1997) · self-emp. 0.007 2.302 0.003 1.469 425.606
(0.007) (2.356) (0.007) (2.449) (302.686)
T · 1(Year = 1998) · self-emp. -0.000 0.927 -0.004 -0.527 233.806
(0.007) (2.644) (0.008) (2.735) (314.743)
T · 1(Year = 1999) · self-emp. -0.003 0.463 -0.009 -1.277 345.309
(0.008) (2.819) (0.008) (2.898) (337.995)
T · 1(Year = 2000) · self-emp. 0.006 1.136 -0.001 -0.730 154.410
(0.008) (2.975) (0.009) (3.058) (351.188)
T · 1(Year = 2001) · self-emp. 0.008 -0.168 0.004 -1.246 338.238
(0.009) (3.120) (0.009) (3.208) (370.719)
T · 1(Year = 2002) · self-emp. 0.001 -0.082 -0.002 -1.301 517.773
(0.009) (3.241) (0.009) (3.339) (374.859)
T · 1(Year = 2003) · self-emp. -0.005 -1.971 -0.010 -3.176 572.885
(0.009) (3.365) (0.010) (3.466) (383.369)
T · 1(Year = 2004) · self-emp. -0.005 -3.051 -0.010 -4.016 602.984
(0.009) (3.444) (0.010) (3.540) (389.939)
T · 1(Year = 2005) · self-emp. -0.003 -2.276 -0.010 -3.202 679.482*
(0.010) (3.515) (0.010) (3.623) (401.362)
T · 1(Year = 2006) · self-emp. -0.004 -2.457 -0.009 -4.845 726.363*
(0.010) (3.585) (0.010) (3.694) (425.170)
Observations 543507 543507 543507 543507 538773
R-squared 0.586 0.628 0.593 0.629 0.767
Notes: The table shows coefficients βks and β
d
ks from specification (2.12), which includes individual and year-
occupation fixed effects. See notes to Figure 2.13 for further details on the outcomes and the sample.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 2.E.10: Main results, heterogeneity along all dimensions but age
SSC SSC work SSC work SSC labour earnings
(1=yes) (days) (1=yes) (days) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T · Post 0.009 6.356*** 0.016** 7.185*** 218.152
(0.006) (2.358) (0.007) (2.443) (194.367)
T · Post ·Male -0.009 -4.208* -0.013* -4.475* 6.055
(0.006) (2.430) (0.007) (2.549) (243.534)
T · Post · High edu. 0.014** 4.952* 0.016** 5.831** 304.339
(0.007) (2.613) (0.007) (2.766) (305.455)
T · Post · Self emp. 0.009 1.487 0.005 0.197 538.806*
(0.007) (2.548) (0.007) (2.646) (301.423)
T · Post · Top terc. -0.002 -3.051 -0.006 -3.746* -58.433
(0.005) (2.009) (0.006) (2.164) (324.295)
Observations 521611 521611 521611 521611 519824
R-squared 0.588 0.625 0.589 0.619 0.770
Notes: The table reports estimates based on an enriched version of specification (2.13), where the
term Ti · Postt and year fixed effects are also interacted with: a dummy that takes value 1 if the
individual is male; a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is high-educated (as measured by a
proxy); a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual belongs to the top tercile of the distribution of
pre-1996 labour earnings; a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual worked as a self-employed
in the last occupation before 1996. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered
at the individual level.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Chapter 3
It’s time to learn: school institutions and returns
to instruction time
3.1 Introduction
Given the important role played by schools in the formation of human capital,
scholars and policymakers have long been interested in understanding what makes
a school more effective. A rich literature examines how school inputs (such as class
size or instruction time) affect students’ achievement. A more recent literature high-
lights the role of school institutions and governance (Woessmann, 2016). Indeed, a
growing line of research explores the effects of granting more autonomy to schools
on learning outcomes (see Section 3.2). In this paper we study if and why the ef-
fects of expanding a specific school input - instruction time - vary across public and
charter schools. This paper therefore lies at the intersection of the two literatures,
as we address the question of whether the way in which schools are managed and
organized affects how they use additional resources.
Studying how school institutions affect returns to additional instruction time is in-
teresting because many countries are considering devoting, or have already allocated,
substantial funds to increasing the amount of time that pupils spend at school.1 In
addition, since time is an inherently limited resource, extended school schedules re-
duce the amount of time that students can dedicate to other activities. Therefore,
the effect on achievement could depend not only on the absolute quality of time use
at school, but also on its relative quality with respect to the learning opportunities
available outside of school. Hence, we also examine whether the effects of increased
instruction time are heterogeneous across pupils from different socio-economic back-
grounds.
1For instance, since 2003 Germany has begun phasing in all-day schooling and the percentage
of pupils attending all-day primary schools has increased from 7.9 per cent in 2005 to 24.2 per
cent in 2013 (OECD, 2016a). Several Latin-American countries have recently transitioned from
two-shift schemes, where some grades are taught in the morning and some in the afternoon, to
one-shift schemes that feature a longer school day (see Section 3.2). As other examples, President
Obama in 2009 and Chancellor Osborne in 2016 advocated for longer school days in the US and
UK respectively. In the US the National Center on Time and Learning (NCTL) promotes extended
school schedules.
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To address these questions, we take advantage of two attractive features of the
Chilean educational system. Firstly, we exploit the passing of the Full School Day
(Jornada Escolar Completa, or FSD henceforth) reform in 1997, which substantially
increased daily instruction time in all publicly subsidized (i.e. public and charter)
primary and secondary schools, whilst leaving the term length and the national
curriculum unchanged. The increment was sizable, ranging from 4 to 9 additional
instruction hours per week depending on the grade. In grades 1 to 4 it translated
into a 26.7 per cent increase in weekly instruction time. Schools could decide when to
adopt the longer school day and how to allocate the additional time across subjects.
Secondly, we leverage the fact that in Chile there are public and charter schools.
Both types of schools are funded through a voucher system, but differ substantially
in terms of ownership and in the degree of autonomy that they enjoy: charter schools
have more autonomy over staff decisions and over the course offer and content.
We estimate the effect of additional instruction time on achievement by exploiting
within-school variation in years of exposure to the FSD across several cohorts of
pupils who started grade 1 between 2002 and 2010, and who later took standardized
reading and mathematics tests at the end of grade 4. As the availability of longer
schedules may affect the composition of pupil intake, we restrict our attention to
cohorts of incumbent students, i.e. those who started primary education in schools
that had yet not adopted the FSD and who may have become exposed to it at differ-
ent stages of their primary education. We further deal with potentially endogenous
mobility across schools by instrumenting actual exposure with the exposure a stu-
dent would have accumulated if he/she had remained in the school where he/she
initially enrolled.
Our preferred linear specifications show that an additional year of exposure to the
FSD raises fourth grade reading scores by 0.024 standard deviations (σ). The effect
on mathematics scores is smaller (0.007-0.008σ) and non significant.
We then explore heterogeneity by pupils’ socio-economic characteristics. The effect
of additional instruction time on academic performance is smaller for students from
advantaged backgrounds than for the rest of the pupils in our sample. This finding is
consistent across different measures of household resources, which include parental
education and the availability of books, a computer and a connection to the Inter-
net at home. Although non negligible, the difference in the benefits of additional
instruction time for pupils from different backgrounds is however not statistically
significant. With this caveat about the precision of our estimates in mind, results
suggest that returns to additional time at school are higher for pupils who - ac-
cording to information drawn from time-use surveys - have scarcer support available
outside of school. We further provide evidence suggesting that the longer school day
is associated with a reduced frequency of homework. As this is likely to particu-
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larly benefit students with limited support outside of school, it could be a potential
mechanism underlying these findings.
Then, exploiting the features of the Chilean setting, we study how school institutions
affect returns to instruction time. In order to avoid capturing differences in the char-
acteristics of students attending different types of schools, we compare public schools
to charter schools that do not charge fees. While fee-charging charter schools serve
pupils from more advantaged backgrounds, public and no-fee charter schools cater
to schoolchildren of similarly lower socio-economic status. We document greater
benefits of longer schedules for pupils who start primary education in no-fee char-
ter schools than for those who start in public schools. The difference is large for
both subjects - mathematics and reading - but is only statistically significant for
the latter. Moreover, it does not decline when, in the same regression specification,
we allow for the effect of longer schedules to differ depending on students’ socio-
economic background; this further suggests that the estimated difference does not
reflect heterogeneity in the characteristics of students attending the two types of
schools.
While survey evidence suggests that public and charter schools allocate the addi-
tional instruction time across subjects in a similar way, we uncover a significant
difference in how public and no-fee charter schools adjust total contract and teach-
ing hours to provide longer schedules: no-fee charter schools rely more on hiring new
classroom teachers and less on increasing work hours per teacher than public schools,
as shown by the evolution of the number of classroom teachers and their contract
hours after the adoption of the FSD. It therefore appears that the higher degree of
autonomy enjoyed by charter schools over staff decisions allows them to adjust the
teaching input in a different way. Moreover, we show that public school teachers
display a lower degree of satisfaction with the FSD scheme than their colleagues in
charter schools. If extended teachers’ working hours translate into a lower quality of
time use at school, this could be one mechanism underlying the documented hetero-
geneity. The literature has found that charter schools are typically associated with
better learning outcomes. Our findings suggest that in the context of a large-scale
expansion of a school input (i.e. instruction time), charter schools may be able to
adjust other inputs (i.e. teaching hours) in a more effective way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related lit-
erature. Section 3.3 describes the Chilean education system and the FSD reform.
Section 3.4 presents the identification strategy. Section 3.5 describes the data and
the sample. Section 3.6 discusses the main findings. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Related Literature
This paper speaks to the growing literature that examines the effects of school
institutions on pupils’ performance. Several papers focus on newly founded or con-
verted charter schools in the US. Studies on oversubscribed charter schools exploit
the fact that admission depends on a lottery and document a positive effect both
on school performance (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2011; Dobbie et al., 2011) and on
medium-term non academic outcomes (Dobbie and Fryer Jr, 2015). Dobbie and
Fryer Jr (2013) and Angrist et al. (2013) highlight that high-performing charter
schools are characterized by certain practices and features, among which there is
increased instruction time. Along this line, Baude et al. (2014) show that the qual-
ity of charter schools in Texas improved between 2001 and 2011, largely driven by
the adherence to No Excuses-style curricula. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2016) analyze
charter takeovers (i.e. formerly public schools converted into charter schools) and
also report positive effects on achievement of grandfathered students. Eyles et al.
(2017) and Eyles and Machin (2018) examine how the conversion of some English
community schools into academies - autonomous, state-funded education establish-
ments not subject to local authority control - affects achievement of legacy enrolled
pupils. The former work studies several post-2010 episodes of conversion involv-
ing already high-performing primary schools and does not find significant effects on
achievement. The second assesses the first round of conversion of mostly under-
performing secondary schools in the 2000s, documenting instead a positive impact
on test scores.
Our work is also related to the literature on the relationship between instruction
time and achievement.2 A set of papers studies the effect of the number of school
days prior to standardized tests on performance, by exploiting either unplanned
school closures due to adverse weather conditions (Marcotte, 2007; Marcotte and
Hemelt, 2008; Hansen, 2011; Goodman, 2014) or changes in term dates and/or test
dates (Sims, 2008; Agu¨ero and Beleche, 2013; Aucejo and Romano, 2016). These
studies find positive, although in some cases modest, effects. While they leverage
small variations in the number of school days, we focus on substantial and perma-
nent changes to the length of the school day. Varying the length rather than the
number of school days may have different consequences on student achievement. For
example, while the former entails a re-organization of daily routines, the latter does
not.
Starting from Lavy (2015), recent studies examine the effect of instruction time on
2The early studies mostly focus on term length and report modestly positive to insignificant
effects. These studies rely either on variation in term length between and within US states over
time (Rizzuto and Wachtel, 1980; Card and Krueger, 1992; Grogger, 1996; Betts and Johnson,
1998; Eide and Showalter, 1998) or on cross-country differences (Lee and Barro, 2001; Woessmann,
2003). A review of studies conducted in the 1985-2009 period can be found in Patall et al. (2010).
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achievement and the drivers of its effectiveness by using cross-country PISA data
and exploiting within-pupil or within-school variation in subject-specific classroom
hours. Lavy (2015) finds that a one-hour increase of weekly subject-specific in-
struction time raises scores by 0.06σ and that school and student characteristics
matter: the effect is larger for schools that enjoy more autonomy and for pupils
from disadvantaged backgrounds. Rivkin and Schiman (2015) further highlight that
productivity of instruction time depends positively on the quality of the classroom
environment, as captured by student disruption and student-teacher interactions.
Cattaneo et al. (2017) focus their attention on Switzerland and document that stu-
dents in more demanding school-tracks enjoy greater benefits. Also these studies
leverage a source of variation different from ours. Different allocations of weekly
instruction time across subjects do not necessarily entail a change in the length of
the school day. Students do not have to re-arrange their daily routine or reduce the
time for activities carried out outside of school, nor do schools need to operate for
more hours.
A number of papers exploit instead reform-induced variation in instruction time.
Pischke (2007) and Parinduri (2014) study the effects of exceptionally short or long
school years due to country-level reforms of school calendars that leave the curricu-
lum unchanged.3 More similarly to us, Huebener et al. (2017) and Lavy (forth-
coming) examine reforms that increase weekly instruction hours in Germany and
Israel, respectively. They both find a positive effect on achievement. The former
documents a larger gain for high-performing students, while the latter does not find
evidence of differential benefits across pupils from different socio-economic back-
grounds. Battistin and Meroni (2016) and Meroni and Abbiati (2016) study an
expansion of mathematics and reading instruction time in lower secondary schools
in southern Italy, documenting positive effects on mathematics test scores, concen-
trated among high-achieving disadvantaged pupils. Recently, Figlio et al. (2018)
show that extending the school day and providing additional literacy instruction
time in low-performing schools in Florida have a positive effect on reading test
scores.
Similarly to Chile, several other Latin American countries have switched from a
two-shift scheme - where some grades are taught in the morning and some in the
afternoon - to a one-shift scheme, substantially lengthening the school day. The im-
pact has been evaluated in a series of reports.4 Findings are mixed, suggesting that
3The former studies the short 1966-67 West German school year and documents an increase
in repetition rates in primary school as well as a reduction in enrollment to higher secondary
school tracks, but no effects on earnings and employment. The latter examines the long 1978-
79 Indonesian school year and reports a reduction in repetition rates and improved educational
attainment, with positive effects also on wages and on the probability of working in the formal
sector.
4Cerdan-Infantes and Vermeersch (2007) on Uruguay, Almeida et al. (2016) on Brazil and
Hincapie (2016) on Colombia.
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how the reform of school schedules is implemented and how additional instruction
time is used play important roles in shaping returns.
Two papers study the effect of the FSD reform in Chile on standardized test scores.
Bellei (2009) focuses on performance at grade 10 in 2001 and 2003, adopting a
difference-in-differences approach. Berthelon et al. (2016) explore the effect on early
literacy skills at grade 2. Based on one year of observations (2012), they instrument
exposure to the FSD with the local availability of schools offering longer schedules.
Both papers find positive and significant effects on performance. We focus on all
cohorts that start primary school between 2002 and 2010 and examine the effect
of the FSD on their academic performance in a different grade (grade 4). In addi-
tion, we propose a different identification strategy to assuage concerns about student
endogenously sorting into schools offering the FSD. Furthermore, we examine how
schools’ types and students’ characteristics affect returns to longer schedules and
explore some mechanisms that could explain the heterogeneous effects. In a recent
paper Dominguez and Ruffini (2018) study the effect of the FSD on longer-term
outcomes; they focus on educational attainment and earnings when individuals are
in their 20s and 30s, finding positive effects.
3.3 Institutional Setting
3.3.1 The Chilean School System
The Chilean school system features two education cycles: primary education
(grades 1-8) and secondary education (grades 9-12). Standardized tests called
SIMCE assess pupils’ knowledge and skills in core subjects at the end of various
grades. The testing frequency is highest in fourth grade, with tests taking place
every year since 2005.5
Education is provided by three types of schools: public schools, charter schools and
non subsidized private schools. Public schools are free and are funded through stu-
dent vouchers.6 Charter schools are private, but they are publicly subsidized through
the voucher system as well. Since 1994 charter schools can also charge tuition fees,
but the size of the voucher decreases as tuition fees increase. Non subsidized pri-
vate schools are funded only through tuition fees and are usually substantially more
expensive than charter schools.
The FSD reform applies to public and charter schools, which serve more than 90
5Fourth graders were also tested in 1999 and 2002.
6During the 1980s the Chilean school system experienced a major transformation that trans-
ferred the administration of public schools from the Ministry of Education to Municipalities. Fur-
thermore, the funding system was changed by introducing a voucher that could be used both in
public and charter schools.
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per cent of the students attending regular programs in the school system.7 Despite
both being publicly subsidized, they are different in how they are managed and regu-
lated. Public schools are either managed by the Municipal Department of Education
(DAEM ) or by non-profit Municipal corporations.8 The working conditions are reg-
ulated by a labor code specific to education professions.9 Charter schools are private
organizations and, accordingly, the working conditions of teachers are regulated by
the private sector labor code.10 Different regulations translate into charter schools
having greater autonomy and flexibility in the management of the teaching staff,
in terms of recruiting, dismissal and compensation policies. They also enjoy more
responsibility and freedom over the design of the curriculum. In Appendix Section
3.A we discuss in more detail the main regulatory differences between public and
charter schools. We also provide further evidence when exploring the differential
effect of the FSD by type of school in Subsection 3.6.3.
3.3.2 The FSD Reform
In 1997 the Chilean government decided to increase daily instruction time in all
publicly subsidized primary and secondary schools (i.e. public schools and charter
schools), whilst leaving the term length and the national curriculum unchanged.11
The Full School Day (Jornada Escolar Completa, or FSD henceforth) reform aimed
at improving the quality of education and reducing inequality in learning outcomes.12
The reform envisaged a substantial increase of instruction hours (which last 45 min-
utes). Specifically, in primary schools 8 instruction hours were added in grades 1 to
6 and 5 hours in grades 7 and 8; in secondary schools, grades 9 and 10 experienced a
9-hour increase of instruction time per week.13 In grades 1 to 4, this translated into
a 26.7 per cent increase of weekly instruction time. As a result, in 2015 the length
of school days in Chilean primary schools was the highest among OECD countries,
when considering total compulsory instruction time (OECD, 2016b).
Schools could choose when to implement the FSD.14 The deadline was initially set
to 2002. However, it was later extended and differentiated by type of school and
student: 2007 for all public schools and for charter schools catering to disadvan-
7This figure excludes education for adults, education for students with specific disabilities and
other types of special programs.
8While the director of the DAEM is usually a teacher appointed by the Municipality, corpora-
tions are led by a board of directors who do not need to be teachers and whose president is the
major of the Municipality.
9This is called Estatuto de los Profesionales de la Educacio´n.
10This is called Co´digo del trabajo.
11Increasing daily instruction time is not mandatory in grades 1 and 2.
12The Law 19494 that introduced the FSD was published on January 25, 1997.
13In grades 11 and 12, 6 instruction hours were added in the scientific-humanities track, while 4
hours were added in the vocational track.
14Schools could also adopt the FSD in different grades at different times, but they were mandated
to ensure that pupils who started attending the longer school day in a given grade would then also
be exposed in all following grades.
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taged pupils, 2010 for the rest of charter schools. Yet, by 2013 - the last year of data
available to us - there were still schools operating under the old scheme. Figure 3.1
illustrates the pattern of adoption of the FSD between 1997 and 2013 for primary
schools. For every year, it shows the number of schools, as well as the share of
public and charter schools, that had adopted the policy by that year. The two types
of schools display similar patterns of adoption, although a larger share of public
schools had implemented the FSD by 2013.15
By the time the reform was announced many schools were operating a two-shift
scheme: some grades were taught in the morning and some in the afternoon. The
increased instruction time and the longer school day required a change to a one-shift
scheme, where all pupils attend school from the morning to mid-afternoon. Table
3.1 illustrates the daily school schedules with and without the FSD, inclusive of time
devoted to breaks. Without the FSD pupils spend at least 5 hours per day at school.
The typical morning shift runs from 8.00 to 13.00, while the typical afternoon shift
runs from 14.00 to 19.00. Under the FSD students spend at least 7.08 hours per day
at school. If the school adopts the FSD from Monday to Friday, the typical school
day starts at 08.00 and ends at 15.05. If the school adopts the FSD on 4 days and
the shorter school day on the remaining one, the typical longer school day starts at
8.00 and ends at 15.45.16
The passage from a two-shift to a single-shift scheme implies that pupils have lunch
at school. For most students, however, this did not translate into a substantial
change in the nutritive content of their diet. First, Chile had virtually no problem
of infant malnutrition when the FSD reform was passed.17 Second, students from
disadvantaged backgrounds could also have lunch at school under the short school
day scheme. The main difference between the short and the long school day is there-
fore the increase of instruction time, which requires adjusting the teaching input.
Table 3.2 reports weekly instruction hours per subject with and without the FSD
for grades 1 to 4. It shows that the legislated increase in instruction time was
not allotted to specific subjects, but rather allocated to the so-called “Free Choice
time”, which schools could decide how to use. Therefore, schools had considerable
freedom over the organization of the FSD, the only constraint being the approval
by the Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educacio´n) of a pedagogical plan that
described the use of the additional time.
We do not observe how each school allocates the additional time across subjects.
However, we can provide some evidence based on a survey administered in 2005 to
15By 2013 around 12 per cent of primary schools were still operating without the FSD.
16The minimum hours of daily instruction are prescribed by the law. Schools can freely choose
the time at which the school day starts. The daily schedules in Table 3.1 are built assuming that
the full school day and the morning shift start at 8.00, while the afternoon shift starts at 14.00.
17In 2000 only 2.9 per cent of children aged 0-6 suffered from malnutrition and only 0.3 per cent
suffered from moderate or serious malnutrition (Mo¨nckeberg B., 2003).
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investigate the use of time in fifth grade at 387 urban primary schools that had
already implemented the FSD at that point.18 Drawing on this, Table 3.3 reports
the allocation of weekly instruction time across curricular subjects, both for all
schools (columns 1-2) and distinguishing between public (columns 3-4) and charter
(columns 5-6) schools. “Core time” excludes “Free Choice time”. It shows that
schools devote a substantial portion of “Free Choice time” to core subjects. Among
those, more hours are allocated to Spanish than to mathematics.19 A small fraction
of additional instruction time is dedicated to other subjects; the remaining portion
of “Free Choice time” is distributed among various extra-curricular activities (not
reported in the table for brevity). Charter schools devote slightly less additional
time to Spanish and mathematics. However, the allocation of additional instruction
time across subjects is similar in public and charter schools. The only significant
differences emerge with regards to foreign languages and religion, to which charter
schools devote more of the additional instruction time.
To further investigate the effect of the FSD on schools’ time use, we rely on data that
reports, at the school-class-year level, the list of subjects taught.20 Appendix Figure
3.C.1 shows, in an event study framework that collapses information at the school-
grade-year level, the evolution of the total number of subjects, as well as subjects
related to specific disciplinary areas, around the adoption of the FSD.21 Following
the introduction of the longer school day in a given grade, the number of subjects
taught in that grade increase by a small but statistically significant amount, up to
almost 0.1 four years after the implementation of the policy. The increase is driven
by the fact that there are more subjects related to foreign languages as well as more
tutorials and workshops. While the number of subjects is an imperfect measure of
how schools use the additional time, as they could simply increase the hours devoted
to each subject, this provides further evidence that the longer school day translated
into an increase of instruction time.
Augmenting instruction time and lengthening the school day generated additional
18The survey was administered by the Studies Directorate of the Sociology Faculty at the
Catholic University of Chile (DESUC ) and a report based on it was written by Ruz Pe´rez and
Madrid Valenzuela (2005).
19Spanish also features more instruction time also under the shorter school day.
20This data is available at http://datos.mineduc.cl/dashboards/19923/
bases-de-datos-de-planes-y-programas-de-estudios-anos-2002-al-2016/.
21The event study specification reads:
Ygst = γg + ηs + θt + λsg + φst + µgt +
−2∑
ρ=−5
βρ1(pgst = ρ) +
4∑
ρ=0
βρ1(pgst = ρ) + εgst (3.1)
g, s and t index the grade, the school and the year, respectively. pgst = t − Egs is the distance
(in years) from the event, which is the introduction of the FSD in grade g of school s. Controls
consist of grade (γg), school (ηs) and year (θt) fixed effects, as well as their interactions. The FSD
is adopted in event-year 0 and coefficients βρ show how different the number of subjects taught is
in event-year ρ relative to event-year -1, which is taken as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered at the school-grade level.
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operational costs, which were funded through an increase in the baseline vouch-
ers, by 25-50 per cent depending on the grade (Table 3.2).22 Some schools also
had to expand their infrastructure in order to switch to the single-shift scheme.
Infrastructure-related costs were funded through ad-hoc additional resources, which
were allocated through public tenders organized by the Ministry of Education and
its regional offices. Priority was usually granted to schools catering for students
from lower socio-economic backgrounds.23
3.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to study whether increased instruction time and a longer school day
affect achievement, we exploit the fact that we observe several cohorts of pupils
starting primary education in a given school in the 2002-2010 period and then taking
a standardized test at the end of grade 4 – possibly in a different establishment –
over the period 2005-2013. Since we can follow the entire school career of each one
of such students, we can compute actual years of exposure to the FSD by the end
of grade 4 as ExpFSD4 =
∑4
j=1 d
j, where dj is a dummy that takes value 1 if the
pupil is exposed during grade j to the FSD.24
We then estimate the following specification:
Yist = ηs + θt + βExpFSD4ist + γXist + δZst + εist (3.2)
Yist is the test score of student i who starts primary school in school s in year t
and then takes the standardized test at the end of grade 4. ηs is a set of school
fixed effects that account for time-invariant heterogeneity across schools; θt is a set
of year fixed effects that control for common unobserved year-specific shocks. In
the richest specifications, we also include a set of controls at the student and at
the school level. Specifically, Xist is a vector of student characteristics measured
in first grade, which include: gender, age, attendance rate and end-of-year status
(i.e. promotion to second grade or retention in first grade). Zst averages student
characteristics contained in Xist at the school level. It also includes enrollment and
22The final amount that a school receives through student vouchers also depends on its location,
size, and other characteristics. We report the increase of the baseline voucher, because this was
the change common to all schools.
23Yet schools serving pupils from higher socio-economic backgrounds were less likely to need
infrastructure-related investments.
24The treatment is therefore more precisely defined as the number of grades attended at least
once under the FSD scheme by the end of grade 4. Furthermore, exposure during grade 4, the
grade when students take the standardized test, is computed taking into account only the first
year when a pupil attends grade 4. This is motivated by the choice of considering only the first
observation when schoolchildren belonging to the master sample (see Section 3.5) take the test
multiple times. Throughout the paper, we use the term years of exposure to the FSD for brevity.
Moreover, the two definitions are exactly equivalent for non repeaters, who constitute the largest
majority of the sample (88 per cent).
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average class size in first grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
By including first-grade school fixed effects, specification (3.2) leverages variation in
exposure to the FSD by the end of grade 4 across cohorts of students who enrolled
in the same establishment. It therefore exploits the fact that, depending on whether
the school adopted longer schedules within our sample period (i.e. by 2013) and on
the exact year of adoption, adjacent cohorts of enrollees could experience a different
exposure to the FSD before taking the test. This source of variation can be used
to estimate the causal effect of the FSD on learning outcomes if cohorts of pupils
are not systematically different along characteristics that are not taken into account
in specification (3.2) and that correlate both with years of exposure to increased
instruction time and with achievement.
Given the staggered adoption of the FSD across schools, a first concern is that
parents would factor the availability of the longer school day into their preferences
about the school in which to enroll their children. This could affect the composition
of pupil intake, possibly along dimensions that our set of controls cannot account
for. According to parent surveys administered alongside the test in 2005, the FSD
was the most important reason for enrolling their child in a given school for only
2.46 per cent of parents. Proximity to home (27.61 per cent), the presence of a
relative in the school (15.66 per cent) and the school’s prestige (18.89 per cent) were
cited as the most important determinants of school choices.25
Nonetheless, we address this concern by restricting our analysis to incumbent pupils.
This means that we only consider pupils who enroll in first grade in a given school
before such school adopts the FSD. As an example, if a school adopts the longer
school day in 2007, we discard students who start primary education in that school
in 2007 or later. Cohorts who enrolled before 2007, on the other hand, made their
decision before the introduction of the FSD and possibly became exposed to it
at some point in their school career. For incumbent students who never repeat a
grade the range of the treatment variable (ExpFSD4) is 0-3, as exposure to the FSD
cannot start earlier than in grade 2. For repeaters, on the other hand, the range is 0-
4; the variable takes value 4 in cases when the school adopts the FSD in the year when
the pupil is repeating first grade. Furthermore, restricting the sample to incumbent
students implies that first-grade controls included in specification (3.2) are observed
before the adoption of the FSD and hence are pre-determined with respect to the
treatment. The focus on legacy enrollment cohorts also characterizes recent studies
on the effects of charter takeovers in the US and of academy conversions in England
(Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2016; Eyles et al., 2017; Eyles and Machin, 2018). This
restriction attenuates identification issues related to unobserved changes in pupil
intake, the more so the less parents can anticipate the exact year in which a school
25The ethical values (8.47 per cent) and the cost (7.34 per cent) of the school follow in the
ranking. The presence of the FSD is ranked eight among fifteen options.
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will adopt the FSD.
Students can move across schools and in Chile school transfers are indeed a common
phenomenon; in our master sample (described in Section 3.5) around 35 per cent
of students change school between grades 1 and 4. Pupils who enroll in first grade
in the same establishment and in the same year can therefore experience a different
exposure to the FSD by the time they reach grade 4. Furthermore, if mobility across
schools is influenced by the availability of longer schedules, student-level actual
exposure to the FSD could be correlated with other unobserved determinants of
achievement. To mitigate this concern, in our preferred specification we instrument
actual exposure to the FSD with the exposure a student would have accumulated
had he/she never transferred from the school where he/she attended first grade. The
instrumental variable is therefore PotExpFSD4 =
∑4
j=1 d
j
s, where d
j
s is a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if the student would have ever been exposed to the FSD
in grade j, had he/she remained in school s, where he/she started first grade.26
When discussing results in Section 3.6, we will show that the instrument is relevant,
as there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between “potential”
exposure and actual exposure to the FSD by grade 4. By relying on this instrument
we aim to isolate and exploit the variation in actual exposure that is not affected
by possibly endogenous mobility decisions of incumbent pupils after first grade.
Moreover, we assume that “potential” exposure is not systematically correlated with
unobserved determinants of achievement and affects fourth grade test scores only
through its impact on actual exposure.
A remaining concern is that the timing of adoption may depend on past performance.
For example, if schools switch to the longer school day after they observe a cohort
of pupils faring particularly poorly at the test, our estimates may simply capture
mean-reversion effects. In general, there can be concerns about confounding effects
of underlying school-specific trends in test scores. We show in Section 3.5 that
there are no visible clear trends in reading and mathematics scores in the years
preceding the switch to longer schedules. Another concern is that other events may
take place at the school around the time of FSD adoption, which could also affect
learning outcomes in the following years. We discuss and address these further issues
in Appendix Section 3.B, where we show that findings remain similar when: (i) we
restrict our attention to pupils starting primary school in establishments that did not
receive public funds for expanding infrastructure; (ii) we control for another policy
26To build this “potential” measure of exposure we also assume that the student would have
never repeated, as we do not observe the pattern of repetitions in this counterfactual school career.
Therefore, the range of the instrumental variable for all incumbent pupils is 0-3. The first stage
regression specification reads:
ExpFSD4ist = η0,s + θ0,t + β0PotExpFSD4ist + γ0Xist + δ0Zst + ist (3.3)
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targeting disadvantaged students implemented in 2008 or we focus our attention
only on cohorts of students not exposed to such a policy.
3.5 Data and sample
We link several administrative and survey datasets on account of unique school,
student and teacher identifiers.
Data on achievement in fourth grade comes from a nationwide standardized low-
stakes test (SIMCE test) designed by the Education Quality Agency (Agencia de
Calidad de la Educacio´n).27 It is administered at the end of the school year and is
marked by external examiners, therefore leaving little room for test score manipu-
lation. Individual records on performance in the test are available for fourth grade
students in 1999, 2002 and then with a yearly frequency from 2005 onward. We
restrict our attention to the 2005-2013 waves of the test. The reason is that we
can follow students’ school careers only for cohorts who start primary school from
2002 onward; this is necessary both to correctly identify incumbent students (i.e.
pupils who enroll in first grade in a school that has not yet adopted the FSD) and to
compute actual exposure to the FSD for students who move across schools between
grades 1 and 4. 2013 is the last year of data available to us. We use pupil-level
test scores in the reading and mathematics sections of the test as our measure of
achievement. Scores are standardized by year and subject to have a mean equal to
0 and a standard deviation equal to 1. Alongside the test, surveys are administered
to students and their parents, as well as to teachers. Based on questions that are
consistent across all waves of the parent survey, we recover a rich set of information
on pupils’ backgrounds as of grade 4 that we use to study heterogeneity by students
characteristics. Based on teacher surveys, we provide evidence on the frequency of
homework assignments in schools with and without the FSD.
The second source of information is the register of pupils enrolled in the school sys-
tem over the period 2002-2013, which is maintained by the Ministry of Education.
Besides gender and date of birth, for every school year it records information about
the school that the student attends, the attendance rate and the end-of-year status
(i.e. promotion to the next grade or retention in the same grade). We also have
access to the register of educational establishments, from which we recover the lo-
cation (an urban or rural area) and the administrative status of the school (public,
charter or non subsidized private). A companion dataset records the year of adop-
tion of the FSD at the school-grade level over the period 1997-2013. Based on these
sources, we reconstruct the school career from grade 1 to grade 4 of every student
who started primary school between 2002 and 2010 and took the fourth grade test
27While the stakes are low because the test does not impact a student’ final evaluation, schools
care about it because school-level average scores are publicly available for consultation.
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between 2005 and 2013; we then compute the actual years of exposure to the FSD
by the end of grade 4, as well as the exposure a student would have experienced had
he/she never transferred from his/her first grade school. We also retrieve the set
of first grade student- and school-level characteristics that we include in the richest
regression specification. In order to distinguish charter schools with and without
tuition fees, we rely on a dataset maintained by the Ministry of Education that
records all the subsidies that schools received from the government over the 2005-
2013 period. Since charter schools that charge tuition fees receive reduced subsidies,
we can distinguish them from schools that do not charge tuition fees.28
We also exploit the information contained in the register of teachers, which is avail-
able for the period 2003-2013. We draw on this dataset to study how no-fee charter
and public schools adjust the number of teachers and their working hours after the
adoption of the FSD. We also rely on the 2005 Longitudinal Teachers Survey (En-
cuesta Longitudinal Docente) to investigate differences in teachers’ opinions on the
FSD;29 based on the 2015 Time-Use Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Uso de Tiempo),
we examine if academic support outside of school varies across pupils from different
socio-economic backgrounds.30
Finally, we digitized from primary sources the list of schools that received additional
funds to expand their infrastructure when lengthening the school day; we parsed the
releases of the Official Journal (Diario Oficial) published by the Interior Ministry
(Ministerio del Interior) over the period 1997-2004 and searched for the outcomes of
all public tenders through which ad-hoc resources for infrastructures were assigned.31
Based on this, we create a dataset that records, for every school, the year in which
resources were disbursed and the amount received, if any. Since 2008, students from
disadvantaged backgrounds are granted additional subsidies (PSS) on top of the
vouchers. We obtain the list of beneficiaries from the Ministry of Education. This
information is used to perform robustness checks described in Appendix Section 3.B.
In order to create the master sample of our analysis, we restrict our attention to
incumbent pupils, i.e. students who started first grade in a given school when the
FSD had not been yet introduced (see Section 3.4). Furthermore, we discard stu-
dents that attended non subsidized private schools at some point between grades 1
and 4. This is motivated by the fact that the FSD reform only applies to publicly
subsidized schools. Moreover, we do not know whether a given non subsidized pri-
vate school was already offering a longer school day or started providing it at some
28We classify a charter school as a no-fee charter school if it never charged fees between 2005
and 2013. For 2.39 per cent of charter schools attended in first grade by students belonging to the
master sample we do not find information about the tuition fees in the dataset.
29The Longitudinal Teachers Survey was implemented by the Microdata Center of the University
of Chile.
30The database of the 2015 Time-Use Survey can be downloaded from https://www.ine.cl/
estadisticas/menu-sociales/enut.
31The last tender took place in 2004.
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point after it became compulsory for other types of schools. Therefore, students
attending non subsidized private schools cannot serve as a control group.
The master sample consists of around 600,000 fourth-grade test takers; they started
primary school between 2002 and 2010 in schools that had not yet adopted the FSD
and took the test between 2005 and 2013. It follows that schools attended by pupils
in the master sample had not switched to the longer school day by 2002. Given
that the first transitions to the single-shift occurred in 1997, our sample of schools
consists of mid to late adopters.
As discussed in Section 3.4, a threat to identification could arise if schools adopted
the FSD based on the trend or transitory component of test scores. Figure 3.2 plots
coefficients from an event study exercise where the specification reads:
Yist = ηs + θt +
−2∑
ρ=−5
βp1(pst = ρ) +
4∑
ρ=0
βρ1(pst = ρ) + εist (3.4)
Yist is the reading or mathematics score of student i who takes the SIMCE test in
school s in year t. pst = t − Es is the distance (in years) from the event, which is
the introduction of the FSD in at least one grade in school s. ηs and θt are school
and calendar year fixed effects, respectively. The FSD is implemented in event-year
0 and coefficients βρ show how different scores in event-year ρ are relative to event-
year -1, which is taken as the reference year. Schools are observed up to 5 years
before and after the introduction of the longer school day and the sample consists
of all schools where students in the master sample enrolled in first grade.32 For
both subjects, there appear not to be evident trends in the pre-adoption period,
suggesting that test scores were not trending either downward or upward before
schools decided to implement longer daily schedules. Furthermore, there are no
evident spikes or dips in test scores just before the introduction of the FSD. On the
other hand, from event-year 1 scores start increasing, suggesting a positive effect of
the FSD on achievement. We will then provide a formal estimation based on our
identification strategy in Section 3.6.
Table 3.4 reports summary statistics for pupils in the master sample. Column (1)
pools all students together, whereas columns (2) to (4) split schoolchildren according
to the type of school (public, charter without tuition fees or charter with tuition fees)
they attended in first grade. In the vast majority of households (87 per cent) parents
do not have university education.33 Only 15 per cent of students have more than
32The sample is unbalanced, meaning that not all schools are observed in every event-year. Given
the calendar of SIMCE tests, using a balanced sample would significantly reduce the number of
event-years that we can observe. For this exercise, we also use the 1999 and 2002 waves of the
SIMCE test.
33We build a variable that measures parental education by setting ParentalEd =
max(MotherEd, FatherEd), where MotherEd and FatherEd are the highest mother and fa-
ther’s academic attainment, respectively; if the information for either one of the two parents is
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50 books at home; 55 per cent of the households have a computer at home and
slightly less than one third also have a connection to the Internet.34 The first grade
attendance rate is very high (94 per cent) and 3 per cent of pupils repeat first grade.
On average, there are 35 students in a first grade class.
When splitting students according to the type of establishment they started primary
school in, it emerges that public schools and charter schools without tuition fees cater
to relatively similar students. On the other hand, schoolchildren attending charter
schools that charge tuition fees live in more aﬄuent households. Test scores are
lowest in public schools and highest in charter schools with tuition fees.
3.6 Results
In this section we first discuss the average effect of the FSD on all pupils in
the master sample (Subsection 3.6.1). We then explore whether and how effects
are heterogeneous depending on the resources available in the household where the
student lives (Subsection 3.6.2) and on the type of school he/she attends (Subsec-
tion 3.6.3). Heterogeneous effects of additional instruction time are interesting to
study because increasing the amount of time that pupils spend at school reduces the
amount of time they can devote to other activities outside of school. The return to
longer school schedules therefore could depend on the absolute quality of time use
at school, which can vary across schools, and on its relative quality with respect to
time use outside of school, which can vary among students.
When investigating heterogeneous effects, we estimate a richer version of specifica-
tion (3.2), whereby we also interact the treatment and all controls with a dummy
variable D that captures a given dimension of heterogeneity.35 We report estimates
coming from the preferred linear IV specification that includes the full set of controls
(which we denote as FE-IV2).36
3.6.1 The effect of the FSD on achievement
Table 3.5 reports results from regression specification (3.2). We start by dis-
cussing coefficients when we estimate the most parsimonious specification, which
missing, we rely on the level of education achieved by the other parent.
34Information about students’ backgrounds, i.e. parental education and resources at home, is
drawn from parent surveys. Since these variables are observed at the end of grade 4, they could
be affected by a student’s exposure to the FSD (for example, if longer school days have an effect
on parents’ labour supply); for this reason, they are not included in the regression specifications,
which only feature pre-determined controls. Furthermore this information is missing for around 15
per cent of schoolchildren in the sample.
35A fully interacted specification yields estimates that are equivalent to those obtained from
separately estimating two regressions on the sub-sample where D = 0 and on the sub-sample
where D = 1.
36ExpFSD4 and ExpFSD4 · D are instrumented with PotExpFSD4 and PotExpFSD4 · D,
respectively.
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only includes school and year fixed effects, and we do not instrument actual years
of exposure to the FSD (specification FE1, column 1). These estimates point to a
virtually null effect on reading and a negative impact on mathematics. Including
pre-determined controls listed in section 3.4, however, changes the picture signifi-
cantly (specification FE2, column 2): the effect of an additional year of exposure
to the FSD is positive for both subjects, although it is only statistically significant
for reading (0.011σ). This indicates that controlling for first-grade status (pass or
repeat) is important because repeaters, who are low performers, spend more years
at school and are therefore more likely to be exposed to the FSD at some point.
As mentioned in section 3.4, a non negligible fraction of students transfer from one
school to another between grades 1 and 4. Furthermore, the availability of longer
daily schedules appears to influence mobility across schools. Appendix Figure 3.C.2
shows the evolution of transfers of pupils attending grades 1 to 4 at the school-year
level, in a 5-year window around the implementation of the FSD. The estimated
event study specification reads:
Yst = ηs + θt +
−2∑
ρ=−5
βp1(pst = ρ) +
4∑
ρ=0
βρ1(pst = ρ) + εst (3.5)
Following the introduction of longer schedules schools experience a decline in the
outflow of pupils; at the same time, although the pre-adoption pattern is more
scattered, inflows of students appear to increase, with a spike in the year of adoption.
As a result, net transfers (i.e. the difference between transfers into and transfers
out of a given school) grow, by up to 5 pupils per year. Appendix Table 3.C.1
further shows that, among schoolchildren who belong to the master sample, those
who transfer are negatively selected, as they have a slightly lower attendance rate in
grade 1 (93 per cent versus 95 per cent) and are more than twice as likely to repeat
first grade.37 Moreover, it emerges that pupils tend to transfer towards schools
that offer the FSD; while transferring and non transferring students have a very
similar “potential” exposure (i.e. the exposure they would have experienced had
they remained in their first-grade schools), the former end up with a much higher
actual exposure.38 Partly because of fewer transfers out and more transfers in, the
number of students per class in grades 1 to 4 increases after the adoption of the
FSD (Appendix Figure 3.C.3) by an amount that is however modest (less than 1.50
additional pupils) when compared to the average class size in primary schools.
These patterns motivate the decision to instrument actual exposure (ExpFSD4)
with the exposure a student would have experienced had he/she never transferred
37First-grade attendance rates have a very low dispersion, so that a 1 percentage point difference
amounts to almost one fifth of a standard deviation.
38This also holds true also when restricting the comparison to students who never repeat between
grade 1 and grade 4.
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(PotExpFSD4). When adopting the IV approach, estimates are remarkably stable
across the most parsimonious specification (FE-IV1, column 3) and the specification
featuring all controls (FE-IV2, column 4). An additional year of exposure to the
FSD significantly raises reading test scores by 0.024σ. The effect on mathematics
test scores lies in the narrow range 0.007-0.008σ, but is not statistically significant.
As shown in the same table, the instrumental variable displays a positive and strong
relationship with the treatment, as the first stage coefficient is statistically significant
and equal to 0.72, implying that for slightly less than 30 per cent of pupils the real
exposure and the “potential” exposure do not coincide.
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.5, we relax the assumption that every additional
year of exposure has the same effect on achievement. We estimate the preferred
IV specification in a fully non parametric way, by introducing a set of dummies
for every possible level of exposure to the FSD and setting 0 years of exposure as
the reference category.39 The non parametric specification reveals that the effect of
longer schedules increases more than linearly with exposure. Three years of exposure
are associated with a 0.114-0.116σ increase of reading test scores, significant at the
1 per cent level, and a 0.057-0.058σ increase of mathematics test scores, significant
at the 5 per cent level.
The IV estimates therefore show that the FSD has a positive effect on learning
outcomes, which increases more than linearly with exposure and is stronger for
reading than for mathematics. The stronger impact on reading may depend on the
fact that a larger fraction of additional instruction time is devoted to Spanish than
to mathematics (Table 3.3). The pattern of coefficients in the fully non parametric
specification is consistent with added instruction time in earlier grades having a
positive effect on achievement in later grades. Moreover, as the passage from a two-
shift to a one-shift scheme implies a re-organization of daily routines, it may also be
explained by the presence of adaptation costs that eventually fade away over time.
A possible remaining concern is that other events may happen in a school around
the adoption of the FSD and affect learning outcomes in the following years. In
Appendix section 3.B we show that our estimates are robust to: (i) restricting the
attention to pupils who started primary schools in establishments that most likely
did not expand their infrastructure at the same time when the FSD was adopted; (ii)
39The non-parametric specification therefore reads:
Yist = ηs + θt +
2∑
k=1
βk1(ExpFSD4ist = k) + β31(ExpFSD4ist >= 3) + γXist + δZst + εist (3.6)
Specification (3.6) highlights that we collapse 3 and 4 years of actual exposure into a unique
category, as only very few pupils (i.e. students who repeat first grade in the year when the school
adopts the longer schedules) attend all 4 grades under the FSD scheme. In the IV specification, the
set of dummies that capture every possible level of actual exposure to the FSD are instrumented
by a set of dummies that capture every possible level of exposure a student would have experienced
had he/she never transferred out of his/her first grade school.
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controlling for a policy granting further subsidies to disadvantaged schoolchildren
since 2008.
3.6.2 Heterogeneity by students’ backgrounds
In this subsection we explore whether the effect of the FSD varies depending on
the characteristics of the environment students are exposed to when they are not
in school. We focus our analysis on the role of household resources, as reflected by
parental education and the availability of books and ICT technologies at home.40
We rely on this information to distinguish schoolchildren from a more privileged
background (for whom D = 0) from others (for whom D = 1).
Table 3.6 shows that longer schedules appear not to benefit in a significant way
pupils from more advantaged backgrounds. An additional year of exposure to the
FSD does not raise by a statistically significant amount reading and mathematics
scores for children living in households where at least one parent has some university
education (columns 1 and 4), there are more than 50 books (columns 2 and 5), or
both a computer and a connection to the Internet are available (columns 3 and 6).
On the other hand, reading scores increase by a significant amount for pupils living
in households where neither parent has any university education (0.022σ), there are
at most 50 books at home (0.022σ), and either a computer or a connection to the
Internet is not available (0.024σ).41 Also mathematics scores increase by a larger
amount, which however never becomes significantly different from 0.
It has to be noted, however, that the documented difference, as captured by the in-
teraction term ExpFSD4×D, although large in size, is not statistically significant.
With this caveat concerning the precision of the estimates in mind, the analysis
provides suggestive evidence that returns to an additional hour of instruction time
tend to be larger for students who have fewer resources and opportunities available
at home and for whom, therefore, the relative quality of time spent at school is
higher.
Drawing on information coming from the 2015 Chilean Time-Use Survey, Appendix
Table 3.C.2 shows that pupils from privileged backgrounds indeed receive more sup-
port outside of school. We restrict our attention to households where there is at least
one child aged 5-18 and we divide them into two groups, depending on whether ei-
ther the head of the household or the head’s spouse has any university education
(Uhh = 1) or not (Uhh = 0). In households where Uhh = 1, the percentage of heads
of household and heads’ spouses who declare that they help their children with their
40This information is drawn from parent surveys administered alongside the test. The non-
response rate is similar across the variables and is around 15 per cent. This explains the smaller
sample size.
41These figures are the sum of coefficients related to the main term ExpFSD4 and the interaction
term ExpFSD4×D. They are significant at the 1 per cent level.
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homework is 48 per cent, whereas this percentage drops to 33 per cent in households
where Uhh = 0 (column 1). Summing up the minutes that they dedicate to helping
with homework on a given day of the working week and on a given day at the week-
end, there is a 15-minute difference in favor of households where Uhh = 1 (column
2). Assuming a uniform distribution of help across the days of the week, this would
translate into a difference of around 50 minutes per week. It is also interesting to
look at support by other providers, in the form of tutoring outside of school. 5
per cent of pupils aged 12-18 and living in households where Uhh = 0 receive some
tutoring, as opposed to 12 per cent of students living in households where Uhh = 1
(column 3). In terms of minutes per day, the former receive tutoring for less than
half the time than the latter (column 4).
Appendix Table 3.C.3 draws information about the frequency of mathematics home-
work from the teacher surveys administered alongside the SIMCE test in 2011, 2012
and 2013. The limited period for which this information is available does not allow
us to study the evolution of homework’s frequency around the adoption of the FSD
in an event study framework such as the one in (3.5). Panel A considers all schools
and shows that the frequency of homework is lower in schools with the FSD than in
establishments without it. For example, the percentage of teachers assigning home-
work after every class is roughly 20 per cent in schools where the FSD is not in
place, while it drops to about 12 per cent in schools that feature longer schedules.
In panel B we restrict our attention to schools that had not adopted longer schedules
by 2011 and we compare the frequency of homework between the years 2011 and
2013. In establishments that did not adopted the FSD in 2012 or 2013 (column 2),
the frequency is very similar in the the two years. On the other hand, homework is
assigned much less frequently in 2013 than in 2011 in establishments that switched
to the FSD by that year (column 3).42 Overall, there is therefore suggestive evidence
that longer school schedules are associated with less homework. If the productiv-
ity of homework is higher for schoolchildren from advantaged backgrounds, because
they have more support at home, the reduction of its frequency that seems to be as-
sociated with longer school schedules could be one of the mechanisms that explains
the documented heterogeneity.
3.6.3 Heterogeneity by school type
The absolute quality of time use is likely to be the primary driver of additional
instruction time’s effectiveness. It is therefore important to study the contribution
of school characteristics in shaping returns to longer schedules. The Chilean school
system provides an attractive setting because public and charter schools, whilst
42As an example, in 2011 around 52 per cent of teachers working in schools that had not adopted
the policy declared that they had assigned homework after almost every class. This figure remained
the same in schools that had not adopted the FSD by 2013, while it fell to 31.82 per cent in schools
that adopted it in 2012 or 2013.
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being both publicly subsidized, differ in terms of ownership and in the degree of au-
tonomy. As explained in Subsection 3.3.1, charter schools have more autonomy than
public schools over the management of school resources and the design of the curric-
ula. Appendix Table 3.C.4 reports answers to school surveys administered alongside
the 2006 and 2009 waves of PISA tests, which ask about the tasks over which the
principal, the teachers or the governing body of the school have considerable re-
sponsibility. The sample consists of all public and charter schools that offer primary
education.43 It confirms that principals as well as the teachers and the governing
bodies of charter schools have greater autonomy in designing the curricula, as they
can decide the course offer and the course content more frequently. Moreover, they
are more likely to be responsible for the budget formulation and allocation. They
are also in charge of taking personnel decisions, in terms of recruitment, promotions
and dismissals.
We therefore study whether the FSD has a differential effect in public and no-fee
charter schools. To this end, we compare pupils who attended a public school in
grade 1 (for whom D = 0) to students who enrolled in a charter school that does not
charge tuition fees in grade 1 (for whom D = 1). The choice of focusing on these two
types of schools is motivated by the fact that, as shown in Table 3.4, charter schools
that charge tuition fees cater to more aﬄuent pupils, whereas public schools and
charter schools without tuition fees serve pupils of similarly lower socio-economic
status. As we aim to uncover the role of school institutions, we do not want to
capture differences related to students’ characteristics.
Table 3.7 shows that returns to additional instruction time are higher for students
starting primary school in no-fee charter schools than for those who enrolled in public
schools. The difference, as captured by the interaction term ExpFSD4×D, is siz-
able for both subjects and statistically significant with regards to reading (columns
1 and 5). The effect of an additional year of exposure to the FSD on reading test
scores is more than three times larger for students starting primary school in no-
fee charter schools (0.061σ) as opposed to in public schools (0.019σ). Mathematics
scores are raised by a statistically insignificant 0.012σ for pupils attending grade 1
in public schools; the coefficient more than doubles to 0.029σ for enrollees of no-
fee charter schools, although the associated p-value is slightly above 0.1. Pupils
attending public schools and no-fee charter schools are similar. If anything, those
attending the latter type of school are slightly more aﬄuent. In Subsection 3.6.2
we provided suggestive evidence that longer schedules are less beneficial to students
from advantaged backgrounds. Hence, small differences in student characteristics
across the two types of institutions should not be responsible for the large observed
differences in returns to longer schedules. In columns (2) to (8) we further show
43PISA tests are administered to pupils aged 15. We therefore restrict our attention to secondary
schools that also offer primary education, which explains the very small sample size.
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that the documented differential effect remains remarkably stable when we add the
interaction between exposure to the FSD and a dummy capturing parental educa-
tion (columns 2 and 6), the availability of books at home (columns 3 and 7), and
the availability of ICT technologies at home (columns 4 and 8).44
As discussed earlier, charter schools have more autonomy over the design of the
curriculum and personnel decisions. According to survey evidence provided in Sub-
section 3.3.2, public and charter schools allocate the additional instruction time
across subjects in a similar way. Therefore, we turn our attention to personnel deci-
sions and investigate how the adoption of the FSD affects the number of classroom
teachers, and their contract and teaching hours using the event study specification
outlined in (3.5). Consistent with the need to provide more instruction hours, Figure
3.3 shows that total classroom teachers’ contract hours and teaching hours increase
after the adoption of the FSD (top panel). Moreover, the pattern of coefficients
is similar across public and no-fee charter schools and confidence intervals overlap.
Indeed, Appendix Table 3.C.5 shows that the difference between public and no-fee
charter schools is significant only in the last event-year. When total contract and
teaching hours are divided by the number of classes (bottom panel), the differences
between the two types of schools are never significant.45
An increase in the number of total contract and teaching hours can be achieved by
adjusting both the number of classroom teachers and the number of contract/teaching
hours per teacher. Figure 3.4 shows that the number of classroom teachers grow both
in public and no-fee charter schools, but the increase is higher in the latter. On the
contrary, contract hours per teacher increase more in public schools. Appendix Table
3.C.5 shows that these differences are statistically significant in most post-adoption
event-years. Also teaching hours per teacher grow more in no-fee charter schools
than in public establishments, with the difference been slightly smaller. Therefore
no-fee charter schools rely more than public schools on expanding the number of
teachers, whereas they resort less to increasing teachers’ workload. It seems that
autonomy over staff decisions allows charter schools to adjust the teaching input in
a different way.
Appendix Table 3.C.6 reports teachers’ opinions in 2005 about the FSD, dividing
them according to the type of school (public or charter) in which they teach. Public
44In columns (2) to (8) all controls are also interacted with the dummy capturing a given char-
acteristic of the household in which the student lives. Furthermore, specifications are estimated on
the sub-sample of pupils for whom all background characteristics (parental education, number of
books at home, availability of ICT technologies at home) are non missing. The number of obser-
vations is nonetheless slightly different across specifications because of differences in the number
of singletons that are dropped.
45The coefficients presented in Table 3.C.5 come from a richer version of specification (3.5),
where event year dummies and calendar year fixed effects are also interacted with a dummy (Ds)
taking value 1 if the school is a no-fee charter school. This specification allows us to test whether
differences between public and charter schools are statistically significant.
CHAPTER 3. 186
school teachers display a lower degree of satisfaction with longer daily schedules.
Only 45 per cent of them judge the FSD as “good or very good”, compared to 54
per cent of charter school teachers. This may signal that the workload of teachers
in public schools increases excessively following the introduction of the FSD. This
could in turn negatively affect the absolute quality of additional time use in public
schools, contributing to explain the lower returns to longer schedules.46
3.7 Conclusions
Scholars and policymakers have long been interested in understanding the deter-
minants of school effectiveness. Many countries undertake costly educational reforms
in order to expand the resources available to schools. Some countries, including US
and UK, have also implemented reforms that grant schools more autonomy.
In this paper we study whether the effects of a policy that expands a specific school
input - instruction time - are different across two types of schools - public and no-fee
charter schools - that cater to similar students but differ in the degree of autonomy.
Moreover, as the the returns to additional instruction hours could depend not only
on the absolute quality of time use at school, but also on its relative quality with
respect to time spent outside of school, we examine whether the effects of longer
schedules are heterogeneous across schoolchildren from different backgrounds.
We address these questions by exploiting the introduction of the Full School Day
(FSD) in Chilean publicly subsidized (i.e. public and charter) primary schools. We
leverage within-school variation in years of exposure to longer schedules by the end
of grade 4 across several cohorts of pupils starting primary education in a given
school between 2002 and 2010, and taking a standardized test at the end of grade
4. To limit the confounding effect of changes in the characteristics of pupil intake,
we restrict our attention to cohorts of incumbent pupils, i.e. students who started
primary education in schools that had not yet adopted the FSD and who possibly
became exposed to it at some stage of their first four years of education. Further-
more, we account for potentially endogenous mobility across schools after first grade
by instrumenting actual exposure with the exposure a student would have experi-
enced, had he/she never transferred out of the school where he/she attended first
grade.
46Bellei (2009) and Berthelon et al. (2016) find that the effect of the FSD on achievement is larger
in public schools. Bellei (2009) focuses on pupils attending grade 10 in 2001 and in 2003, while
Berthelon et al. (2016) examine the effect of the FSD at grade 2 in a single year (2012). In both
cases, the sample of schools and the population studied are different from the ones we investigate,
and the sample periods mostly do not overlap. Furthermore, to avoid that our estimates are
confounded by differences in students’ characteristics, we compare public schools only to charter
schools that do not charge tuition fees, because we provide evidence that they serve pupils from
similar backgrounds. Additionally, we show that the larger effect of the FSD found for students
starting primary school in no-fee charter schools persists once we also allow longer schedules to
affect schoolchildren of higher and lower socio-economic status in a different way.
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We first document a positive and modest average effect of longer schedules on reading
and mathematics test scores, although estimates for the latter are not statistically
significant. It is important to highlight that relying on legacy enrollment cohorts for
the sake of identification implies that we are able to study only the first years after
the implementation of the FSD. Insofar as it takes time to adjust, short-term effects
- which are interesting to study because most large-scale input expansion programs
would entail some initial adaptation challenges - may be lower than long-term ones.
In order to study whether school institutions affect returns to additional instruc-
tion time, we then compare pupils who started primary education in no-fee charter
schools with students who enrolled in public schools. We find that reading scores
increase significantly more for the former than for the latter. We focus on these
two types of establishments because they serve similar students, which attenuates
concerns that the estimates reflect differences in the characteristics of students who
attend different types of schools. No-fee charter schools enjoy more autonomy over
the design of the curriculum and personnel decisions. Since survey evidence suggests
that public and charter schools allocate additional instruction time across subjects
in a similar way, we turn to analyze staff decisions and we uncover a significant dif-
ference. No-fee charter schools and public schools increased the total contract and
teaching hours required to provide longer schedules in a different way: no-fee char-
ter schools relied more on hiring additional teachers and less on increasing working
hours per teacher than public schools. If public school teachers deal more often with
a higher workload, which would be consistent with them reporting a lower satisfac-
tion with the FSD, then the absolute quality of time use in public school may be
lower, thus contributing to explaining the lower benefits we document for them.
Our findings are in line with the growing literature showing that charter schools are
associated with improved learning outcomes (see Section 3.2). Lavy (2015) docu-
ments that the productivity of instructional time is larger in schools that have more
autonomy over staff and budget decisions. We find a similar result and provide
suggestive evidence that autonomy over personnel decisions seems important when
expanding instruction time, because providing longer schedules requires adjusting
the teaching input. In general, our results suggest that school institutions and gov-
ernance matter for the effectiveness of various education policies. Further analysis
on complementarities between school inputs and institutions could be a promising
avenue for future research.
We also show that longer schedules do not raise significantly the reading scores of
students from more advantaged backgrounds, as captured by parental education, the
number of books at home and the availability of a computer and a connection to the
Internet at home. On the other hand, reading scores of other pupils in the sample
improve significantly. Although large in size, the difference in the benefits enjoyed
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by individuals from different backgrounds is not statistically significant. With this
caveat in mind, our findings suggest that the relative quality of additional time spent
at school is higher for pupils with fewer resources at home, thus yielding larger ben-
efits. According to information contained in teachers’ surveys, the adoption of the
FSD is likely associated with a reduced frequency of homework. In light of the lim-
ited support, as shown by time-use surveys, that pupils of low socio-economic status
receive outside of school, substituting autonomous study at home with supervised
learning at school may be a mechanism underlying the documented heterogeneity.
These findings are in line with the results of Lavy (2015), who presents a cross-
country analysis based on 2006 PISA data.47 If also confirmed in other settings,
they would suggest that the amount of time spent at school may play a role in
reducing the inequality of learning opportunities. As pupils from different back-
grounds are exposed to the same school inputs for a larger part of the day, the role
of household inputs - the quality of which varies greatly - may become less impor-
tant. This is likely to be especially true if, as in the Chilean setting, the additional
instruction time does not entail an expansion of the curriculum. Indeed, in a set-
ting where increased weekly instruction hours serve to teach additional contents,
Huebener et al. (2017) document a widening gap between high- and low-performing
German pupils.
Finally, policies that extend the length of the school day may also affect non-
academic outcomes. Berthelon and Kruger (2011), for instance, show that the FSD
reduces the incidence of teenage pregnancies among poor girls and of youth crime;
Contreras and Sepu´lveda (2016) report a positive effect of the FSD on labor force
participation and employment of single mothers whose youngest child is eligible to
attend longer schedules. Studying these outcomes goes beyond the scope of this pa-
per, but it is important to bear them in mind when evaluating this type of policies.
47When restricting the analysis to a sub-set of developing countries that include Chile, Lavy
(2015) finds a stronger effect among schoolchildren from highly educated families. However, he
does not provide country-specific estimates that allow to verify what is the effect in the case of
Chile.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: FSD adoption over the period 1997-2013
Notes : The figure illustrates the pattern of adoption of the FSD in primary
publicly subsidized schools over the period 1997-2013. On the left axis it
plots the number of schools that had adopted the policy by a given year; on
the right axis it displays the share of public and charter schools that had
implemented the FSD by a given year.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of test scores relative to 1 year before the FSD adoption
(a) Reading
(b) Mathematics
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) plot coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence intervals, from
the event study specification (3.4). The FSD is adopted in event-year 0 and coefficients
show how different reading and mathematics test scores are in event-year ρ relative to
event-year -1, which is taken as the reference year. The sample consists of all schools
where students in the master sample enrolled in first grade. All specifications include
school and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of contract and teaching hours relative to 1 year before the
FSD adoption
(a) Contract hours (b) Teaching hours
(c) Contract hours/n. of classes (d) Teaching hours/n. of classes
Notes: Panels (a) to (d) plot coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence intervals, from
the event study specification outlined in (3.5). The FSD is adopted in event-year 0 and
coefficients show how different contract and teaching hours are in event-year ρ relative to
event-year -1, which is taken as the reference year. The sample consists of all schools where
students in the master sample enrolled in first grade. All specifications include school and
calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of number of teachers, contract hours per teacher and teaching
hours per teacher relative to 1 year before the FSD adoption
(a) Number of teachers (b) Contract hours per teacher
(c) Teaching hours per teacher
Notes: Panels (a) to (c) plot coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence intervals, from
the event study specification outlined in (3.5). The FSD is adopted in event-year 0 and
coefficients show how different the number of teachers, contract hours per teacher and
teaching hours per teacher are in event-year ρ relative to event-year -1, which is taken as
the reference year. The sample consists of all schools where students in the master sample
enrolled in first grade. All specifications include school and calendar year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Daily schedules with and without the FSD
FSD No FSD
(1) (2)
Minimum number of hours per day 7.08 5.00
Example of daily schedule
5 days under FSD:
08:00-15.05
4 days under FSD:
08.00 - 15.45
Morning shift: 08:00-13:00
Afternoon shift: 14:00-19:00
Notes: The table reports the minimum number of hours students spend at school every
day and the daily schedule with and without the FSD in place, inclusive of time devoted to
breaks. The minimum number of hours is prescribed in the law. Schools can freely choose
the time at which the school day starts. The daily schedules are built assuming that the full
school day and the morning shift start at 8.00, while the afternoon shift starts at 14.00.
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Table 3.2: Hours of instruction per week and student voucher with and without the
FSD
Subject/Grades
1st - 4th
FSD No FSD
(1) (2)
Mathematics 6 6
Spanish 6 6
Natural and Social Sciences 6 6
Physical Education 3 3
Arts and Music 4 4
Technology 3 3
Others 2 2
School Free Choice 8 0
Total 38 30
Student Voucher (U.S.E.) 1.99 1.45
Notes: The table reports weekly subject-specific and total instruction
time with and without the FSD, for grades 1 to 4. The informa-
tion comes from the Decree 625 of the Ministry of Education pub-
lished in 2003 (http://bcn.cl/253tx). It also reports the amount
of the student voucher with and without the FSD, expressed in educa-
tional subsidy units (U.S.E). This information comes from the version
of the DFL2/1996 of the Ministry of Education published in May, 2003
(http://bcn.cl/1uy40). These units underwent some modifications
since the implementation of the FSD reform.
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Table 3.3: Use of time under the FSD in primary schools (hours per week)
Subject All Schools Public Schools Charter Schools
Core time Free Choice time Core time Free Choice time Core time Free Choice time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spanish 5.47 2.39 5.39* 2.49 5.59* 2.24
(0.98) (1.64) (0.81) (1.59) (1.18) (1.71)
Mathematics 5.19 1.48 5.14 1.55 5.25 1.37
(0.94) (1.31) (0.78) (1.34) (1.13) (1.26)
Social Sciences 3.83 0.17 3.84 0.15 3.81 0.19
(0.81) (0.56) (0.74) (0.56) (0.91) (0.55)
Natural Sciences 3.89 0.49 3.91 0.47 3.85 0.51
(0.73) (0.94) (0.70) (0.93) (0.77) (0.96)
Foreign Languages 2.03 0.27 1.90*** 0.16*** 2.22*** 0.43***
(0.70) (0.75) (0.59) (0.57) (0.80) (0.93)
Technology 2.03 0.01 2.00 0.004 2.05 0.02
(0.53) (0.12) (0.52) (0.07) (0.54) (0.18)
Art 3.12 0.06 3.09 0.07 3.17 0.06
(0.81) (0.35) (0.77) (0.33) (0.86) (0.38)
Sports 2.10 0.04 2.04** 0.028 2.19** 0.06
(0.61) (0.27) (0.50) (0.21) (0.74) (0.34)
Religion 1.92 0.04 1.89 0.00*** 1.97 0.10***
(0.47) (0.28) (0.51) (0.00) (0.38) (0.43)
Number of Schools 387 229 158
Notes : The table reports hours per week allocated to different subjects in fifth grade for a representative
sample of urban schools that had adopted the FSD by 2005 and were surveyed by the Studies Directorate
of the Sociology Faculty at the Catholic University of Chile (DESUC ). “Core” time excludes “Free Choice”
time. *, **, *** indicate that the number of hours allocated to a given subject is significantly different
between public and charter schools at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. Standard deviations are
in parentheses.
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics
All Public Charter
No Tuition Fees Tuition Fees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Students demographics
Female 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49
Age at school entry 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.59
Parental education
Less than university 0.87 0.92 0.91 0.78
Resources at home
Books (1 = At most 50) 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.79
Computer (1=yes) 0.55 0.42 0.50 0.72
Internet (1 = yes) 0.31 0.20 0.27 0.46
Schools Characteristics
First grade average class size 34.68 33.69 35.37 35.53
First grade enrollment 82.33 83.09 72.39 86.56
Academic performance
Fourth grade reading test score -0.04 -0.17 -0.12 0.18
Fourth grade Mathematics test score -0.04 -0.17 -0.15 0.19
First-grade attendance rate 94.23 93.88 94.83 94.33
End of first-grade status (1=repeat) 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
N. of students 604532 270417 114074 218495
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the sample of fourth graders who started
primary school between 2002 and 2010 in publicly subsidized schools that had not yet
adopted the FSD. Parental education refers to the highest educational attainment among
the mother and the father; in case the information is missing for one parent, it refers
to the education level of the other parent. All figures are expressed as fractions, except
from averages referring to the age of pupils, class size, enrollment, test scores and the
attendance rate. Test scores are standardized by year and subject (including also pupils
who are not in the master sample) to have mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal
to 1. The number of observations in columns (2) to (4) does not sum to the number of
observations in column (1) because for 2.39 per cent of charter schools we could not find
information about the tuition fees.
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Table 3.5: Effect of the FSD on test scores
Linear specification Non parametric specification
FE1 FE2 FE-IV1 FE-IV2 FE-IV1 FE-IV2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Reading
Years under FSD 0.002 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Years under FSD = 1 0.023 0.022
(0.015) (0.015)
Years under FSD = 2 0.029** 0.030**
(0.015) (0.014)
Years under FSD = 3 0.116*** 0.114***
(0.021) (0.021)
First stage coefficient 0.720*** 0.720***
(0.005) (0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 23614.36 24416.41 5136.66 5265.46
N. of students 596108 596108 596108 596108 596108 596108
B. Mathematics
Years under FSD -0.007** 0.005 0.007 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Years under FSD = 1 -0.014 -0.015
(0.016) (0.016)
Years under FSD = 2 -0.003 -0.002
(0.017) (0.016)
Years under FSD = 3 0.057** 0.058**
(0.023) (0.023)
First stage coefficient 0.719*** 0.720***
(0.005) (0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 23460.87 24294.13 5140.07 5278.70
N. of students 596281 596281 596281 596281 596281 596281
Student-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
School-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the effect of the FSD on reading and mathematics test scores. Estimates in columns (1),
(3) and (5) are based on a parsimonious specification that only includes as controls school fixed effects and year fixed
effects. Estimates in other columns are based on a richer specification that features an additional set of controls.
Specifically, student-level controls include: gender, age at school entry, as well as the attendance rate and the status
(pass or repeat) at the end of grade 1. School-level controls include averages of the students’ characteristics at the
school level, as well as enrollment and average class size in first grade. The effect of the FSD is assumed to be linear
in exposure in columns (1) to (4), whereas it is allowed to vary in a fully non-parametric way in columns (5) and (6).
In specifications FE-IV1 and FE-IV2 the treatment (i.e. actual years of exposure to the FSD by the end of grade 4)
is instrumented with the exposure a student would experience had he/she never transferred out of his/her first-grade
school. Standard errors are clustered at the school level and are reported in parenthesis.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Appendices
3.A Public and Charter Schools
Public and charter schools are subject to different regulations. This translates
into charter schools enjoying more autonomy and flexibility over curriculum, bud-
getary and personnel decisions.
Public schools are either managed by the Municipal Department of Education (DAEM )
or by private non-profit education corporations. While the director of the DAEM is
a teacher, corporations are led by a board of directors who do not need to be teach-
ers and whose president is the major of the municipality. Under both management
schemes decisions related to the allocation of resources and to hiring/firing school
staff are taken at the municipality level and school principals are not necessarily in-
volved. Charter schools are instead private organizations and all relevant decisions
are taken by the school authorities.
The working conditions of the employees of public schools are regulated by the Es-
tatuto de los Profesionales de la Educacio´n. The relevant regulation for charter
schools is the Co´digo del Trabajo, the labor code that applies to all firms in Chile.
Appointments of public school teachers are decided by a commission that is formed
by the Major, the director of the DAEM or the education corporations, as well
as one randomly selected teacher from the schools in the municipality. Priority is
given to spouses of teachers already working in the municipality. The salary of
public school teachers is fixed according to a national scale that takes into account
experience, training, specific difficult situations (such as teaching in rural, remote
or deprived areas) and responsibilities. Firing is subject to many restrictions. It
is possible only if one of the following conditions are met: (i) school enrollment
decreases; (ii) the national curriculum undergoes changes that justify the decision;
(iii) schools’ merges; (iv) protracted poor performance (see below). Teachers hav-
ing tenured positions enjoy a greater job security.48 In any case, firings have to be
justified in the Annual Plan of Educational Development that needs the approval of
the Provincial Office of the Ministry of Education. Charter schools are instead free
to set their own recruitment and dismissal criteria. Wages and the other working
48The Estatuto de los Profesionales de la Educacio´n contemplates two type of contracts, titular
and contratado. The first type of contract affords a greater job security, as it offers a tenured
position.
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conditions are subject to the same regulations that apply to private firms.
There are also differences in the evaluation of teachers. The Estatuto de los Pro-
fesionales de la Educacio´n originally set some criteria for assessing teachers perfor-
mance, but they were never fully implemented. In 2003 a new evaluation system
was agreed. Nevertheless it is quite lax and in practice very few teachers receive
poor evaluations. In principle, teachers could be fired if they fare unsatisfactorily in
two or three consecutive evaluations. School principals are not accountable based
on the school performance and they can be fired only in case of a grave fault, while
poor evaluations can result in assigning them to smaller schools. Charter schools
can instead set their own evaluation systems and the consequences in case of poor
performance.
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3.B Robustness Checks
As a first robustness check, we show that specification (3.2) delivers similar esti-
mates if we also control for a set of characteristics of teachers in the school s where
the student started first grade in year t. Specifically, we include as controls the share
of female teachers, the share of teachers with an education degree and teachers’ av-
erage age.49 Appendix Table 3.B.1 shows that results are virtually unchanged.
A possible concern not addressed by specification (3.2) is that other events may
happen in a school around the time of FSD adoption and affect learning outcomes
in the following years. Our estimates would then also capture the effects of other
changes to the school environment.
The first potential confounder to check is infrastructure investment, as some schools
had to expand their infrastructure prior to switching to a single-shift scheme. Funds
disbursed for this purpose covered costs related to replicating the existing infras-
tructure on a larger scale, not to improving it. Nonetheless, to address this issue, we
replicate our analysis on the sample of pupils who started first grade in schools that
did not receive public funds for expanding infrastructure. These establishments are
unlikely to have made substantial changes to their facilities prior to lengthening the
school day. Columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table 3.B.2 report estimates that are
in a similar range as those coming from the full sample of schools. An additional
year of exposure to the FSD raises reading test scores by 0.020σ. The effect on
mathematics test scores is virtually 0. According to this exercise, infrastructure
investment does not appear to be an important alternative driver of our estimates.
In 2008 Chile introduced a Preferential School Subsidy scheme (Subvencio´n Escolar
Preferencial, or PSS henceforth) which grants schools an additional subsidy for each
disadvantaged student they cater to.50 To check whether our estimates are also
capturing the roll-out of the subsidy, we implement two exercises. First, we enrich
specification (3.2) with controls for the individual exposure to the PSS scheme (i.e.
the number of grades during which the student received the subsidy) by grade 4
and the average share of pupils benefiting from the PSS scheme in the schools at-
tended by a student in grades 1 to 4. Second, we estimate specification (3.2) on
the sub-sample of cohorts never exposed to the PSS (i.e. those starting primary
education before 2005). In both cases, coefficients are similar to those coming from
the main specification and, if anything, in the case of reading they are slightly larger
49These controls are not included in the baseline specification because they are not available for
the year 2002 and are missing for some schools in other years. In this regression specification, we
assume that the teaching staff in 2002 is the same as that observed in 2003, so as not to drop one
year of observations.
50The receipt of the subsidy is conditional upon schools developing a pedagogical plan that
outlines how additional funds are used to improve learning outcomes and upon allowing for an
external evaluation of the results achieved. See Santiago et al. (2013) for more information.
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(Appendix Table 3.B.2, columns 3 and 5).
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Table 3.B.1: Effect of the FSD on test scores including teacher controls
Linear specification Non parametric specification
FE2 FE2 FE-IV2 FE-IV2 FE-IV2 FE-IV2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Reading
Years under FSD 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Years under FSD = 1 0.022 0.023
(0.015) (0.015)
Years under FSD = 2 0.030** 0.032**
(0.014) (0.014)
Years under FSD = 3 0.114*** 0.115***
(0.021) (0.021)
First stage coefficient 0.720*** 0.723***
(0.005) (0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 24416.41 24689.20 5265.46 5244.84
N. of students 596108 578112 596108 578112 596108 578112
B. Mathematics
Years under FSD 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Years under FSD = 1 -0.015 -0.012
(0.016) (0.016)
Years under FSD = 2 -0.002 0.001
(0.016) (0.016)
Years under FSD = 3 0.058** 0.060***
(0.023) (0.023)
First stage coefficient 0.720*** 0.723***
(0.005) (0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 24294.13 24506.65 5278.70 5253.62
N. of students 596281 578281 596281 578281 596281 578281
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teacher-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the effect of the FSD on reading and mathematics test scores. Estimates in columns (1),
(3) and (5) are based on the specification with baseline controls. Student-level controls include: gender, age at school
entry, as well as the attendance rate and the status (pass or repeat) at the end of grade 1. School-level controls include
averages of the students’ characteristics at the school level, as well as enrollment and average class size. Estimates in
columns (2), (4) and (6) include also controls referring to teachers’ characteristics when the students attend grade 1.
Specifically, they are the share of female teachers, teachers’ average age and the share of teachers with an education
degree. The treatment in specifications FE2 is actual years of exposure to the FSD by the end of grade 4, while in
specifications FE-IV2 is instrumented with the exposure a student would experience had he/she never transferred out
of his/her first grade school. Standard errors are clustered at the school level and are reported in parenthesis.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 3.B.2: Effect of the FSD on test scores - robustness checks
No infrastructure funds PSS
Reading Mathematics Reading Mathematics Reading Mathematics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years under FSD 0.020** -0.001 0.027*** 0.011 0.026** 0.002
(0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
Number of students 379449 379691 596020 596190 291057 291085
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 9202.99 9259.78 21528.75 21474.33 11287.84 11198.08
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table presents the results from a set of specifications that check the robustness of the main estimates of
the effects of the FSD on test scores. All specifications include school and year fixed effects, and actual exposure to
the FSD is instrumented with the exposure a student would accumulate had he/she never transferred from the school
where he/she attended first grade. In columns (1) and (2), specification (3.2) is estimated on the sub-sample of pupils in
the master sample who start first grade in schools that did not receive public funds for expanding their infrastructure.
In columns (3) and (4) specification (3.2) is enriched with two additional controls, on top of those listed in the notes
to Table 3.5: individual exposure to the Preferential Subsidy Scheme (PSS) policy by grade 4 and the average share
of pupils benefiting from the PSS in the schools attended by the student in grades 1 to 4. In columns (5) and (6)
, specification (3.2) is estimated on the sub-sample of cohorts never exposed to the Preferential Subsidy Scheme (i.e.
cohorts starting primary education between 2002 and 2004). Standard errors are clustered at the school level and are
reported in parenthesis.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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3.C Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 3.C.1: Evolution of the number of subjects relative to 1 year before the FSD
adoption
(a) Spanish (b) Mathematics
(c) Foreign languages (d) Tutorials and workshops
(e) Sport (f) Total n. of subjects
Notes: Panels (a) to (f) plot coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence intervals, from the event
study specification outlined in (3.1). The FSD is adopted in event-year 0 and coefficients show
how different the number of subjects taught is in event-year p relative to event-year -1, which is
taken as the reference year. The sample consists of all schools where students in the master sample
enrolled in first grade. All specifications include school, grade and calendar year fixed effects, as
well as their interactions. Standard errors are clustered at the school-grade level.
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Figure 3.C.2: Evolution of transfers relative to 1 year before the FSD adoption
(a) Transfers out of the school (b) Transfers into the school
(c) Net transfers (in-out)
Notes: Panels (a) to (c) plot coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence intervals, from the event
study specification outlined in (3.5). The FSD is adopted in event-year 0 and coefficients show how
different the number of transfers in grades 1 to 4 is in event-year p relative to event-year -1, which
is taken as the reference year. The sample consists of all schools where students in the master
sample enrolled in first grade. All specifications include school and calendar year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 3.C.3: Evolution of class size relative to 1 year before the FSD adoption
Notes: The figure plots coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence intervals,
from the event study specification outlined in (3.5). The FSD is adopted in event-
year 0 and coefficients show how different the average class size in grades 1 to 4
is in event-year ρ relative to event-year -1, which is taken as the reference year.
The sample consists of all schools where students in the master sample enrolled
in first grade. All specifications include school and calendar year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Table 3.C.1: Characteristics of students in the master sample who do and do not
transfer
First grade FSD Exposure
Academic Performance
Attendance Repetition Real Potential
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Do not transfer between grades 1 and 4 94.64 0.02 0.52 0.51
Transfer between grades 1 and 4 93.44 0.05 1.35 0.42
Notes : Columns (1) and (2) show the average attendance rate in grade 1 for students
in the master sample and the fraction of them who repeat grade 1, distinguishing
pupils who never transfer between grades 1 and 4 from those who transfer. Columns
(3) and (4) display their average actual exposure to the FSD by grade 4 as well their
average “potential” exposure, i.e. the years of exposure a student would experience
had he/she never transferred out of his/her first-grade school.
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Table 3.C.2: Support received by students outside of school
Help with homework Tutoring
from household
head and head’ spouse
1 = Yes Hours 1 = Yes Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No university 0.328 0.462 0.050 0.123
University 0.484 0.717 0.119 0.280
Observations 6205 6205 2671 2671
Notes : The table shows the amount of support that stu-
dents receive outside of school, depending on whether
they live in a household where one among the household
head and the head’ spouse has some university educa-
tion (row “University”) or not (row “No university”).
The units of observation are the households heads and
their spouses (in households where these is at least one
child aged 5-18) when the question is whether they pro-
vide help with homework. The units of observations
are pupils aged 12-18 (younger children are not inter-
viewed) when the question is whether they receive tu-
toring outside of school. Information is drawn from the
2015 Chilean Time-Use Survey (Encuesta nacional sobre
uso del tiempo).
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Table 3.C.3: Frequency of mathematics homework
A. All schools
No FSD FSD
(1) (2) (3)
Every class 20.04% 11.80%
Almost every class 50.39% 39.35%
Some classes 28.42% 46.33%
Never 1.15% 2.51%
N. of Teachers 3294 18494
B. Schools that had not adopted
the FSD by 2011
2011 2013
No FSD FSD
Every class 22.51% 18.81% 7.95%
Almost every class 51.88% 52.10% 31.82%
Some classes 24.50% 28.34% 59.09%
Never 1.11% 0.74% 1.14%
N. of Teachers 902 808 88
Notes: The table reports information about the fre-
quency of mathematics homework, drawn from the 2011,
2012 and 2013 waves of the teacher surveys administered
alongside the SIMCE test. Panel A compares the fre-
quency of homework in schools with and without the
FSD. Panel B focuses on schools that had not adopted
the FSD by 2011 and compare homework frequency in
2011 and 2013. In 2013, schools are divided according to
whether they switched to longer schedules by that year
(column 3) or not (column 2).
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Table 3.C.4: Differences in school autonomy between public and charter Schools
Public schools Charter schools
(1) (2)
Textbook use 98 100
Courses content 30 63
Courses offer 70 97
Formulate budget 18 96
Allocate budget 52 97
Hire teachers 28 98
Fire teachers 11 97
Set starting salaries 2 88
Increase salaries 2 91
Observations 62 85
Notes: The table reports the percentage of schools
in which the principal, the teachers or the governing
body have a considerable responsibility over the listed
tasks. Information comes from the 2006 and 2009
school surveys administered alongside PISA tests. The
sample consists of all public or charter schools in the
Chilean PISA sample that also offer primary educa-
tion.
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Table 3.C.5: Evolution of teacher related inputs relative to 1 year before the FSD
adoption
Contract HH. Teaching HH. Contract HH.N. of Classes
Teaching HH.
N. of Classes N. of Teachers
Contract HH.
N. of Teachers
Teaching HH.
N. of Classes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Event-year -5 6.507 8.355 -1.838*** -0.861* 0.239 -0.285 -0.058
(9.269) (8.588) (0.710) (0.489) (0.289) (0.253) (0.266)
Event-year -4 6.712 8.316 -1.198* -0.481 0.222 -0.309 -0.209
(8.060) (7.596) (0.622) (0.396) (0.257) (0.209) (0.223)
Event-year -3 -3.556 -1.857 -1.058*** -0.850*** -0.115 -0.262 -0.187
(6.566) (6.063) (0.360) (0.325) (0.214) (0.165) (0.198)
Event-year -2 1.630 1.301 -0.539** -0.451* 0.073 -0.085 -0.072
(4.568) (4.302) (0.252) (0.242) (0.150) (0.115) (0.137)
Event-year 0 25.898*** 26.016*** 2.570*** 2.222*** 0.297* 0.921*** 0.871***
(5.359) (5.119) (0.334) (0.280) (0.160) (0.139) (0.149)
Event-year 1 69.697*** 65.191*** 5.473*** 5.148*** 0.832*** 2.567*** 2.325***
(6.157) (5.886) (0.342) (0.318) (0.186) (0.161) (0.180)
Event-year 2 77.471*** 72.651*** 6.323*** 5.891*** 0.951*** 2.912*** 2.636***
(6.671) (6.254) (0.375) (0.340) (0.199) (0.192) (0.212)
Event-year 3 75.693*** 72.580*** 6.638*** 6.289*** 0.777*** 3.339*** 3.102***
(7.754) (7.170) (0.437) (0.392) (0.235) (0.226) (0.245)
Event-year 4 80.204*** 76.055*** 7.345*** 6.837*** 0.815*** 3.674*** 3.303***
(8.578) (7.968) (0.507) (0.456) (0.261) (0.264) (0.284)
Event-year -5 · no-fee charter -21.642 -20.688 -0.014 -1.378 -0.490 0.060 -0.640
(19.645) (16.428) (1.369) (1.127) (0.624) (0.598) (0.621)
Event-year -4 · no-fee charter -17.450 -18.870 0.019 -0.933 -0.118 0.066 -0.384
(14.774) (12.779) (1.046) (0.865) (0.478) (0.473) (0.550)
Event-year -3 · no-fee charter -5.987 -3.150 0.213 0.244 0.184 0.229 0.320
(11.892) (11.005) (0.861) (0.777) (0.411) (0.415) (0.450)
Event-year -2 · no-fee charter -20.465** -20.247** -0.978 -0.876 -0.543* 0.167 0.119
(9.075) (8.880) (0.624) (0.580) (0.316) (0.354) (0.397)
Event-year 0 · no-fee charter -11.967 -9.823 -0.261 0.359 0.077 -0.754** -0.370
(10.717) (9.832) (0.778) (0.714) (0.328) (0.338) (0.353)
Event-year 1 · no-fee charter -12.675 -11.155 -1.068 -0.645 0.654 -1.804*** -1.331***
(13.391) (11.319) (0.798) (0.736) (0.415) (0.379) (0.413)
Event-year 2 · no-fee charter 0.834 -1.541 -0.223 -0.166 1.058** -1.553*** -1.221**
(13.714) (11.724) (0.826) (0.791) (0.426) (0.435) (0.488)
Event-year 3 · no-fee charter 19.009 14.212 0.236 0.174 1.549*** -1.475*** -1.147**
(15.902) (14.086) (0.961) (0.877) (0.493) (0.489) (0.536)
Event-year 4 · no-fee charter 45.435** 40.769*** 1.375 1.244 2.308*** -1.464*** -1.122**
(17.756) (15.615) (1.065) (0.973) (0.547) (0.536) (0.571)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of school-years 18765 18765 18538 18538 18765 18765 18765
Notes: The table reports coefficients from a richer version of the event study specification outlined in (3.5) where calendar year fixed
effects and event years are also interacted with a dummy Ds taking value 1 if the school is a no-fee charter school, and 0 otherwise.
The FSD is adopted in event-year 0 and coefficients show how different total contract hours, teaching hours, contract hours per class,
teaching hour per class, total number of teachers, contract hours per teacher and teaching hours per teacher are in event-year ρ relative
to event-year -1, which is taken as the reference year. The sample consists of all schools where students in the master sample enrolled
in first grade. All specifications include school and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. *, **
and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 3.C.6: Teachers opinion about the FSD
Public Schools Charter Schools
(1) (2)
Good or very good 44.99% 54.44%
Not bad, not good 32.99% 29.89%
Bad or very bad 22.02% 15.67%
Notes: The table reports the opinion of teachers about the FSD, di-
viding them according to the school (public or charter) in which they
teach. Information is drawn from the 2005 wave of the Encuesta
Longitudinal Docente implemented by the Centro de Microdatos of
the Universidad de Chile.
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